Examining the dynamic cascading of international norms through cluster genealogies. 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and Other Cases by Sumita, Benita
 University of Bradford eThesis 
This thesis is hosted in Bradford Scholars – The University of Bradford Open Access 
repository. Visit the repository for full metadata or to contact the repository team 
  




EXAMINING THE DYNAMIC CASCADING OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS  
THROUGH CLUSTER GENEALOGIES 
 















submitted for the degree of 




Division of Peace Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences  








Title: Examining the dynamic cascading of international norms through 
cluster genealogies 
Keywords: Constructivism; Internal Displacement; Norm Cascading; 
Replication; Particularization; International norms; Multilateral Agreements; 
UNSCR 1325, Chemical Weapons Convention; 1998 UN Guiding Principles 
 
In 1998 the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were developed 
following years of crises faced by the millions of people experiencing forced 
displacement, especially those internally displaced. These Principles were 
widely considered to be precedent setting, both historically and normatively. 
However, the examination of the construction of the international norms that 
underpin the Principles indicates that there are important epistemological 
weaknesses in widely used constructivist frameworks that understand 
normative shifts in international relations. They are critiqued as being 
impedingly linear, temporally compressed and analytically obstructive in its 
agent-centric view of norm cascading. This research aims to address some 
of these gaps with an enhanced life-cycle model using cluster genealogies 
and the processes of replication and particularization. The reformulated 
framework is tested for robustness and feasibility using two preliminary 
cases – UNSC Resolution 1325 and the Chemical Weapons Convention. It 
is then used to conduct an in-depth original analysis of the development of 
the 1998 UN Guiding Principles. The findings in the case of the Guiding 
Principles show, for example, that though the acceptance of the IDP 
definition was a big leap, the replication and particularization of human rights 
limits the humanitarian scope of the Guiding Principles, and also brings into 
question existing humanitarian protection of IDPs under the Geneva 
Conventions. Meanwhile, rooting them in ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ has 
not shifted the community of states’ intersubjective take on sovereignty, but 
it has added to the existing normative tension – individual vs. state – that 






This thesis would not have been possible without the persistent 
encouragement of my husband, Danny Geevarghese, and support of my 
parents. I am also extremely grateful to my supervisor Prof. Owen Greene 
who has been patient with me, and constructively detail-oriented on my 
work. A special note of thanks goes to Prof. Jim Whitman with whom I 
began my PhD, and to my doctoral colleagues and friends, Roberta Holanda 
Maschietto, Susan Flämig, Sarah Njeri and others who spent many many 
hours deliberating ideas with me. I am also thankful to the Brookings 
Institute for allowing me to access their unarchived data on the Guiding 
Principles, and to Dr. Roberta Cohen for helping me to find them. Finally, I 
would like to dedicate this thesis to Libby Kerr who is sadly no longer with 
us. We have had many conversations about the internal displacement crisis 
that pushed me to dig deeper into its development and normative 
framework. I am deeply indebted for all the support and encouragement I 















Table of Content 
 
Abstract         ii 
Acknowledgement        iii 
List of Major Figures and Tables      vi 
Chapter 1: Introduction to Thesis      1 
1.1. Research Purpose       1 
1.2. Hypothesis and Question      2 
1.3. Order and Change in International Anarchy   3 
1.4. Locating Internal Displacement     5 
1.5. Research Strategy       11 
1.6. Chapter Outline       17 
 
Chapter 2: Denaturalizing the Construct of International Norms 20 
2.1. Constructivism: A Useful Framework for this Research  20 
2.2. What Are Norms       23 
2.3. Tenets of Constructivism in International Studies   44 
2.4. Conclusion        49 
 
Chapter 3: Examining the Life Cycle of International Norms  51 
3.1. International Norms Emerge and Develop: A Life Cycle Begins 52 
3.2. Norm Emergence: The Beginning     53 
3.3. Norm Cascading: The Tipping Threshold    56 
3.4. Internalizing Norms: Completing the Life Cycle   73 
3.5. The Gaps: Missing Dynamics of Norm Development  74 
3.6. Conclusion        82 
 
Chapter 4: Dynamic Norm Cascading: An Enhanced Theoretical  
Framework         85 
4.1. Scope of the Enhanced Framework     86 
4.2. Dynamic Norm Cascading Framework    90 
4.3. Applying the New Enhanced Framework    117 
 
Chapter 5: Preliminary Testing of the Enhanced Model  126 
5.1. Case I: UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325  127 
5.2. CASE II: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)   155 
5.3. Reflections on the Application of the Model   175 
 
Chapter 6: Internal Displacement: From Crisis to Norm Creation 178 
6.1. Internal Displacement: The Crisis     178 
6.2. The Development of International Norms on  
 v 
Internal Displacement       179 
6.3. Meaning, Power and Legitimacy by Replication and  
Particularization        203 
6.4. Conclusion         212 
 
Chapter 7: Dynamic Norm Cascading of Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement        214 
7.1. Stage 2 – Unpacking the Guiding Principles   216 
7.2. STAGE 3: Re-examining Internalization in Colombia  274 
7.3. Change and Order through the Guiding Principles  283 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion       290 
8.1. Formulations on the Enhanced Theoretical Framework  291 
8.2. Theoretical Contributions      293 
8.3. Contributions to Knowledge in Preliminary Case Studies  298 
8.4. Findings from In-depth Study on the Guiding Principles  306 
8.5. Considerations for Future Research     316 
 
Bibliography         317 
 





























List of Major Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Stages of Classic Norm Life Cycle    52 
Figure 2: Enhanced Life Cycle of International Norms   89 
Figure 3: Norm Ecosystem of the Guiding Principles   272 
Table 1: Analytical Matrix of the processes in Enhanced Model 91 
Table 2: Chronology of Dynamic Norm Cascading of UNSCR 1325  153 
Table 3: Chronology of Dynamic Norm Cascading of CWC 1993 173 
Table 4: Analysis of the Drafts of Guiding Principles   200 
Table 5: Analysis of the Guiding Principles    205 
Table 6: Chronology of Dynamic Norm Cascading of  









INTRODUCTION TO THESIS 
 
“We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public 
attitudes towards the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of 
morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents.”  
- Former UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, 1991 
(as cited in Cohen and Deng 1998: 1) 
 
1.1. Research Purpose 
A positive shift in attitudes towards the masses of displaced populations and 
their protection is what former UN Secretary General de Cuellar is referring 
to, especially to those internally displaced. Before the end of the millennium, 
the shift in attitude resulted in the establishment of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement. Thomas Weiss and David Korn (2006: 
9-10) said, “It is hard to imagine an idea that is better than IDPs to illustrate 
the importance of crucial changes in discourse and reframing of possible 
solutions to international challenges.”  
 
Weiss and Korn claim that the Westphalian paradigm of sovereignty and its 
guarantees of non-intervention did not stand up to the challenges posed by 
the increasing number of human rights violations. “The efforts” that led to the 
creation of the international norms on internal displacement and other 
associated institutional arrangements enabled the normative understanding 
of sovereignty to “adapt,” “evolve and transform” as sovereignty as 
responsibility (Weiss and Korn 2006: 6). This Kuhnian (1970) assertion of a 
dominant paradigm being replaced by a new one is problematic. This 
research questions and critically examines exactly this claim – have the 
norms that apply to situations of internal displacement paradigmatically 
shifted the normative framework of international relations to soften its stance 
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on sovereignty? This thesis argues that the normative shifts attributed to the 
quiet adoption of the Guiding Principles are not paradigmatic, but 
nevertheless dynamic and more complex than have been understood.  
 
To examine and develop this claim, the core of this research is centered on 
unpacking and critically examining the international cascading of the norms 
of the Guiding Principles. Here the thesis traverses two paths – one is in 
examining and (re)understanding the normative foundations of the Guiding 
Principles to better comprehend its cascading impact on international 
relations. This path of inquiry backtracks to the other, and therefore has to 
be dealt with first – it involves critically examining theories of norm 
development in the constructivist framework for which they are known to be 
academically robust in the field of international relations. This examination 
leads this thesis to propose a revised theoretical framework of norm 
development rooted in unpacking the ontology and epistemology of norm 
cascading – a revision that is based on and inspired by Finnemore et al’s life 
cycle model.  
 
1.2. Hypothesis and Question 
The theoretical examination leads this thesis to propose that:  
Constructivist accounts of how norms spread and develop are deficient in 
terms of the mechanisms by which these processes occur. Norm cascading 
is more dynamic and multi-dimensional. Norms extend their reach and 
reinforce their power and legitimacy through replication and particularization 
before state acceptance and adherence, and do not merely cascade through 
state acceptance and adherence. 
 
Two questions guide this present research. The first question is: How do 
international norms cascade before state acceptance and adherence? The 
second, and equally important question relates directly to the case of the 
Guiding Principles: What are the normative underpinnings of the Guiding 
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Principles, and how have they cascaded within existing international 
normative structures?     
 
Thus this present research sets out to achieve two objectives. The first is the 
development of an enhanced life cycle model that would enable a deeper 
examination of norm development and cascading as dynamic and complex 
processes. The revised theoretical framework enables the second objective, 
which is a multi-dimensional study of the Guiding Principles to better 
comprehend its normative significance – both in terms of impacting change 
and maintaining order. The enhanced model is also tested on other 
international norms to substantiate its robustness, and that of the research 
proposition. Before concluding this introduction with an outline of our 
research strategy, the next two subsections sets some background on our 
overall approach.   
 
1.3. Order and Change in International Anarchy 
This research tends to take a broadly constructivist approach, and its 
associated theories, because this approach appears to be most useful for 
understanding the social and normative dimensions of international 
relations. Constructivism may be seen as relatively new in the field of 
international relations – a quarter of a century – compared to its 
predecessors such as realism, liberalism and others. But it quickly captured 
the much-needed ontological and epistemological space, first in international 
relations, that was hungry for a deeper and more nuanced understanding of 
social relations. The 1980s saw the growing influence of constructivism as 
the most predominant post-positivist theory. Titles that begin with the 
‘constructivism of...’ or ‘constructivism in...’ or ‘construction of...’ are aplenty 
and infiltrate many disciplines.  
 
Constructivism aims to explain and explore the world beyond its visible, 
observable material resources and capacities – an exploration of social facts 
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or norms. It is to move away from a causal explanation of the world 
determined by materialistic individuals driven to act to meet their selfish 
ends and aspirations, as enabled or constrained by their material 
circumstances. This is not to say that humans are not driven, deterministic, 
selfish or aspirational. This also does not imply that a material world does 
not exist. Knowing social reality in a post-positivist sense is to know how 
people know their world; in a constructivist sense it means to know how 
people construct their world, and in turn constructed by it.  
 
At the global level, constructivism looks at how states construct international 
relations, and in turn is defined and characterized by it. Ontologically, 
constructivism is about the construction of social reality and 
epistemologically, it is about the social construction of knowledge (Onuf 
1989). In a constructivist understanding, social reality, in the international 
relations context, is that of order and stability and the study of the underlying 
structures that enable the maintenance of this reality. To understand how 
this order and stability is constructed would involve a study of how actors in 
the international system understand order and stability; i.e. construct 
meaning collectively, which is indicated by social knowledge or social facts, 
about their social reality.  
 
Herein lies the most interesting aspect of the theoretical framework of 
constructivism for our purposes – in that it not only helps to understand 
order and the equilibrium of social coexistence, but also understands that 
change is possible without tipping or disrupting the existing equilibrium. 
Constructivist scholars provide models1 that explore the path and process of 
                                                        
1
 Here are some of the proponents of the theories of constructivist international relations: 
Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998), International norm dynamics and political change, 
International Organization, Vol.52 No.4, pp.887-917; Björkdahl, A. (2002), Norms in 
International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections, Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, Vol.15, No.1, pp.9-23; Risse, T., Ropp, S.C. and Sikkink, K. 
(1999), The power of human rights: international norms and domestic change, Cambridge: 
CUP; Florini, A. (1996), The evolution of international norms, International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol.40 No.3, pp.363-389; and others 
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change. However, a critical engagement with the theoretical literature 
reveals that, as can be seen in chapter 3, these models, though ground 
breaking, demand further development. 
 
For instance, the life cycle model of Finnemore and her associates that is at 
the focus on this research does not explain change and order – an important 
theoretical dimension of constructivism. In fact, change itself is limited to 
state acceptance and adherence to an international norm. This 
understanding is far too simplistic and reductionist, and also where this 
thesis’ specific focus originates.  
 
It was in trying to understand how internal displacement and the Guiding 
Principles were conceptualized to fit the international social fabric that led 
this research to dig deeper into what change, if any, was brought about by 
this construct, and if and how any shift in order may have been experienced 
due to this change. But the existing constructivist frameworks were deficient 
in explanatory purchase. A small but conceptually and theoretically 
significant gap needed to be addressed. This is not only a theoretical 
contribution, but also strengthens the empirical contribution to knowledge 
with a better understanding of internal displacement and its normative 
framework.  
 
1.4. Locating Internal Displacement 
Internal displacement is perhaps one of the most complex protracted 
emergencies of our times. It is thus ironic that in addressing crises of 
internal displacements, these situations are, more often than not, responded 
to, even today, as they were humanitarian in nature – in need of basic 
materials to survive. In so doing, the complexity of internal displacement is 
overlooked and misunderstood by these very humanitarian responses. Mark 
Duffield (2001: 208) explains this best in his book on global governance and 
new wars as he writes about the case of internally displaced Southern 
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Sudanese in 1990s, “…during the course of the 1990s, UN agencies, donor 
governments and NGOs, albeit unintentionally, complemented state aims 
and facilitated the desocialization and subordination of displaced 
Southerners. Part of the reason…is the inability of aid policy to address 
political complexity.”  
 
This misunderstanding is deepened further when human rights is 
manipulated to conform to existing humanitarian responses instead of 
changing and conforming practice to reflect human rights (Duffield 2001: 
222). The concept of Internal displacement is, as are the millions of people 
categorized as internally displaced, caught between the boundaries of 
national sovereignty, growing international human rights web, and nascent 
international laws. Owing to this complexity the international community 
often address situations of internal displacement with a humanitarian 
response, leaving long-term issues unaddressed.  
 
Independent, neutral, non-state entities and organizations, such as the 
International Red Cross, are always welcome to provide unconditional 
humanitarian assistance without any judgment. Internal displacement is one 
of the many tragic conundrums of our times because though it may seem 
like a primarily and physically an internal situation, it is still one that requires 
solutions and responses from the international community. Internally 
displaced people need support and assistance not only as a humanitarian 
response, but also in ensuring long-term retributive and restorative 
responses to violations of their human rights.  
 
Francis Deng (2001: 143), the first UN Special Representative of the 
Secretary General on IDPs, called this ‘the paradox of the well fed dead’: 
“The tendency in the international community is to respond to the crisis with 
humanitarian relief assistance, with little or no attention given to protection. 
Internal displacement is indeed a humanitarian issue, but it is also a human 
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rights concern. If we are to avoid the paradox of the “well fed dead,” it is 
critical that assistance be closely linked to protection.” However, the 
question remains as to whether the Guiding Principles have addressed the 
protection gap or not. And if they have, then how have the Guiding 
Principles impacted the understanding and practice of other international 
norms, such as sovereignty or humanitarianism.  
 
These normative complexities make internal displacement and its Guiding 
Principles an ideal focus for this thesis. Displacement has been a constant 
concern since we have had violence and wars, yet it is only as recently as 
1998 that the international community accepted a body of principles to guide 
them in their responses to situations of internal displacement. This body of 
principles too is not new; the world was not agreeing to revolutionary 
normative changes in 1998, they were only recognizing – not even formally 
adopting – existing international norms and other legal provisions that can 
be applied in the situations of internal displacement specifically. So if there 
are normative and legal provisions that are already applicable to situations 
of internal displacement and the protection of the rights of the internally 
displaced, what normative shifts did the Guiding Principles bring about? 
Abdul Malik, who has been internally displaced for over two decades, may 
be asking a similar question. “I know that we are still looked upon as second 
class citizens here,” said Abdul Malik to a reporter in early 2013 about his 
host community in the northwestern district of Puttalam in Sri Lanka.2  Malik 
is one of over 75000 Muslim Tamils displaced in 1990 in the conflict ravaged 
island nation. Unlike the over 90,000 Sri Lankans accounted for as 
displaced by the International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) in 
early 20143 who were perhaps displaced for a number of years, Malik has 
                                                        
2
 IRIN (2013) Sri Lanka’s Muslim IDPs 25 Years On, Irin: The Inside Story on Emergencies, 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/97297/briefing-sri-lanka-s-muslim-idps-25-years-on, 21 
January 2013, accessed on 10 June 2014 
3
 IDMC, Sri Lanka: Country Profile, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 
http://www.internal-displacement.org/south-and-south-east-asia/sri-lanka/, accessed on 10 
June 2014 
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been displaced for most part of the Sri Lanka armed conflict, and now post-
conflict conflict phases – that adds to over 25 years. So Malik and most of 
the 75000 Tamil Muslims forced out of their homes in 1990 by the then 
emerging group LTTE – Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – have spent a 
quarter of their lives as displaced, and second-class citizens in their own 
country.  
 
Malik, and those in similar protracted situations of displacement are far 
beyond being just labelled internally displaced; they are structurally and 
systemically displaced within the boundaries of their own country that has 
the responsibility to ensure their rights as citizens be upheld. A few tens of 
thousands who have taken refuge in Puttalam have registered as having 
returned but are reportedly finding it understatedly difficult to rehabilitate 
socially and economically. In a report at the end of the 2013, the IDMC 
reported, “Tens of thousands of Muslims expelled from the north by the 
LTTE in 1990 have registered as having returned, but in reality they are 
thought still to be living in their places of refuge in Puttalam or alternating 
between Puttalam and the north for want of adequate assistance. They have 
struggled to re-establish livelihoods and access housing and land in either 
place. Some who said they would prefer to integrate locally in Puttalam have 
been unable to register as residents there” (IDMC 2013). This complex, and 
more often than not protracted, situation of internal displacement is the 
reality of people like Malik not only in Sri Lanka, but also in Kashmir, 
Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine, Bosnia, Kurdish regions of Iraq, 
border regions of Lebanon, Syria and many such countries and regions of 
blurry boundaries. 
 
Fifteen years since the quiet adoption of the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement in 1998, and the number of IDPs has increased year-on-year. 
Over 33 million people were internally displaced due to conflicts and 
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violence alone as of January 2014.4 Of this, 10 million remain unprotected 
and unassisted. This means that at least 10 million internally displaced 
people do not even have access to humanitarian support. In 2014 alone, the 
Syrian conflict has forced close to 9 million people out of their homes and 
unable to return within their own country. Setting up humanitarian corridors 
was one of the primary tasks of those who met for peace talks led by UN 
representative Lakdhar Brahimi. This too was unsuccessful. This is not to 
say that the normative framework on internal displacement is not considered 
effective enough to be accepted as a response to the appalling situations of 
those forcibly displaced. But it still begs the question as to why it has not 
become the normative force behind people, groups and organizations trying 
to help, support and protect IDPs.  
 
But the High Commissioner of the Office of Human Rights, Zaid Raad Al 
Hussein feels the human rights situation is not all bad as suggested in his 
remarks at a October 2014 press conference, “Human rights are now being 
upheld in more countries than ever before. It seems to me that the broad 
trajectory of humanity is a positive one, and that in an increasing number of 
communities and countries, all human beings are seen as fully equal in 
dignity, and their rights are largely observed… Credit for that should go to all 
those countless brave and committed men and women – civil society, 
activists, journalists, lawyers, state employees and politicians – who over the 
decades have eventually succeeded in firmly rooting international human 
rights norms in their societies.”5  
 
Though it seems contradictory in the light of the plight of hundreds of 
thousands who are displaced within their own home countries, 
Commissioner Al Hussein is right in identifying a “positive trajectory.” He has 
                                                        
4
 Figures are drawn from the International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC).  
5
 OHCHR (2014), Press Conference Statement by United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15173&LangID=
E, accessed on 2 January 2015 
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rightly credited people for it. The world in which human rights seem all so 
natural and the only way to exist and co-exist is only a few decades old. It is 
rooted far back in history but in its intersubjectively collectivizing 
international normative form, it is still only in the first leg of its journey, 
making a “positive trajectory” a big step in the right direction.  
 
Michael Freeman (2011: 15), in a recent edition of his book on Human 
Rights suggests that there are two views to the origins of this human 
construct. “According to one view, the concept of human rights had little 
history before the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. On this view, 
the history of human rights would be the history of the UN concept. A more 
common view is that the contemporary concept of human rights has a much 
longer history. The view is better, because it enables us to investigate the 
historical and philosophical bases of the modern concept.” This research 
agrees on both views put forward by Michael Freeman in that human rights 
is a human construct that dates back centuries and millennia, but for the 
purposes of this research it would be prudent to go back as far as the 
establishment of the United Nations, which having accepted the second 
view also means that any UN human rights conceptualization is deeply and 
richly rooted in history and philosophy. 
 
But in the short period of time since the establishment of the UN, there has 
been a proliferation of human rights or rights-based norms, including the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Does the increasing number of 
human rights norms signal an inherent weakness in its normative framework 
that new norms need to be constructed to keep human rights alive? What is 
their purpose? And how can their impact and normative significance be 
studied? Though some may believe that there is a general optimistic shift 
towards upholding and protecting human rights, grievous violations and 
infractions still persist. So if adherence to norms is not a guaranteed 
measure of continued existence of human rights, then what is? There is a 
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piece missing in our understanding of how human rights norms structurally 
persist in practice and policy, which lies in the examination of how norms 
cascade outside the perspective of state acceptance and adherence. 
 
1.5. Research Strategy  
There are two pillars to the research strategy used in this thesis: one is the 
case study of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, and the other 
is the epistemological building of mid-level theory that supports the case 
study. The constructivist theoretical framework is used as the foundation. A 
review of the constructivist literature on the concept of norms and its 
development not only proves that the framework is ideal for this research, 
but also helps to identify existing gaps or weaknesses and formulate a way 
to address them. Existing constructivist theories of international norms take 
a linear approach to understanding the development of an international 
norm without exploring linkages to existing international normative 
structures. The theories imply a unidirectional and synchronic process of 
norm development primarily dependent on state acceptance and adherence. 
But it is a more dynamic and diachronic process – a development process 
over time. Therefore the thesis then aims to construct a mid-level theory, 
which is inspired by Finnemore et al’s life cycle model, but enhanced to 
address some of the weaknesses and examine norm cascading more 
dynamically. There is an added strategic layer that helps to fortify both the 
case study and the mid-level theoretical framework pillars: this is inclusion of 
preliminary test cases.  
 
They are:  
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) 
- Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) 
 
Preliminary testing helps in three ways: it demonstrates how the renovated 
life cycle model can be applied, it reveals any strengths, weaknesses or 
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difficulties in applying such a model, and it also provides an opportunity to 
adjust or rectify the model. There are also three reasons for the choice of 
these preliminary test cases, as elaborated in the following subsection. 
 
1.5.1. Case Choices  
(i) Common Organizational Platform 
Both cases exhibit the significance of an organizational platform to launch or 
formalize the emergent norm. An existing or new organizational platform is 
an important element in the constructivist framework of norm development. 
The preliminary cases chosen here both originated at the United Nations. 
This makes the level of analysis in each case similar thereby ensuring 
consistency in the preliminary testing phase, making the deeper testing of 
the Guiding Principles more concrete, valid and reliable. 
 
(ii) Indicators of replication and particularization 
Each of the preliminary test cases have elements of broader understandings 
of human rights or have borrowed from existing norms, conventions and 
laws – sometimes in meaning and sometimes in practice, and sometimes in 
both. However, while drawing from existing international norms, the 
emerging norm also particularizes the focus of its purpose more specifically.  
 
For instance, UNSCR 1325 addresses a very broad issue of protecting the 
rights of women in situations of violence and conflict, increasing women’s 
role in peacebuilding and maintaining peace. As stated in the resolution, it 
draws on existing international norms of the Geneva Conventions, Additional 
Protocol II, Refugee Convention, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and even the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. However, the resolution also aims to 




(iii) Spectrum of legality 
An important differentiating factor was also a determining factor for the case 
choices – the type of international norm. Here the type is identified within a 
spectrum of legality. The two cases vary in their legal nature. Resolutions 
are not expressly referred to as an instrument of the United Nations in its 
Charter but it has become a preferred choice of instrument. “Resolutions are 
the common legal instrument for an organ or body to make a 
recommendation or statement, recall a fact, express an opinion, or 
undertake any other matter of substance” (Gruenberg 2009: 481). 
Therefore, a UN Security Council resolution has direct legal standing. 
However along the spectrum of legality, UNSC resolutions may fall behind 
conventions and treaties that are considered hard laws, such as the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.  
 
The purpose of this research is not to investigate the level(s) of effectives of 
international norms, legal or otherwise. But it is perhaps necessary to justify 
the choice of the test cases that falls at different points along the spectrum 
of legality from soft to hard law. It is clear from the three cases chosen here 
that each has some legal status because they reiterate existing norms that 
are already international laws or have the standing of international law. The 
debate that arises here is whether cases with varying levels or nature of 
legality can be tested with the same consistency. The short answer is yes. 
The longer explanation, as Finnemore (2000: 703) argues, raises the lack of 
distinctiveness of legal norms. “What distinguishes legal norms from other 
norms is simply not clear” in their effectiveness or the influence they exert. 
Therefore the degree of legality of the cases chosen here does not impede 
on the investigation into development of international human rights norms.   
 
1.5.2. Data Sources 
This research relies on archive documents – primary and secondary sources 
– and two interviews. During the very early stages of this research, Mr. 
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Dennis McNamara, then Director of the Internal Displacement Division of the 
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was 
contacted. Though the interview is not used in the thesis, it was formative. 
The second was an email interview of one question with Dr. Roberta Cohen 
of the Brookings Institute and a crucial member in the development of the 
Guiding Principles. She is aware, in no uncertain terms, that her answer to 
this one question will be used in this thesis. 
 
With regard to data sources, secondary information was accessed on the 
UN’s extensive and systematic online library. These include draft 
resolutions, final resolutions, statements made by member countries and 
more. But from my reading of the available literature on internal 
displacement and the development of the Guiding Principles, it became 
clear that the UN archives does not have all the documents relating to the 
development of the normative framework on internal displacement, 
especially documents on the preliminary legal discussions and debates, 
confidential memos, exchanges between various experts, organizations, 
state representatives and practitioners in the field.  
 
Though several books made references to these documents, they were not 
available in the UN archives – online or in print. So the search for these 
documents began by contacting several authors, and staff at UNHCR, 
OCHCHR, and the UN archives and Francis Deng himself. Each person 
took this researcher a step closer to the information. It was clear that the 
early paper trail on the development of the Guiding Principles were not 
officially archived anywhere. The search that began in June 2011 finally led 
to the documents in April 2012 at the Brookings Institute in Washington D.C. 
where it was still sitting in four cardboard boxes, yet to be archived. It is 
thanks to Roberta Cohen who located the unarchived data trail.  
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The documents found at Brookings dated back to the early 1980s, and these 
included: 
i. Normative debates and discussions between legal and non-legal 
experts looking at how to draft the GPs based on existing 
international laws and norms 
ii. Notes and summaries from several roundtable discussions 
organized by various governments and non-governmental bodies 
iii. Statements made by individual UN member-states 
iv. Notes and briefs from the meetings of the UN inter-agency task 
force on IDPs 
v. Several early drafts of the GPs with comments, reservations and 
notes from experts, organizations and member-states 
vi. Preliminary reports on IDPs by the International Law Association 
with their draft of the GPs 
vii. Internal communication – letters and faxes – between Mr. Deng, 
Ms. Cohen and various UN agencies, government and non-
government representatives on aspects of the principles and 
internal displacement 
viii. Individual lobbying strategies implemented to promote the scope, 
nature and need for the GPs with UN member-states 
ix. Several preliminary studies on human rights, humanitarianism and 
internal displacement  
x. Draft resolutions tabled at the UN Commission of Human Rights, 
ECOSOC, the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council 
xi. Notes, reports and statements from the Refugee Policy Group 
(RPG) where Ms. Cohen was a senior adviser at the time 
xii. Newspaper reports on the initial stages of the development of the 
Guiding Principles 
 
These original primary documents together with the archived material 
collected through the UN library make for a rich and concrete research. 
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Before going on to the chapter-wise outline of this research, this section 
ends with a brief elaboration of the research agenda.  
 
1.5.1 Three-fold Research Agenda 
The strategy set out in this research enables to fulfill a three-fold agenda, as 
follows: 
 
Theoretical – In deliberately examining the cascading of international norms 
before state acceptance and adherence through an enhanced and revised 
model, this research is aptly situated to explore and expand the theoretical 
boundaries of constructivism from the mid-level, revealing a more dynamic 
and complex development of norms than has thus far been understood.  
 
Empirical – Three international norms are examined using the revised model 
– UNSC resolution 1325, Chemical Weapons Convention 1993 and the 
1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. These cases have 
thus far not been studied in this manner, which make them concrete 
contributions to knowledge and the constructivist literature. More 
importantly, understanding the embedding of internal displacement and its 
normative framework within the broader international structure of norms is of 
particular importance to this research.  
 
Policy Practice – The broader aim of this research is to be the first step in an 
attempt to understand the intricacies of the policy development process(es) 
at the international level, particularly at the United Nations. It is one step 
towards the direction of looking at how international policy development 
balances the push towards consensual change within the gravitational pull 
for order, stability and sense of security amongst the community of states. 
The nexus of change and order and their inter-linkages are revealed in the 
case studies.  
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1.6. Chapter Outline 
The thesis begins in chapter 2 with an ontological and epistemological 
exploration and denaturalization of the concept of norms across disciplines – 
from philosophy, politics to sociology and economics. It reveals the socially 
constructed nature of norms, though they seem to exist naturally. It also 
reveals their significance in understanding, on the one hand, order, 
coexistence and cohesion and, on the other hand, change; one concept but 
twin nature. This chapter aims not only to contribute towards building the 
theoretical background to the thesis, but also to develop a definitional table 
on the concept of norms (see annex). The table enables a cross-disciplinary 
comparison of the features and characteristics of norms, and leads to 
revealing striking similarities. This is especially significant in understanding 
normative international relations that display quite the family resemblance.  
 
This is followed by a critical examination of the constructivist theories of 
international norms in chapter 3. Starting with a brief exploration of the 
origins of the school of constructivist thought, its foundations and tenets, the 
chapter lays the groundwork to study better and deeper the theoretical 
framework and its challenges with special emphasis on Finnemore et al’s life 
cycle model. Revealing gaps in the theoretical framework, the thesis argues 
that constructivist accounts of how norms cascade are deficient in terms of 
the mechanisms by which these processes occur. Norm cascading is more 
dynamic and multi-dimensional. Norms extend their reach and reinforce their 
power and legitimacy through replication and particularization before state 
acceptance and adherence and do not merely cascade through state 
acceptance and adherence. 
 
Chapter 4 sets out the mid-level theoretical framework, and develops the 
key stages. It develops a revised and improved model based on the 
Finnemore and associates’ life cycle framework. The revised model does 
not abandon the life cycle structure, but reworks and adds to it to give it the 
 18 
potential to examine norm development in complex and dynamic ways. 
Stepping back from the linear life cycle perspective, the reformulated 
framework proposes to study the development of international norms in 
three stages. The first stage starts where the life cycle model does – with 
the norm entrepreneur, the immediate events and occurrences that lead to 
the emergence of a norm. In addition to this synchronic analysis, this stage 
also examines the norm to identify broad norm clusters or groups.   
 
These clusters are examined genealogically in an effort to situate the case 
under study within existing norm ecosystems. This will allow a better 
understanding on how norms are embedded, and how a specific cluster may 
have evolved through processes of replication and particularization. At the 
end of this stage, the analysis reveals change and order, which have been 
classified as catalytic and cyclical change. The genealogical probing is 
substantiated with quantitative indicators of state acceptance, as used in the 
classic model. The final stage of the revised model turns back to the life 
cycle framework’s focus on internalization. Here a country is chosen to 
better assess how a norm is internalized.   
 
UNSC Resolution 1325 and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention are 
the case studies used to test the new framework in chapter 5. Preliminary 
testing helps in three ways: it demonstrates how the renovated life cycle 
model can be applied, it reveals any strengths, weaknesses or difficulties in 
applying such a model, and it also provides an opportunity to adjust or 
rectify the model. This chapter flows from one case study to the next, 
starting with the UNSCR 1325. Each case is tested in three stages, as 
developed in chapter 4.  
 
There are several reasons for selecting these two test cases. They 
represent different types of international norms and normative instruments, 
allowing this present research to examine the extent to which the model can 
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be used to test the development and spread of any type of international 
norm. Meanwhile, the cases touch on different areas of international 
relations. While UNSCR 1325 relates to issues on women, peace and 
security, CWC relates to the non-use of chemical weapons. This also adds 
to the robustness of testing, as the model and hypothesis can then be 
applied to different normative spheres, and across norm ecosystems 
demonstrating the dynamic nature of norm development and life. Finally, the 
test cases chosen are theoretically of varying degrees of legal obligation and 
adherence. Many scholars have argued that the degree of legality of an 
international normative instrument bears little weight on its application or 
realization, and it is more a question of perception and accepted 
understanding within the international community (Kratochwil 1989; 
Finnemore 2000; Abbott, Keohane, et al. 2000; Whitman 2010). This thesis 
will not delve into the impact of the legal nature of a norm on its 
development or life, except to note its legal standing within the international 
community as one of several potentially relevant factors. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 are dedicated to the examination of the Guiding Principles. 
These chapters are the crux of the thesis. Chapter 6 focuses on stage one 
of the model that examines the synchronic view of the development of the 
norm. This original analysis of the development of the Guiding Principles 
aims to offer nuanced insights into the development of the Principles by 
studying the original documents, including a thorough examination of the 
various drafts of the Principles to understand its evolution better. The 
penultimate chapter examines the Principles through stages two and three 
of the revised model. It reveals the dynamic nature and processes of 
cascading of the clusters of norms the make up the Principles. The in-depth 
examination will reveal the normative underpinnings of the Principles, what it 
means, and how it constructs internal displacement and IDPs. The 
concluding chapter 8 will bring together the research findings and future 
research implications.  
 20 
CHAPTER 2. 
DENATURALIZING THE CONSTRUCT OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
 
Reason is not in the world, we impose it on the world. 
Immanuel Kant 
 
This chapter is a precursor to the critical examination of constructivist theory 
of international norms that will be discussed in the next. Here we review the 
nature of the theoretical framework of constructivism, its tenets, and its 
central element – norms. The examination of this key ingredient of 
constructivism, and its theories in relation to international norms will help to 
lay out some of the limitations of the latter, especially in understanding norm 
cascading in a dynamic way, and in particular cascading that is not limited to 
state adherence. In turn, this enables the thesis to outline a mid-level 
theoretical response to a better examination of norm cascading, as will be 
detailed in chapter 4.   
 
2.1.  Constructivism: A Useful Framework for this Research 
The post-positivist turn in international relations – away from the codification 
of patterns of interaction between states (Carr 1964: 13), and their rational-
choice assumptions based on material or observable dimensions of self-
interest and power – paved the way for debates6 (Maghrooni 1982; George 
1989; Brown 2001) that looked for ways to understand the international 
interaction of states beyond materialism and methodological individualism 
(Checkel 1998). Here constructivism emerged as “the fastest growing 
oppositional movement with IR theory” (Brown 2001: 52). Through 
conceptual elaboration and sustained empirical analysis (Price and Reus-
                                                        
6
 The first great debate took place between the realists and idealists in the beginning of the 
20
th
 century. It focused on the central concept of international relations. By mid-century, the 
ontological debate shifted to an epistemological question of how to study international 
relations between the traditionalists and behaviourialists. It is the third debate that criticized 
the lack of a normative perspective.  
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Smit 1998), those promoting a broadly constructivist approach were not only 
able to conceptualize social facts or norms, but also to contribute to 
understanding their role in international relations.  
 
2.1.1. Nature of Constructivism  
Ontologically, constructivism is about the construction of social reality, and 
epistemologically, this leads to the social construction of knowledge (Guzzini 
2000). However, constructivists are also ontological realists because they 
believe in the existence of a material world (Wendt 1999). The difference is 
that they understand the material world as being determined by the meaning 
ascribed to it by agents – how an idea constitutes the material – making it 
ideational yet dual in ontology. They capture a middle ground from which 
“reality exists independently from our accounts, but does not fully determine 
them” (Adler 1997: 324).  
 
As one of the constructivist pioneers, Onuf (1989: 38), said: “We construct 
worlds we know in a world we do not.” This means that constructivism tries 
to understand how actors or agents understand the world they are in – their 
social reality – by studying their behaviour as well as their discourses. This 
in turn means, studying what guides behaviour by exploring collective 
shared understandings – normative structures and norms – and how they 
come about. Constructivism aims to explain and explore the world beyond 
its visible, observable material resources and capacities. It is to move away 
from a causal explanation of the world determined by materialistic and self-
interested individuals. This is, however, not to say that agents are not 
driven, deterministic, selfish or aspirational. This also does not imply that a 
material world does not exist, or that materialism does not have its 
explanatory purchase. 
 
Drawing primarily from the field of sociology and the works of Durkheim 
(1898), Weber (1949) and Giddens (1979), constructivists offer “alternative 
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understandings of a number of the central themes in international relations 
theory, including: the meaning of anarchy and balance of power, the 
construction of state identity and interest and the relationship between them, 
an elaboration of power, and the prospects for change in world politics” 
(Hopf 1998: 172).  
 
As Fierke (2007: 167) summarizes, constructivists “emphasis the social 
dimension of international relations and the possibility of change.” 7 
Constructivist pioneers, such as Nicholas Onuf (1989), Friedrich Kratochwil 
(1989) and Alexander Wendt (1987, 1992, 1999) laid out the early 
foundations of the social dimension of international relations. These first 
constructivists did not cross paths though their works put forward similar 
ideas.   
 
Onuf (1989) is credited with coining the name of the theory – constructivism 
– though in his own book he claims that the philosophical underpinnings of 
constructivism are not his alone. His constructivism – heavily indebted to 
Anthony Giddens – focuses on rules – informal as well as legal rules – as 
the theoretical middle between understanding social relations and structures 
or social facts. Meanwhile, Wendt (1992, 1995 and 1999) focused on the 
creation, recreation and reproduction of state identities in international 
relations and how they depend on shared knowledge and collective meaning 
                                                        
7
 This is not to say that constructivists form one united theoretical framework. There are 
various kinds of constructivism (Reus-Smit 2009), and also degrees of constructivism that 
ranges from conservative or conventional, to critical and radical (Hopf 1998). In its systemic 
form, constructivism focuses solely on the interaction of states. At the unit-level form that 
looks at the “relationship between domestic social and legal norms and the identities and 
interests of states.” Bringing the two forms together is the holistic approach. This form 
“treats the domestic and international as two faces of a single social and political order” 
(Reus-Smit 2009). The degrees of constructivism varies primarily in the approach adopted – 
foundationalism or anti-foundationalism – by conventional and critical constructivist. 
Conventional constructivists are interested only in discovering identities and their 
associated social practices that can then explain certain actions. Meanwhile critical 
constructivists are not only interested in discovering identities but also understanding how 
these identities came to be accepted as truth.  
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that are constituted by the fundamental structures of international politics, 
which are social and not strictly material.  
 
Kratochwil’s constructivism is epistemological, which uses rules and norms 
– terms he uses interchangeably – as a means to understand political life 
and its analysis (Zehfuss 2002). He sees the international system as an 
“artifice of man-made institutions, such as, not limited to states. In general 
institutions are settled or routinized practices established and regulated by 
norms” (Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994: 222).  
 
2.2. What Are Norms 
The prevalence of structures of social knowledge and social practices that 
are common to an international system is neither a recent phenomenon nor 
a recent discovery. They were also characteristic of the ancient civilizations 
– including code of Hammurabi, laws of Babylonia and Assyria and many 
more. Historical research has shown that civilizations that have grown to a 
certain level of cultural prominence also develop simultaneous relations with 
the outside world “that soon take the shape of a whole system of institutions” 
(Korff 1924: 246-247).  
 
Korff (1924: 249) uses institutions to mean practices that include 
international law, moral ideas and conceptions. In his view, moral ideas and 
conceptions would “crystallize” into a system of international law over time. 
A normative perspective on international relations has clearly been prevalent 
in the discipline since the early twentieth century, but perhaps not as widely 
accepted as with constructivism.  
 
Constructivism may have made international norms an intellectual trend 
since the 1990s, but its conceptual foundations have been borrowed heavily 
from sociology, anthropology, political science and even psychology. In 
international relations, the study of norms is most prominent in the areas of 
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international organizations, international political economy, regime theory 
and the behaviour of states domestically. However, there is no agreed upon 
definition of the term norms; in fact there is no agreed upon usage of the 
term itself. This is not a discouraging aspect in any way; it only indicates the 
complex and dynamic nature of norms; and the fact that a range of variants 
and ‘schools’ of constructivism have developed. 
 
Various constructivists use different terms to refer the same concept – 
norms are sometimes referred to as rules, or values, or social institutions. 
For instance, Onuf and Kratochwil use norms and rules interchangeably. 
Kratochwil (1989: 10) claims that “while all norms are directives, not all 
directives function like norms, and while all rules are norms, not all norms 
exhibit rule-like characteristics.” Definitions 8  range from norms being 
characterized as commands, values, and facts to standards of behaviour, 
institutions and more. At a metaphysical level, norms can be described as 
the impermissibility of inferences of whatever complexity from “is” to “ought” 
(Brandom 1979), and ought to is.  
 
2.2.1. Tracing Norms from Early Philosophers 
Concerns about the normative order of society permeated and were 
embedded in not just the debates on the constitution of society but the ideal 
constitution of society as deliberated in Plato’s (1894, 2000) The Republic to 
Hobbes’ Leviathan and Pufendorf’s (1729) On the Law of Nature and 
Nations. The early philosophers were elucidating the essentials of the co-
existence of a group of humans under a sovereign power through the 
observance, exercise and application of social, moral and legal norms.  
 
Though the nature, function and development of norms were not in their 
immediate and explicit scope of exploration, the normative bounds of co-
                                                        
8
 A table of definitions on norms across disciplines is included in the Annex. 
 25 
existing were ubiquitous in, for instance, Plato’s (1894, 2000) inquiries on 
the just behaviour of man; or Hobbes’ (1962) design and definition of a 
commonwealth structured by the laws of a sovereign, their observance by 
man and the performance of the covenant for fear of punishment; and Kant’s 
exploration of the Foundations (or Groundwork) of the Metaphysics of 
Morals and Metaphysics of Morals where he asserted that it was a moral 
requirement for rational human agency to conform to categorical 
imperatives. Ecclesiastical as these inquiries may sound, these philosophers 
were modeling the reasons and justifications for the rational existence of 
man – both moral and legal – in a social setting that not only allowed for the 
survival of man in his natural form as free and equal but also cooperatively 
with, and not infringing upon the existence of, other free and equal men. 
Much of this thinking followed on from the pre-existence of natural, and 
sometimes divine, law and its binding character as the ultimate source of 
normative order in the nation-state system.  
 
These early philosophers could be categorized into naturalist and non-
naturalist schools of thought. The difference in the two schools essentially 
rooted in the acceptance of norms as natural facts or not. Even within the 
naturalists, there are ontological and epistemological differences. In Hobbes’ 
(1962) understanding, the state of nature could only exist as the anarchy of 
free wills with no laws or sovereign authority to coordinate the coexistence 
of men. This was because Hobbes believed that “every private man is a 
judge of good and evil actions” and therefore would not necessarily agree 
with each other or nothing pressurizing – civil law or authority – them to 
agree with each other on good and evil actions in the state of nature.  
 
But for a naturalist like Pufendorf (1792: 3), the state of nature can reveal 
dos and don’ts for human social behaviour. Socialized humans then 
imposed standards or “modes” of behaviour that have been extracted from 
experience of what is onto the existing natural state of being. The purpose of 
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modes was for “the guiding and tempering the freedom of voluntary action, 
and for the procuring of decent regularity in the method of life” (Pufendorf 
1792: 3). Immanuel Kant took a similar line of thought on human social 
behaviour. For Kant (1964: 21), the imperatives of social behaviour – what 
he called “categorical imperatives” – were a priori. They could not be learnt 
from experience but were instinctual or led by pure reason; similar to 
Pufendorf’s natural normative order.  
 
The early Western thinkers were not focused on norms per se, but 
concerned themselves with the behaviour of humans, behaviour that would 
promote “normative” order. The philosophers were not referring to the act or 
behaviour alone; they were referring the “right” kind of behaviour. They were 
referring to the nature of human behaviour; such as just, good, right, 
appropriate and so on. Therefore it was not enough that behaviour could be 
described in “a way in which we in fact regulate our conduct.” It was 
necessary that “they make claims on us; they command, oblige, recommend 
or guide” (Korsgaard 1996: 8). These were claims laden with moral weight 
or values that translate into behaviour that ought to be followed. These 
standards of behaviour were not just acts to be followed, but it was the 
nature of the acts that enabled social co-existence by adhering to the right 
behaviour.  
 
2.2.1.1. From Normative to Norms 
According to early Western philosophers, this standardized social co-
existence created normative order. Focused on the moral weight and value 
of human behaviour, much of the early deliberations on human social 
behaviour did little to understand norms but explained the normative as “a 
special realm of fact that validates, justifies, makes possible and regulates 
normative talk, as well as rules, meaning, the symbolic and reasoning. 
These facts are special in that they are empirically inaccessible and not part 
of the ordinary stream of explanation” (Turner 2010: 1). However the 
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philosophical concerns of normative order provided the twentieth century 
legal philosophers, legal theorists and other social scientists with a good 
foundation to address norms in a more direct and explicit manner. 
 
Legal philosophers, such as Hans Kelsen (1991: 2), described norms as 
commands that institute values. “The Ought – the norm – is the meaning of 
a willing or act of will, and – if the norm is a prescription or command – it is 
the meaning of an act directed to the behaviour of another person, an act 
whose meaning is that another person (Or persons) is to behave in a certain 
way.” It means that one can express a will as an obligatory action on the 
part of another’s behaviour. This act of will has also to be recognized either 
through experience or observation. As an obligation,  there is always the 
possibility of non-conformity. And to Kelsen, a norm that stipulates a certain 
behaviour thereby making it obligatory also creates a value. Following 
Kelsen’s magnum opus – The General Theory of Norms – there was scant 
legal and economic attention to the study of norms until the mid-1990s. 
 
Among the few who did examine this from an economic perspective, Adam 
Smith adopted a rationalist approach to understanding what he called ‘rules 
of conduct’. These were “the only principle by which the bulk of mankind are 
capable of directing their actions” by “continual observations” that “lead us to 
form to ourselves…what is fit and proper either to be done or to be avoided.” 
Smith’s concern was mainly economical in that he thought it was in the best 
interests – read beneficial for – of man to follow the rules of conduct. He 
indirectly points to social regularities that are formed through continual 
observation; similar to the understanding of the new norms scholars (Smith, 
as cited in Coase 1976: 7-8).   
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The new norms scholars,9 as Richard McAdams (1997) called them grew 
through the 1990s. They tried to rationalize the cooperative social behaviour 
of humans. The overarching view was that there were “informal social 
regularities” individuals felt “obligated to follow because of an internalized 
sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both” 
(McAdams 1997: 340). Meanwhile, the social nature of norms has been the 
core of investigation and study for sociologists for decades. 
 
2.2.1.2. Norms of Right Behaviour to Social Norms of Coexistence 
From the narrow focus on proper and dutiful behaviour, sociologists delved 
into broader and tougher questions not just about human social behavior, 
but also more importantly about what held societies together? George 
Homans (1951: 121), identifying the glue of societies as norms, defined 
them as “ideas in the minds of the members of a group…” Meanwhile, some 
like Elliot Aronson (2007: 19) defined “conformity” of human social behaviour 
as “a result of real or imagined pressure from a person or group of people.”   
 
Unlike Homans or Aronson who did not state the purpose of norms, Talcott 
Parsons (1966: 18-19) points out, “they have regulatory significance for 
social processes and relationships… Norms are primarily integrative; they 
regulate the great variety of processes that contribute to the implementation 
of patterned value commitments.” But according to Max Weber not every 
social action was normative, in that it had social character.  
 
Weber’s (1971: 77) social action could be classified as a norm only if “the 
actor’s behaviour is meaningfully oriented to that of others.” The infusion of 
meaning, not just value or moral weight, into the concept of norms opened 
                                                        
9
 The new norms scholars include Robert Ellickson (1991), Lisa Bernstein (1992), Robert 
Cooter (1994, 1996, 1998), Dan Kahan (1997, 1998), Lawrence Lessig (1995, 1998), 
Richard McAdams (1995, 1997), Randal Picker (1997), Eric Posner (1997, 1998a, 1998b) 
and Cass Sunstein (1996b). 
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up a whole new avenue of sociological understanding of societies. Anthony 
Giddens (1979), quite aptly, called this meaningful human social behaviour 
structures. They were not just standards of behaviour or social practices in a 
society; or institutionalized approaches and responses in a society. But they 
also relate “on the one hand to the constitution of meaning, and on the other 
to the sanctioning of modes of social conduct” (Giddens 1984: 18).  
 
Milton Rokeach also spoke of institutionalized values along the same lines 
as Giddens. His institutional values were “socially shared cognitive 
representations of institutional goals and demands”. They signify a set of 
standards that make it possible “to be regarded by others as having satisfied 
societally and institutionally originating definitions of morality and 
competence” (Rokeach 1979: 48).   
 
The idea and concept of institutionalization introduced norms into the 
discipline of economics as well through the development of game theory and 
new institutionalism. Within new institutional economics, norms can be 
explained in a top-down and bottom up manner. For instance, Nelson and 
Sampat (2001: 40) explored the dos and don’ts of human socio-economic 
behaviour as “institutions” or “social technologies”. Nelson and Sampat’s 
top-down approach takes social technologies as “institutions, but rather only 
those that have become a standard and expected thing to do, given the 
objectives and the setting.” On the other hand, the bottom-up approach is 
not outcome-oriented but can influence the outcome by social constraints 
that affect the incentives and behaviour of individuals through social 
interaction.  
 
As this cross-disciplinary overview has shown, definitions and descriptions 
of norms vary in many ways, and there is no agreed upon standard. 
However, irrespective of the number of definitions, there are certain 
common characteristics for the broad concept of norms that are be extracted 
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here. Norms are: (i) social imperatives; (ii) identifiable by their friction 
between impulses to freedom vs. imperatives of order; (iii) expressions of 
value; (iv) collective intentions of a critical mass; (v) regular social 
interactions; (vi) instruments of legitimacy and legitimization; and (vii) 
sanctionable. These will help to better understand norms, and its centrality 
in constructivist theories. 
 
2.2.2. Characteristics of Norms 
(i) Of social imperatives 
Norms express oughts – the ideal dos and don’ts of social coexistence. 
These oughts are considered ideal human social behaviour that enables 
social order. It is the belief that following certain dos and don’ts can enable a 
social environment of cordial, non-conflictual and cooperative interaction. 
The belief is not a natural phenomenon but develops around a constructed 
meaning, which Weber (1971: 77) explains as, “not every type of contact of 
human beings has a social character; this is rather confined to cases where 
the actor’s behaviour is meaningfully oriented to that of others.” Giddens 
(1984: 18) more directly refers to norms as the “constitution of meaning,” in 
that they create meaning and are the language of social interaction. 
Practices and norms around state sovereignty and human rights – explored 
in later chapters – are a couple of instances.  
 
Both Weber and Giddens indicate that a norm is a social imperative only if it 
is authoritatively meaningful. For a norm to be authoritatively meaningful, it 
has to not only be meaningful to the individual performing the normative act 
or following normative practice, but it also has to be understood and 
recognized as such by others within a specific social context. Both Weber 
and Giddens point to the intersubjective nature of a norm, as a related 
characteristic of the social nature of an imperative. 
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However, it should be noted here that meaningful social order is not a zero-
sum situation. There can be degrees of oughtness, with expectations of 
regularity and consistency in behaviour that become embedded over time 
(Geortz and Diehl 1992). Societies or social groups do not crumble or 
descend into disorder at the slightest deviation from the meaning or 
standard behaviour. Reality can vary in degrees from what ought to be, 
especially because norms form a complex and dynamic web of social 
imperatives that conflict and coexist. This does not mean that social order 
does not exist, but that there is room for flexibility.  
 
Giddens (1984) is clear on this point when he relates norms to constitution 
of meaning wherein “constitution” can be seen as a process of negotiating 
the social language of human behaviour, and not the act in itself. A similar 
proposition was provided by Homans (1951: 124) who said, “Our norms are 
ideas. They are not behaviour itself, but what people think behaviour ought 
to be.” This leads to the second characteristic of interest vs. imperative. 
 
(ii) Impulses of interest vs. imperatives of order 
Central to this characteristic is agency, which Geortz and Diehl (1992) say is 
difficult to determine because it is not easy to entangle norm-like behaviour 
from actions of self-interest. But Geortz and Diehl’s observations need to be 
qualified by the distinct definition of agency where intention is not the same 
as capability. Agency is not identified with the intention of the agent or state 
but with the capability to carry out an act and the conscious effort in doing so 
(Giddens 1984). Intention is only secondary to an agent’s capacity to choose 
to follow a normative practice, which may or may not be in conformity with 
self-interest. In social psychology, this is understood as living “in a state of 
tension between values associated with individuality and values associated 
with conformity” (Aronson 2007: 13), such as accepting or rejecting asylum 
seekers for the benefit of one’s own domestic affairs.  
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Pufendorf (1729: 3) characterizes the tension as “…tempering the freedom 
of voluntary action…” while Kant (1964: 15) notes that norms – he calls 
them categorical imperatives – “command everyone without regard to his 
inclinations…” Recent academics, like Aronson (2007: 19) refer to this 
tension as “real or imagined pressure” or an exertion of influence over 
behaviour independent of the beliefs of individual actors (Thomson 1993), or 
“the propensity to feel shame…” (Elster 1989: 105) This pressure or tension 
compels one to consider foregoing self-interest for the larger social interest 
because they are not always “coterminous” (Geortz and Diehl 1992: 637), 
thereby creating an obligation.  
 
(iii) Expressions of value 
Despite the tension, norms have power of persuasion and they compel 
certain accepted and expected behaviour. The compelling force comes from 
meaning associated with the norm, the obligation, and the value attached to 
it. This essential feature of norms has spawned centuries of thinkers and 
scholars concerned with the right and appropriate behaviour of man to the 
imperatives of social order. Even international relations scholars, such as 
Adler (1991: 60) highlight this importance: “Values are mixed with varying 
amounts of knowledge, beliefs and expectations because our judgments of 
what should be are related to our judgments of what is.” For instance, values 
placed around international peace and security compel certain collective 
understandings and actions. 
 
His conceptualization of values is borrowed from Milton Rokeach (1973; 
1979), who explored human values from a sociological perspective. 
According to Rokeach (1979: 48-50) individual and institutional values are 
equally important. Individual values are those “socially shared cognitive 
representations of personal needs” whereas institutional values are “socially 
shared cognitive representations of institutional goals and demands”. 
Therefore Rokeach’s values, as shared by Adler, is not only about standards 
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of socially accepted behaviour and expectations, but it also signifies an 
intersubjective nature, as a set of standards that makes it possible “to be 
regarded by others as having satisfied societally and institutionally 
originating definitions of morality and competence”. 
 
Value judgments are evaluations expressed through the self-imposed 
compliance with normative order as against the impulse to freedom. Though 
it is an expression of internally self-imposed compliance, it is linked 
externally to the result of understanding and recognizing the complex 
interconnected structures of meaning which enable social order and 
interaction. Sunstein (1996: 916-917) differentiates the types of values that 
can arise from complying with norms. There could be “intrinsic value” in 
choices a person makes.  
 
For example Sunstein illustrates that whether to exercise by jogging or 
playing squash depends on which the individual values, as more fun or 
healthier. Meanwhile, being seen playing squash could augment the status 
of the person indicating a “reputational value”. In addition to how people 
would like others to perceive them and measure their standing in society, 
there is “self-conception value” (Sunstein 1996). The image an individual 
would like to project and would like others to believe is also an image the 
self has to conceive. According to Smith (Coase 1976: 7), humans should 
not have any trouble in projecting a magnified self-worth, “we are all 
naturally disposed to overrate the excellencies of our own character.” 
 
However, some influential philosophers have viewed the value-expressing 
characteristic of norms through a lens of morality. Though this view has 
strong leanings to moral philosophy, these scholars include philosophers 
like Plato and Kant to contemporary thinkers and academics such as 
Nietzsche, Kelsen, Rokeach and others. “…The judgment that some 
behaviour is ‘valuable’ or ‘has value’ (and in this sense, is ‘good’) means 
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that this behaviour – as modally indifferent substrate – is decreed to be 
obligatory in a norm, is the content of an Ought.” What Kelsen (1991: 61) 
explains here is that norms can incline or obligate people to behave in the 
appropriate manner because of its value or as Rokeach (1979: 50) notes, 
behave in ways that “…have satisfied societally and institutionally originating 
definitions of morality and competence.” 
 
But as the legal academic Michael Perry (2000) asks in an article titled, 
“What is morality anyway?” Though Perry argues back and forth 
inconclusively between the religious and non-religious basis of morality, his 
core idea is that morality is a reason for deciding for or against a behaviour. 
By vesting morality with the weight of reason, it would seem that while value 
is related to the consequence of a norm, its morality stems from the origin of 
the norm – a sense that morality is unconditional. In Kant’s understanding, 
“Reason is shown, not merely in understanding the situation or in 
recognizing the quality of the completed action, but in willing the action as 
an action of a certain kind…” (Paton 1947: 87)  
 
In this sense, most norms can be considered moral and all norms can 
contain or exhibit expressions of moral value upon reflection and experience 
rather than to burden all norms or standards of social interaction to be 
predisposed to morality. The measure of value – moral or otherwise – 
ascribed to norms could also vary for different individuals which does not 
question the norm per se, but reflects the kind of tension or obligation that a 
person feels and the specific context of the social situation.  
 
(iv) Collective intentionality for a critical mass 
One of the overarching features thus far has been the social and collective 
nature of norms. Though norms guide individual behaviour, they have 
meaning and value only in a social context. Individual beliefs and routines 
may not be considered normative unless they reach or achieve critical mass 
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through acceptance. This is also a crucial theoretical point in constructivism 
that will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
Critical mass is first and foremost a quantitative factor. It demonstrates the 
extent of the norm’s acceptance, but it does not mean that the norm will be 
adhered to or followed. Secondly, it is a formal indicator of collective 
intention. Therein also lies the challenge – not all norms are formal, 
expressly documented and or formalized by signatures and ratifications. And 
in some cases, normative practices exist, perhaps in different forms, long 
before they are actually formalized. For instance, sovereignty and state 
practices and understandings around it have been around long before it was 
formalized as non-interference in the internal matters of member states in 
the early Hague Conventions and then the UN Charter.  
 
The critical mass of a norm can also accumulate over time. The increasing 
acceptance of norms is one way to indicate their legitimacy and power. 
Adhering to norms also situates and reiterates identity within a social group. 
Conforming to the standards of behaviour that are collectively understood 
because of a common meaning creates and/or reiterates a sense of social 
belonging. This also means that members of a group are able to expect 
others’ behaviour, responses and reactions in specific social situations 
because the person belongs or is considered to belong in the group. And 
being able to not only understand and share social meaning but also make 
meaningful social expectations is the essence of regularity.  
 
(v) Regularity of social interactions 
Regularity of social interaction is reflected in the pattern of behaviour, as 
indicated in Pattaro’s (2000a) definition of norms, or what Giddens (1979) 
identifies as institutionalized approaches and responses in society. 
Characterized as creating social imperatives or standards of social 
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interaction that regulate human social behaviour, norms also enable 
patterns of regularity or patterns of expectations.  
 
This is not to say that regularity implies rigidity or an unchanging social 
order. Change or the possibility of change is part of the normative order. For 
instance, slavery was the norm until the early nineteenth century when the 
abolitionist movement formed and gained momentum. This led to its 
abolition, civil liberties and equal rights for all, which are the norms today. 
Meanwhile slavery exists in other forms, such as bonded labour or human 
trafficking. Regularity is characteristic of a norm, but do not determine or 
create the norm. It is indicative of the possibility of social interactions given 
its accepted and shared nature. When regarded as a regularized or 
regularizing, a normative order can also be considered normal. 
 
Scholars like Thomson (1993) define norms as behaviour that is considered 
“normal” amongst a collective with a caveat that all normal behaviour are not 
norms. In Thomson’s understanding, constant repetition can only be 
considered normal and not normative – a distinction “between the is and the 
ought”. Other authors have pointed out that definitions within disciplines 
such as sociology “stress regularity, normality and uniformity,” foregoing 
normativity (Björkdahl 2002). Regularity, normality and uniformity are 
characteristic of repetition, not normativity. Other like Kelsen (1991) and 
Raymond (1997) also agree. According to Kelsen, when a practice is 
considered normal it is in a mode of is. On the other hand, when a practice 
is normative, it is in the mode of ought. He argues that an ought cannot 
logically follow from an is.  
 
(vi) Legitimacy and legitimation 
Norms imply legitimacy, quite often indistinguishably. As Ian Hurd (1999: 
381) notes, legitimacy is “the actor’s perception” that a rule ought to be 
obeyed. Though conceptually this definition seems quite similar to the 
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definitions of norms, they are not one and the same concepts. Legitimacy 
characterizes norms, and is not conceptually same. Legitimacy can be 
defined as the parameter of authority. As a concept, it provides or 
demarcates the limits of what is and is not considered authoritative. Zelditch 
(2001: 33) claims, “…something is legitimate if it is in accord with the norms, 
values, beliefs, practices and procedures accepted by a group.” This almost 
makes legitimacy and norms a natural phenomenon.  
 
Here it may be useful to turn to Weber (1956, 1964) and other sociological 
and psychological explanations of legitimacy as parameters of authority. The 
legitimacy of norms is insignificant if they are not considered so; implying 
that the parameters of authority evolve from the beliefs, values, attitudes 
and degrees of obligation of people. So, legitimacy is not conceptually the 
same as obligation or value though they are linked.  
 
As Weber explains, the most stable and valid (Geltung) order is one that 
“enjoys the prestige of being considered binding, or, as it may be expressed, 
of “legitimacy”.” Here the parameters of authority are conferred by people 
through compliance, conformity, and reproduction through practice. 
Legitimacy is not to be considered a fixed characteristic of norms. The 
parameters of authority can change, fluctuate or cease altogether depending 
on individual, social, economic and political – local and global – 
environments. The process of establishing and re-establishing legitimacy is 
referred to as legitimation that is continuous and evolving. 
 
There are also times when legitimacy stems from authority and/or by self or 
individual. “Central to the idea of legitimacy is the belief that some decision 
made or rule created by…authorities is valid in the sense that it is entitled to 
be obeyed by virtue of who made the decision or how it was made.” This 
explanation by Tyler (2006: 377) refers to the notion of legitimacy by 
authority when people feel obliged to act in a certain or specific way 
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because they have been asked to do so by someone considered to hold a 
role of authority in their social space – parents, teachers, religious or political 
leaders, friends, employers and so on. Kelman and Hamilton (1989) call this 
“authorization”.   
 
This also means that an individual’s own social identity is created and 
reiterated when conforming to or applying norms as discussed above. This 
social identity provides the authority to make decisions and take actions that 
are considered normative. It also means that legitimacy enables authorities 
and individuals to approve and disapprove of human social behaviour by 
applying sanctions – an important characteristic of norms.  
 
(vii) Sanctions for non-conformity 
Adeimantus pointed out to Socrates that though being just is universal and 
honourable, it is not legally binding as is being unjust. Additionally, being 
unjust is punishable, or at the least admonishable; but being just is an end in 
itself. And since there is no reward for just behaviour, Adeimantus was 
implying that it might be easier to seem just and behave unjustly so long as 
there are no legal repercussions (Plato 1894, 2000).   
 
But a person or state could face more than just legal sanctions when not 
conforming to social imperatives. Additionally, signs of approval could also 
be demonstrated for conformity. The “sanctioning of modes of social 
conduct” (Giddens 1984: 18) includes both measures of approval and 
disapproval. In fact, sociologist Homans (1951: 123) goes to the extent to 
define a norm as a “sanction pattern” because norms stipulate behaviour 
that is acceptable and unacceptable. Sanctions on Iraq for the use of 
chemical weapons come to mind here; this instance will be explored in some 
depth in the case study on the Chemical Weapons Convention.  
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This essential element of sanctions raises a contentious and much-debated 
problematic of all norms being laws, and the legality of norms. While some 
debates have deliberated the efficacy of legal norms and whether legality of 
norms matter to their coherence or adherence, other debates delve on the 
need for the distinction between legal and non-legal norms. Not all norms 
are laws, in that they are not legally binding.  
 
Finnemore (2000) questions this very issue when she asks ‘are legal norms 
distinctive?’ She argues in the article of the same title that there is nothing in 
the legal literature to indicate that norms with legal backing are in any way 
more effective than those without, which she refers to as soft law in line with 
references in legal literature. Finnemore used Thomas Franck’s legitimacy 
framework on pull factors of norms to make her case. Factors of 
determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence and adherence were the 
benchmarks for rule legitimacy (Franck 1990). Finnemore’s argument states 
that none of these factors are unique to legal norms. “There is nothing 
specific to legal norms in any of these characteristics. Thus, non-legal norms 
seem to exert power for the same reasons and in the same ways as soft 
laws.” She reiterates that, “What distinguishes legal norms from other norms 
is simply not clear” in their effectiveness or influence they exert (Finnemore 
2000: 703). This present thesis will demonstrate through the case studies in 
later chapters that legality is not a determining factor, at least in the 
development and cascading of norms.   
 
Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter 
and Duncan Snidal (2000) also stop short of creating a distinguishing line 
between international norms and international law in their conception of 
legalization. They place the two concepts along a continuum, also indicating 
that the effectiveness of legal norm is uncertain and yet to be established. 
Based on the defining components – obligation, precision and delegation – 
the authors explore and understand legalization as a process of 
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institutionalization, thereby introducing a temporal dimension to legality in 
the international system and also accepting international norms as powerful, 
if not equally, as international law. 
 
Kratochwil (1984: 345) indicates that laws have three unique qualities. He 
argues, “law is best understood as a special type of rules guiding conduct, 
rather than a set of commands. Secondly, there is a distinction between the 
narrow conception of law as applied by impartial third parties and the wider 
context in which rules are used, invoked and utilized. The third point 
concerns the importance of legal rules for the performance of duties. Law, 
therefore, is not simply a “constraint,” but it also functions to orchestrate and 
thereby facilitate societal interaction.” But he concludes that these unique 
features do not mean that legal norms are more effective than moral norms. 
His inference also indicates that explaining international relations only 
through legal norms does not make it any more scientific than addressing 
norms in general. Therefore too, sanctions are not limited to legally binding 
norms.  
 
Apart from legal sanctions, there are social and value sanctions. Legal 
sanctions are formal or formalized modes of punishment for not conforming 
to the normative order. In addition to legal sanctions, people have to face 
social and value sanctions when they do not adhere to norms. And in some 
instances, even if legal sanctions are not meted out a person might still have 
to face social and value sanctions. Social sanctions are momentary modes 
of expressing approval and disapproval. This could include gestures or 
reactions of approval or disapproval.  
 
Meanwhile value sanctions are judgments of approval or disapproval that 
may last longer that the period of the social interaction. This could include 
isolation, or ostracization, perhaps even after a legal sanction. Unlike legal 
sanctions, enforcement of social and value sanctions does not require a 
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formal authority. Social and values sanctions can be applied and enforced 
by members of a social group. Apart from these descriptive differences, 
there is nothing to say that legal sanctions are more effective than social or 
values sanctions. Together with being a social imperative that is enveloped 
in the pressure of obligation, and lined with expressions of values, the added 
possibility of sanctions – legal or otherwise – can compel people to adhere 
to norms and enable an environment in which social and normative order 
can be maintained. 
 
2.2.3. Norm Typologies 
Norms have also been understood by what action or behavior they can 
enable by distinguishing them into types. One of the most common 
distinctions is between “regulative norms, which order and constrain 
behaviour, and constitutive norms, which create new actors, interests and 
categories of actions” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Regulative norms 
are often seen as constraining; though they could be understood as limiting 
the means through agents can act.  
 
Ruggie (1998) gives a more detailed analysis of the difference between 
regulative and constitutive rules. Drawing on Rawl’s (1955) distinction 
between justification of a practice and justification of a particular action, he 
claims that regulative rules or norms are intended to have causal effects 
whereas constitutive norms “define the set of practices that make up a 
particular class of consciously organized social activity – that is to say, they 
specify what counts as that activity” (Ruggie 1998: 871). However this does 
not mean that constitutive rules can be reduced to the parts that make up its 
constitutive nature. The individual parts will not have value or meaning apart 
from the whole.  
 
Further categorization into evaluative and prescriptive norms are not given 
due importance in the observation of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) though 
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it is their specific oughtness in prescriptive norms that distinguishes it from 
other kinds of rules.  Legal scholars, such as Hans Kelsen, segregate norms 
into individual and general. The former would involve a one-time individually 
specified obligation while the latter would be a norm that “decrees some 
generally specified behaviour to be obligatory” (Kelsen 1991: 7).   
 
Kelsen created a further sub-classification of the general norms into primary 
and secondary norms. While the primary norm creates or stipulates the 
obligatory behaviour, the secondary norm prescribes a sanction for the 
violation of the primary norm. There is no hierarchy or stratification that 
Kelsen was trying to create. In fact, he was clear that primary and secondary 
norms can be individually expressly formulated and that only legal norms 
necessarily required secondary norms. 
 
Geortz and Diehl (1992) classified norms based on their characteristic 
formation. Norms that correspond to self-interest, thus requiring no 
sanctions with minimal deontological component is termed the cooperative 
norm. It is, therefore, in the best interests of all actors involved to adhere 
and comply by the norms. Hegemonic norms differ by their partial conflict 
with self-interest, sanctioning power in the hands of a powerful actor and 
minimal support from affected actors.  
 
This resonates with the normative structure of the United Nations (UN) 
where norms do not always match with the self-interests of state actors who 
may or may not always support the organization of the UN and the values it 
represents and sanctioning power is bestowed in the hands of five powerful 
actors comprised in the Security Council of the UN. Yet the UN is not a 
centralized authority and since the five veto-wielding nations can differ in 
their decisions to impose sanctions or not in any given situation, Geortz’s 
and Diehl’s third norm type is more in line with other constructivist 
characterization of norms. Decentralized norms are always in conflict with 
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self-interest, with diffused sanctioning power, meaning that sanctions are 
dependent on the willingness of individual state actors, and the 
deontological element is crucial. 
 
One of the early pioneers, Kratochwil’s (1984), classification is broadly 
categorised as instruction-type, practice-type and precepts. Along similar 
lines was the classification by Onuf (1998). Based on the degree of 
functionality, Onuf classified rules, as he called norms, instruction-rules, 
directive-rules and commitment-rules. Instruction-rules provided agents with 
information on what they should do in a particular situation based on their 
relation to the world. Directive-rules are different is that they are more 
emphatic, clearly stipulating the penalties for disregarding the norms. 
Commitment-rules are formed once actors or agents involved or 
prospectively wants to be involved in a relationship makes promises thereby 
creating webs of promises creating rights and duties.  
 
However, the most commonly used classification is that of regulative and 
constitutive norms. There is a debate as to whether norms can be both 
types at once. Some like Raymond (1997: 214-215) see a sharp distinction 
between the regulative and constitutive norms and in international relations 
it is the regulative norms that matter more. Because norms are quasi-
authoritative guides that display an image of the state system by their 
capacity to, firstly, “delineate borders”, secondly, “serve as signposts or 
heuristic mental aids to warn policymakers of the prearranged actions that 
various states will take under certain circumstances”, and thirdly, “like 
standard operating procedures, norms routinize many facets of transnational 
relations.”   
 
On the other hand, scholars such Onuf, Wendt and Giddens argue that 
norms are at the same time constitutive and regulative. Giddens (1979: 66) 
claims that, “all social rules have both constitutive and regulative 
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(sanctioning) aspects to them.” Though Onuf (1998: 68) believes that the 
simultaneous constitutive and regulative nature of norms can be a source of 
confusion, he argues, “from a constructivist point of view, all rules are 
always constitutive and regulative.” Onuf contends that following a particular 
norm means that that norm can be strengthened or weakened thereby also 
constituting the norm and the practice of the norm, thereby making it both 
constitutive and regulative. Wendt (1999: 165) also believes that a sharp 
distinction between constitutive and regulative norms can be “a problematic 
assumption.”  
 
Taking the analogy of a master-slave relationship, Wendt stipulates that the 
norm that constitutes the identity of the slave based on the relationship with 
the master also regulates his/her behaviour. Wendt, like Onuf and Giddens, 
believes that norms can have various levels of constitutiveness and 
regulativeness. But, they should determine the kinds of action or practice 
patterns, and not the kind of norm. Most often they are multi-functional – 
they serve to define the boundaries of collectively accepted behaviour and 
expectation thereby identifying actors with common identities defined by the 
shared understanding.  
 
At the same time, norms can enable actors to accept and be accepted into a 
collective by adhering to shared understandings and practices. This means 
that norms can be enabling, regulative and constitutive based on the 
context. The context cannot be determined by the functionality of the norm 
whereas a particular context can determine the nature and function of a 
norm. It is difficult to determine a strict typology of norms based on their 
functionality. A fluid characterization is also preferable, as it lends to the 
complex and dynamic nature of norms, their development and continuity 
over time.  
 
2.3. Tenets of Constructivism in International Studies 
 45 
With the clear view of the centrality of norms in constructivism, and based 
on the review above of the development or understandings and debates 
about norms, this section examines the principles that are foundational to 
the theoretical framework within which this thesis research is broadly 
located. These tenets are the basis on which constructivists, of all degrees 
and types, understand and argue the construction of social knowledge in the 
context of international studies: (i) anarchy is a condition of international 
relations that is determined by the actions of states (ii) state identities and 
relations in international society are determined by shared understandings 
(iii) shared understanding or meaning is constructed intersubjectively (iv) 
agent and structure is mutually constituted and (v) change is possible. Each 
of the tenets has one element in common – norms or social facts. Following 
a brief discussion of the tenets, this chapter delves into the nature and 
characteristics of norms.  
 
(i) Of the Condition of Anarchy 
Anarchy, a defining feature of international relations, has also been a 
guiding factor in mainstream theories. The lack of such a supra-authority 
leads to an eternal situation of competition and conflict or anarchy – a self-
help system that lacks a sense of collective security – is the claim. 
Constructivists refute this realist assumption. Anarchy is not predetermined, 
as realists would have one believe. The absence of a supreme authority 
over all sovereign states does not necessarily imply a constant state of 
competition for power. Constructivists claim that anarchy is a condition of 
international relations that is determined by the actions of states. 
 
Contradicting realist claims, constructivists argue that a pre-given interest in 
survival is not induced simply by the condition of anarchy, and so power 
competition, security dilemmas, and war are not inevitable features of it. 
Unlike the dominant positivist theories of international relations, 
constructivists do not believe that the state of anarchy never changes. This 
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is not to say that they do not believe that the state of international relations 
is not intrinsically or necessarily anarchical. International relations are 
anarchical but it is not merely material but also ideational – determined by 
the actions and interactions of states, also called practice. 
 
To use a very common example, the United States may not be threatened 
by a British build-up of nuclear arms, as they have a friendly relationship. 
However, the United States would be threatened by a nuclear arms build-up 
by North Korea because of their standoffish relationship (Wendt 1995). The 
example is also limiting in that it defines their relationship based on one 
understanding, in this case an arms race. And though the US may not be 
bilaterally concerned about a British weapons build-up, it will become a 
matter of international unease because of the particular breach of accepted 
collective practice and understandings.  
 
(ii) Shared Understandings determine State Identities and Relations in 
International Society 
The community of states is built on shared meanings, common 
understanding, accepted practices and expected behaviour. This ascribing 
of meaning to the material world also defines state identities, interactions 
and relations between and amongst states internationally. Wendt (1994) 
stipulates that two types of identities are constructed – individual and 
collective or the corporate and the social. The corporate identity is 
comprised by the nature and qualities that make the actor individualistic. 
Social identities “are sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while 
taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object” (Wendt 1994: 
385).  
 
The shared understandings are a complex web of normative structures that 
guide states in their interactions. Over time identities and interests create 
social institutions and social practices between members of particular 
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identities and interests, in turn reinforcing the social institutions. Social 
knowledge as it is collectively constructed and collectively accepted do 
change over time as institutions and practices are influenced by the 
prevailing social contexts, dynamics of a specific time-period, history and 
other social, cultural, economic and political forces.  
 
(iii) Intersubjectivity in International Society 
The collective and shared nature of social reality and knowledge – of states 
and structures – are ontologically significant in the constructivist framework 
(Adler 1997). Intersubjectivity can be understood in two layers. One is the 
individual layer that helps an actor form idea, beliefs, and interests. 
However, this individual layer is linked to the collective layer that helps form 
or transforms these ideas, beliefs and interests. As Searle (1995: 25) 
describes, when doing something together, “the individual intentionality that 
each person has is derived from the collective intentionality that they share.” 
The outcome is a construct of collective meaning,10 agreed upon actions 
and interactions that are meaningful to all actors involved. Therefore actions 
and interactions are not only an act of self-help, but also knowledge-based 
practices.  
 
Acts, practices and knowledge in international relations are also collectively 
constructed meanings that enable normative behavior and social 
coexistence. The intersubjectivity is also manifested in state identities and 
their place in the global community.  
 
(iv) Mutual Constitution of Agent and Structure in International Studies 
                                                        
10
 Even Adam Smith (Coase 1976) spoke of collective meaning in his theory Of Moral 
Sentiments, “Our continual observations upon the conduct of others insensibly leads us to 
form to ourselves certain general rules concerning what is fit and proper either to be done 
or to be avoided. These general rules of conduct are of great importance. They represent 
the only principle by which the bulk of mankind are capable of directing their actions…” 
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In the aforementioned tenets, the interlinked nature of the construct of the 
identities of the state or agent and structures was evident. The blurry 
distinction between the material and social also allows a layered 
understanding of reality without granting primacy to either material or social 
but to see people and society as mutually constitutive (Onuf 1989). The 
inference here is that society and people make each other in an ongoing, 
two-way process (Zehfuss 2002).  
 
Agents are individual actors irrespective of the structure in which they may 
or may not come to identify with. States in international society are the 
actors. And structures are systems that cannot be reduced to the agents 
that socialize in it. The intersubjective practices and collective knowledge 
are the structures that construct the international system. Structures exist 
over time and not only in momentary agents. This tenet of constructivism 
also created an unresolved conundrum of the primacy of agent and 
structure. Though this debate 11  continues, constructivist theories, 
deliberated in the next chapter, are clearly agent-centric and agent driven.  
 
(v) Change is Possible 
Though constructivism refutes the pre-determined nature of international 
relations, the predictability of shared understandings and accepted 
behaviour purports a sense of what it is and how it operates. This indicates 
                                                        
11
 Onuf (1998) avoided this debate by suggesting that the word structure is the source of 
the confusion, recommending that the word be replaced with social arrangement. Wendt 
was the first to confront the problem in-depth in 1987, using Bhaskar’s scientific realism and 
borrowing from Giddens’ structuration theory. In Wendt’s (1987) argument, structures are 
real inasmuch as they generate effects through agents’ actions, which in turn generates, 
rather regenerates the structures. Much along the same lines was Dessler’s (1989) debate 
on the agent-structure issue. His only criticism of Giddens, Wendt and Bhaskar was that 
they all provided possible solutions to the agent-structure issue but at a philosophical level 
that does not explicate the practical approach. The debate turned critical after Hollis and 
Smith’s 1990 book and Wendt’s criticism of it in 1991. Wendt (1991) was unhappy about 
Hollis and Smith’s attempt to conflate the levels of analysis problem with the agent-structure 
problem. Giving the debate a fresh view was Carlsnaes (1992) with Margaret Archer’s 
theory of morphogenesis and its analytical duality.  
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order, but also the possibility of change. Constructivism does not predict 
patterns of change but understands that a concrete normative framework of 
shared meaning and understanding has the potential to effect change. 
Studying how change comes about is significant in the constructivist 
research programme.  
 
According to Adler (1997) if shared understandings are what build 
relationships, then change can be made possible through effecting change 
in the understandings, and not, for instance, by getting rid of the nuclear 
weapons of either the US and North Korea or both as would be the causal 
explanation. Change is also significant in the constructivist understanding of 
power that states can learn to want things other than power; that relations 
between states do not always have to be competitive. However, as 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) claim, understanding change is as hard for 
constructivists as it is for realists.  
 
2.4. Conclusion 
Understanding change is as important in constructivism as studying the 
order of a constructed reality, if not more. It is this research’s aim to examine 
both theoretically anew with empirically grounding. To do this, first this 
research studies existing constructivist theories of international norms, and 
their challenges in the next chapter.  
 
This chapter has laid out the fundamental theoretical pillars, and examined 
the basic nature and foundations of constructivism and its most important 
ingredient – norms. It has demonstrated that the core of constructivism lies 
in understanding norms. The tenets and the debates around them also 
signify the centrality of norms. Though norms seem normal, an almost 
natural phenomenon, this chapter has denaturalized it ontologically as a 




Constructivists also confer due importance, if not equal, to the material 
structures of social reality. In this ontologically physical reality that is socially 
emergent, constructivists also accept that identities, interests and behaviour 
of political agents are socially constructed by collective meaning, 
interpretations and assumptions about the world (Adler 1991). It has been 
shown in this chapter that constructivism explains and explores the world 
beyond its visible, observable material resources and capacities. It is to 
move away from a causal explanation of the world determined by 
materialistic agents driven to act and meet their self-interests, and to 
































EXAMINING THE LIFE CYCLE OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
 
“One important task for future research will be to define more specifically the 
conditions under which certain kinds of norms might prevail or fail in 
influencing action. A related task will be to clarify the mechanisms whereby 
norms are created, changed and exercise their influence.” 
Martha Finnemore (1996: 185)  
 
The previous chapter reviewed the understandings, centrality and 
instrumentality of norms in the constructivist international relations 
paradigm. Constructivism takes forward the normative perspective, and 
aims to provide a theoretical understanding of international relations through 
the construction, development and diffusion of social knowledge and social 
practices. There are several constructivist models of norm development and 
spread in international relations. Perhaps the most widely referred to and 
used being, Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) life cycle framework. In this 
chapter, we examine this framework and what it reveals, and most 
importantly what it does not. The chapter will lead to the hypothesis that:  
 
Constructivist accounts of how norms spread and develop are deficient in 
terms of the mechanisms by which these processes occur. Norm cascading 
is more dynamic and multi-dimensional. Norms extend their reach and 
reinforce their power and legitimacy through replication and particularization 
before state acceptance and adherence, and do not merely cascade through 
state acceptance and adherence.  
 
The theoretical deficiency leads to the need to understand norm cascading 
as a more dynamic and multi-dimensional construct. In the following 
chapter, a revised and enhanced framework is developed to take into 
account and demonstrate how norms can be examined and studied in a 
 52 
more dynamic way. The classic life cycle framework lays out straightforward 
stages to the life of a norm. It starts with the origin of ideas in the 
international system – norm emergence. Then moves on to collective 
acceptance of common meaning, which may have come about cooperatively 
or competitively, thereby cascading the norm. This eventually leads to the 
normalization of practice – internalization.  
 
3.1. International Norms Emerge and Develop: A Life Cycle Begins 
The most widely used constructivist IR theories of international norms 
concentrate on how and why states obey norms (Finnemore 1993; Franck 
1990; Katzenstein 1996; Alvarez 1997), or how norms impact on states’ 
domestic policies and specific international responses (Risse, Ropp and 
Sikkink 1999; Wheeler 2000), or how international relations progress (Adler 
and Crawford 1991), or when norms change or cause change (Finnemore 
and Sikkink 1998; Florini 1996 and others). However, we argue that these 
theoretical frameworks, though useful, often provide a simplistic and 













A relatively thin conceptualization of norms with its agency-centric focus is 













Figure 1: Stages of Classic Norm Life Cycle 
A            B 
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Constructivist theories of norms develop a framing that international 
standards of accepted behaviour among sovereign states constituent of an 
international society become collectively shared over a “life cycle of a norm” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) or sometimes through a “spiral model” (Risse, 
Ropp and Sikkink 1999) or through “cognitive evolution” (Adler 1991). 
 
These models are linear not taking the complexity and dynamism of norm 
formation and the mutual constitution of agency and structure into 
consideration. To be able to tackle the complexity of norm formation and 
development, we first need to understand the existing norm models in some 
depth. Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) life cycle model and Risse and 
Sikkink’s (1999) spiral model are similar, though Risse and Sikkink have 
developed a five-stage model instead of three by elaborating some of the 
stages further. Irrespective of the number of stages, the primary 
development phases attributed to the life of a norm are: norm emergence, 
norm cascading and internalization. 
 
This model indicates that there is a clear beginning and an end to the 
process. Norm emergence is the stage where norm entrepreneurs advocate 
the norms. Kowert and Legro (1996) theorize on the origins of norms that is 
broadly accepted by Finnemore and Sikkink in their life-cycle model. The 
processes that generate, maintain and change norms are ecological, social 
and internal. Ecological processes are determined by the interactions 
between actors and their environments, while social processes involve the 
interaction between actors – humans, states, organizations and other 
political agents – and internal processes are those, which occur within the 
actors and refer mostly to psychological dynamics.  
 
3.2. Norm Emergence: The Beginning 
Norm entrepreneurs are taken to be crucial agents in the first stage of the 
norm development. They are seen as “agents having strong notions about 
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appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community” (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998: 896). Though Finnemore and Sikkink do not go into the 
factors that give rise to the emergence of norms, their model depends 
heavily on the innovative and creative values and skills of the norm 
entrepreneur.  
 
In creating a normative framework, Finnemore and Sikkink claim that 
entrepreneurs take on the role of framing – a concept borrowed from the 
social movements literature by David Snow et al (1986). Snow et al credit 
Erving Goffman (1974) for the concept of framing. It denotes “schemata of 
interpretation” that enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” 
occurrences within their life space and the world at large. By rendering 
events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience 
and guide action, whether individual or collective” (1986: 464).  
 
The role of the norm entrepreneur is similar to the concept of framing where 
they “name, interpret, and dramatize” the issue thereby calling attention to it 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 897). Calling attention to an issue is not an 
easy task for the norm entrepreneurs. They inevitably encounter existing 
standards of behaviour and have to tackle them. The life-cycle model 
stipulates that norm entrepreneurs sometimes have to be explicitly 
inappropriate to take on accepted standards of appropriateness. 
“Deliberately inappropriate acts (such as organized civil disobedience), 
especially those entailing social ostracism or legal punishment, can be 
powerful tools for norm entrepreneurs seeking to send a message and 
frame an issue” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 897). It is clear here that the 
model is based on the assumption that the norm is entirely new and always 
in conflict with existing norms – we will argue later that this is not typically 
the case in relation to international norms.  
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Crucial to the role and existence of a norm entrepreneur is a platform, 
primarily in the form of an organization from which to host their creation. It is 
also the case that, at times, platforms are specifically created for the norm 
entrepreneur. But mostly, existing organizations with broad mandates and 
agendas are able to house a norm entrepreneur thereby providing the 
necessary impetus to promote the norm in question. The organization’s – 
non-governmental, multilateral and others – institutional framework and 
experience in the international system gives the entrepreneur the much-
needed credibility to be able to influence normative change (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998).  
 
In addition to organizational credibility, the organization’s networks of 
information, knowledge and influence can enable shifts in the behaviour of 
actors (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). From the perspective of this 
framework for understanding, it is the power of the agency of the 
entrepreneur or the organization that influences change in the model, 
limiting it, again, to a one-dimensional view of the change and the power of 
norms in international relations.  
 
Emanuel Alder’s cognitive evolution is also centered on the power of the 
agent. Cognitive evolution begins when new expectations and values are 
created; this is the stage of innovation. The innovation stage is similar to 
norm emergence in the life-cycle model. “Innovation occurs when new 
meanings and interpretations are generated by individuals within institutional 
structures” (Adler 1991: 56) Selection is the second stage where 
expectations and values are chosen through various structures and 
processes by actors within domestic institutions. The principle actor here is 
the policy-maker who assumes the role of a norm entrepreneur. This is the 
stage at which other actors in the domestic political system are persuaded to 
accept the new, thereby making it legitimate. 
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Similarly, the first two stages of the 5-stage spiral-socializing model (Risse, 
Ropp and Sikkink 1999) also focus on the agent. But the norm is not new in 
this case; it is the non-adhering state that is new and this ‘target state’ is 
being socialized into accepting a collective identity. The first two stages 
involve a state of repression and denial on the part of the sovereign, which 
then leads to tactical concessions on the part of the State due to pressures 
from local, regional and transnational advocacy groups. The spiral model 
begins at the stage where the “target state” is repressive enough to de-
capacitate any domestic societal opposition. This means that it would 
require transnational advocacy groups to put the violations of the target 
state on the international agenda and this can only be done “if and when the 
transnational advocacy network succeeds in gathering sufficient information 
on the repression in the target state” (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999: 22). 
Once a target state has been spotlighted in the international agenda, 
transnational advocacy network can lobby international human rights 
organizations and other norm-abiding states thus reminding them of their 
identity and duty. Here the transnational advocacy groups assume the role 
of norm entrepreneurs not as the developer of the norm but as the advocate 
of an existing norm. 
 
3.3. Norm Cascading: The Tipping Threshold  
Within this relatively dominant existing constructivist framework, once the 
entrepreneur(s) has garnered the support of a critical mass of states to 
accept the new norm, the second stage of cascading is set in motion where 
emulation is the dynamic that is visible. This “tipping point” is quantified 
approximately by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 901) at “one-third of the 
total states in the system” adopting the norm. According to Finnemore and 
Sikkink, the tipping threshold is not only driven by the norm entrepreneur 
and a well-rooted organizational platform, but also by the institutionalization 
of the norm in specific sets of international rules. This is not a necessary 
condition or one that specifically precedes norm cascading.  
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Another key factor identified in this framework that can drive norm cascades 
is a state that adopts the norm. In certain cases, it may be important that a 
“critical state” adhere to the norm thereby giving it credibility. With different 
norms, different states would be critical. Following the “tipping point”, 
countries begin to adopt the new norm in quicker succession than during the 
tipping threshold. The cascading is driven by international socialization of 
identities that is partly constituted by the social structures in the international 
system that have emerged out of the shared understandings and collective 
knowledge of the actors. Finnemore, Sikkink and their associates identify 
socialization processes as mechanisms used to persuade states to adopt 
and adhere to norms. These include peer pressure, legitimation, conformity 
and esteem (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). 
 
Meanwhile Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) explore the processes of norm 
socialization a little further in their spiral model. Socialization is a concept 
the authors have borrowed from Barnes, Carter and Skidmore (1980). It 
elaborates on the concept of norm cascading, but from within the point of 
view of state adherence and practice of norms. The model elaborates on 
three mechanisms of socialization – not mutually exclusive – that are then 
build into an operational framework to explain the cascading of human rights 
norms in the international system. The three socialization mechanisms are 
namely: instrumental adaptation, argumentative discourse and 
institutionalization. Thus the spiral model is based on the mode of social 
interaction that is dominant in each phase. Developers of the spiral model 
claim that the first reaction of the target state is always to deny any and all 
violations, which indicates that the socialization process has begun – the 
second stage of the model. The opening up of a space for dialogue through 
the socialization process helps to build international pressure. This drives 
the target state to make cosmetic concessions – as the third stage of the 
model – thereby also enabling domestic societal networks to rejuvenate 
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themselves against their state’s violations and non-compliances and engage 
in an argument with the government. Therefore in the first couple of stages, 
the processes of socialization rely on instrumental adaptation, which then 
moves to argumentative discourse and then institutionalization in the later 
and last phases. 
 
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) reiterate that the second stage of lobbying 
and international mobilization is not only about forcing the target state into a 
corner but also opening engagement spaces for domestic networks in the 
target state. The authors caution that this stage can push the socialization 
process forward or cause a backlash depending on the reaction of the target 
state. If the target government does not backlash, then the “pressure from 
above” through transnational advocacy networks and peer pressure together 
with “pressure from below” through domestic mobilization lead to 
“prescriptive status”. It is from this prescriptive status that states adhere to 
norms in a consistent manner. Consistent conformity can be guaranteed, 
according to Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, through constant pressure from 
domestic, national and international networks. In understanding the 
development and diffusion of norms, constructivists limit their exploration to 
the impact of agents whether through adherence or emulation. 
  
3.3.1. Unpacking the Construct of Norm Cascading 
Though Finnemore and Sikkink lay out the groundwork for understanding 
norm cascading, they do not go beyond a quantitative agent-centric and 
agent-driven acceptance of norms. In our review of the constructivist and 
associated literature in this area, we can broadly extract and unpack norm 
cascading as being conceived as being driven by the following three factors: 
(i) Gain meaning and reach (ii) Create power (iii) Establish legitimacy. 
 
(i) Gain meaning and reach 
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The reach of an international norm is typically determined within this 
framework by the number of states that have accepted or endorsed it – one-
third of the member states of the international community, as prescribed by 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). However, the number of states that accept 
and adhere to the norm is not the only defining factor of norm cascading. It 
takes more than politicking and strategic lobbying on the part of the norm 
entrepreneur, interested governments and non-governmental organizations 
to gain the acceptance and adherence of states. Reach is also achieved 
through the meaning prescribed to a norm, and through that which 
emanates from the norm.  
 
Constructivist theorists understand this framing to be an important tool of 
persuasion for norm entrepreneurs. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 914) 
state, “It is the mission of norm entrepreneurs: they seek to change the utility 
functions of other players to reflect some new normative commitment. 
Persuasion is the process by which agent action becomes social structure, 
ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes the intersubjective.”  
 
A frame – as a tool and a process – is not only a means of persuasion; it is 
used to “fix meanings, organize experience, alert others that their interests 
and possibly their identities are at stake, and propose solutions to ongoing 
problems.” This characterization of frame and framing by Michael Barnett 
(1999: 25) can be seen as a good starting point to understand the creation 
of meaning in the development of norms. For this school of constructivists, 
the affixing of meaning is the doorway to norm cascading. The creation or 
attachment of meaning can then be used as a tool of persuasion by norm 
entrepreneurs and their teams or norm partners, enabling norm cascading, 
as these constructivist models indicate.  
 
However, the creation of meaning involves more than being a force of 
persuasion. It is a process of marking international history with a line that 
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demarcates good from bad, acceptable from unacceptable and right and 
wrong, not only in value but also in practice. It is also the process of making 
a concept understandable and meaningful through the words and language 
used to describe the concept.  
 
Language is a determining factor in the creation of meaning. Though rooted 
in the moment of creation, language transcends spatial and temporal 
dimensions, as Berger and Luckmann (1996: 37-38) explain: “Language has 
its origins in the face-to-face situation, but can be readily detached from 
it…The detachment of language lies much more basically in its capacity to 
communicate meanings that are direct expressions of subjectivity ‘here and 
now’.” This also means that language is a bridge between “different zones 
within the reality of everyday life and integrates them into a meaningful 
whole across spatial, temporal and social dimensions.”  
 
This is also true within the international sphere. The creation of meaning in a 
moment in time and space transcends that spatial, temporal and social 
dimension. Onuf (2013: 40), one of the constructivist pioneers, calls this 
naming of concepts “metaphors” and according to him, “metaphors are 
concepts in the making.” Onuf’s understanding can be read as framing as 
well.  
 
For instance, the coining of the term genocide by international jurist, legal 
scholar and a polish refugee Raphael Lemkin is a good example of the use 
and process of framing and affixing meaning to a concept that until 1944 
was unheard of. He brought together Greek – geno meaning race – and 
Latin – cide meaning killing – to coin the word genocide.12 It is not just about 
coining a word or a phrase, but more importantly It is about defining it, giving 
it boundaries – a definition not only decides what can be constructed to 
                                                        
12
 UNHCR, A short biography of Lemkin, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=3b7255121c&query=genocide%20convention, 
accessed on 9 January 2015 
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constitute a particular concept, but also what cannot. Herein lies the 
construction of social reality a la Berger and Luckmann (1996: 34).  
 
“Human expressivity is capable of objectivation, that is, it manifests 
itself in products of human activity that are available to both their 
producers and to other men as elements of a common world. Such 
objectivations serve as more or less enduring indices of the 
subjective processes of their producers, allowing their availability to 
extend beyond the face-to-face situation in which they can be 
directly apprehended.” 
 
Framing is the objectivation of meaning. It involves the removal of the here 
and now from a construct so that it can be used across space and time. This 
draws states to accept and adhere to the norm, creating normative reach, 
according to the prevailing constructivist framework. There are various 
means available to states and non-governmental actors to socialize states to 
accept and adhere to norms. It is in the phase of acceptance and adherence 
that this school of constructivists flags the stage and beginning of norm 
cascading. This is also the point of creation of power and legitimacy in the 
life of a norm. 
 
(ii) Create Power 
Scholars have long studied the concept of power, between people, 
communities, and states. It has become one of the most frequently used and 
debated concepts across disciplines – in political, social and international 
theories and more. The frequency of its use in the international context and 
international analyses – balance of power, superpower, great powers, power 
vacuum – reiterates this significance (Rothgeb Jr. 1993).  
 
Although power has long been a key concept, it remains complex and 
contested. The roots of this complexity and contestations lie, primarily, in a 
 62 
lack of conceptual and analytical agreement on a singular understanding. 
Phrases such as ‘the power of ideas,’ ‘the power of human rights,’ ‘the 
power of deterrence,’ and more leads one to assume the almost natural and 
inevitable force of what we know and understand as ideas, human rights or 
deterrence without taking ‘power of’ as problematiqué. It is not the intention 
of this thesis to enter deep reflection of the concept of power, but the 
discussion here will focus on how power is widely understood and used in 
this school of constructivist literature, and its relevance and relation to norm 
cascading. It is best to begin with the discipline of sociology where Weber’s 
elucidation sheds light on the complexity of power (using Parsons’ 1968 
translation) with a simple definition.  
 
“The probability within a social relationship of being able to secure 
one’s own ends even against opposition.” 
 
As identified by Berenskoetter (2007: 3), Weber’s “definition is remarkably 
rich”. It highlights that power is a “relations phenomenon,” thereby indicating 
also that power is constructed within a social setting defined by the 
parameters and boundaries of a given social relationship in the moment that 
such a relationship came to be or in later instances that transcend social, 
temporal and spatial dimensions. By specifying probability, Weber not only 
suggests that the opportunity or potential does not have to be realized, but 
also that power over does not always signify absolute domination.  
 
This leads to another important feature about power highlighted in Weber’s 
definition – that of resistance. “…the qualification that meeting and 
overcoming resistance is not a necessary feature can be interpreted that 
power means accomplishing one’s will not only against but also with 
others…Weber also allows for the notion of empowerment, or ‘power to’, 
and leaves open the possibility that a power relationship is not necessarily 
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hierarchical, as implied in the notion of ‘power over’” (Berenskoetter 2007: 
3). 
 
Weber’s definition has not only been a starting point to understanding power 
in sociology but also across other disciplines, especially in international 
relations that was dominated by the operationalization of power in term of 
resources but “when people define power as synonymous with the 
resources that produce it, they sometimes encounter the paradox that those 
best endowed with power do not always get the outcomes they want” (Nye 
Jr. 2004: 3).  
 
There is definitely more explanatory and exploratory potential in seeing the 
phenomenon of power as constructed and not natural as Parsons rightly 
conceptualized, which is foundational to any constructivist understanding of 
power (Haugaard 2002). And the concept of power and its understanding is 
a particularly essential and crucial element in understanding norm 
cascading. Having gained in reach, the power of a norm is constructed by 
recognition of the norm and its acceptance by state actors, and especially by 
state adherence, where the norm is reproduced through the right behaviour 
and conduct of states. Further institutionalization into the international 
system and domestication in respective national policies deepens the power 
of the norm. However contested Parsons’ theory on power may be, he sums 
it up best: 
 
“Power then is the generalised capacity to secure the 
performance of binding obligations by units in a system of 
collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with 
reference to their bearing on collective goals and where in case of 
recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by negative 
situational sanctions – whatever the actual agency of that 
enforcement” (Haugaard 2002: 78, emphasis added). 
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This capacity to influence and probability to secure one’s own ends also 
comes with its growing list of names – taxonomy – though relational, does 
not commit to any hierarchy – such as hard power, soft power, relational 
power, meta-power, structural power, compulsory power, institutional power, 
productive power and more.13 It does not serve the purpose of this section of 
the thesis to delve into an in-depth discussion on the types and forms of 
power in international politics suffice to say that each type of power highlight 
similar defining characteristics.  
 
Power is constructed in much the same way that social reality is constructed 
and reality is socially constructed – it is relational, embedded in international 
structures – material and non-material – and is the source of the capacity 
needed for member states to act towards a goal or even change the goal. 
Within the constructivist approach, therefore, and within the context of norm 
cascading and through the creation of a norm, power is the construction of 
the relational capacity that can be aimed – individually or collectively once 
the norm is accepted and adhered to – at legitimized collective obligations 
and goals.  
 
This does not equate power and norm but indicates that, as Giddens (1984: 
16) states, norms are “media through which power is exercised.” It is this 
understanding that justifies the constructivist use (and sometimes overuse) 
of the phrase ‘power of’ in demonstrating the strength or force of an 
                                                        
13
 Hard power is the preserve of the realist school of international relations. Though the 
constructivists do not discount it, they do not look at power solely as materialistic, it is 
considered together with normative power. For instance, a constructivist understanding of 
the events that unfolded on what we know today at 9/11 could not be understood as only a 
failing of America’s hard power or as a result of its excessive use of hard power that 
infringed on the hard power resources (territory) of other state and non-state actors. See 
Nye Jr. (1990, 2004) for soft power; Krasner (1985) for meta-power, Guzzini (1993), Barnett 
and Duval (2005) and others on structural power. Guzzini also elaborates further sub-
taxonomies in his operationalization of structural power – indirect/institutional, non-
intentional and impersonal. And see Barnett and Duval (2005) for explanations on other 
types of power in international politics. 
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international norm. However it is interesting to note that most non-realist 
approach towards power is specifically in understanding power as ‘capacity’ 
or ‘probability’ or ‘ability’ as opposed to seeing power as force. It is 
essentially because even if one were to approach power as a force, that one 
would remain wanting in taking that understanding of force to its outcome of 
being ‘forceful’. A brief exploration of an example would shed more light on 
this distinction and on the concept of construction of power.  
 
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is one of the older 
international norms that would be a good example because: (i) It falls within 
the international human rights normative framework (ii) The norm of 
sovereignty is fundamental to this convention (iii) After the creation of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN Charter and Geneva 
Conventions, it is perhaps one of the first international norms to directly deal 
with people at the international level, and not just states (iv) And unlike 
some of the international norms and laws that were established as the time, 
such as the 1948 Genocide Convention which also sought to protect people 
in violent conflicts directly, the Refugee Convention came with institutional 
backing in the form of the UNHCR – Office of the High Commissioner for 
Refugees. This meant that the Refugee Convention not only had the power 
of meaning but also a mandate to enforce, at least through negotiations, 
assistance and support to people and states alike.  
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the massive influx of those forced 
to flee their countries as the allied and axis forces fatally locked horns 
became a cry for urgent help not only from the hundreds and thousands 
fleeing, but also from countries and their governments where people were 
fleeing to. The drafting of the Refugee Convention in 1949 did two things. 
Firstly, the convention defined the refugee.14 Secondly, it went beyond just 
                                                        
14
 Article 1A (1, 2) of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.  
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addressing the issue of labelling people as refugees (granting status). The 
Convention provided the means and measures to support and protect the 
rights (social and economic) of refugees including the right not to be forcibly 
returned to the country of origin or non-refoulement (Bertrand 1993).15  
 
In developing the convention through a conference of plenipotentiaries, 
accepting it, and establishing a UN institutional mechanism by 1951, power 
– conceptually and operationally – was created through identifying the 
refugees and ensuring their protection. In this case, power – the capacity 
and potential to act – was given not only to states party to the Refugee 
Convention to grant those fleeing persecution and violence with the status of 
refugee, which would in turn grant refugees the power to demand their rights 
from host countries.  
 
The convention is also a medium of power for UNHCR to act as an 
intermediary between states and between states and those seeking refugee 
status. In the constructivist approach the critical mass of support from states 
to develop the convention, draft it, adopt and adhere to it is a reflection of 
the power of the norms of the Refugee Convention – the fact that a provision 
and capacity is available to states to address a situation of forced 
displacement is an indicator of power, and in turn of norm cascading.  
 
The effectiveness of this power is a different matter altogether. It is a fact 
that over the years, since 1951, there are “more refugees but less asylum” 
(Roberts 1998) because first host countries and countries that are highest in 
refugee numbers have increasingly turned away refugees even before they 
get there, or rejected asylum claims even when they are legitimate. This has 
not weakened the convention’s normative standing because as discussed 
                                                        
15
 The principle of non-refoulement is established in Article 33 of the 1951 United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. 
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earlier it is also in violations and infractions that a norm becomes clearer, 
more persistent and more powerful.  
 
(iii) Establish Legitimacy 
It is hard to properly address power or legitimacy except in close inter-
relationship with each other. “Legitimacy constrains power, but also enables 
it; power suffuses legitimacy, but does not empty it of normative content” 
(Clark 2005: 4). There are, obviously, areas of close inter-play or overlap 
conceptually, theoretically and operationally. For our purposes, it is 
important to examine how to employ them as relevant to norm cascading, 
and thus lay out the necessary groundwork as done with power above.  
 
The conceptual and theoretical roots of legitimacy lie in sociology, political 
science, political theory, and its understanding of what legitimate authority or 
power is, means and how it operates. “Politics is not merely a struggle for 
power, but also a contest over legitimacy,” states Inis Claude Jr. (1996: 
368), one of the most prominent scholars in the field of political legitimacy. In 
Claude’s conceptualization of legitimacy, it is a completion of the realization 
of power: “The urge for formally declared and generally acknowledged 
legitimacy approaches the status of a constant feature of political life. This 
urge requires that power be converted into authority, competence be 
supported by jurisdiction, and possession be validated by ownership” (Inis 
Claude Jr. 1996: 367).  
 
Legitimacy is significant to understanding normative international relations. It 
sheds some light on the typically norm compliant behaviour of most states 
especially in the absence of any independent international enforcing 
authority. However, legitimacy is – like the concept of power – complex and 
contested. But as Thomas Franck (1990: 21) observes, “if one is ever to 
demonstrate the existence of the legitimacy factor in securing obedience to 
norms, the global polis is where that elusive factor may be found, isolated, 
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and studied by the social scientist…the international system is the only 
place where legitimacy may be observed “on the hoof”.”  
 
Legal, political and international relations theorists who have addressed the 
concept of legitimacy have generally come to some similar definitional 
conclusions: 
 
“Legitimacy…refers to an actor’s normative belief that a rule or 
institution ought to be obeyed. It is a subjective quality, relational 
between actor and institution, and is defined by the actor’s 
perception of the institution” (Hurd 2007: 7). 
 
“Legitimacy is a property of a rule or rule-making institution which 
itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed 
normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or 
institution has come into being and operates in accordance with 
generally accepted principles of right process” (Franck 1990: 24). 
 
“Legitimacy is defined as the governed recognizing the right of the 
governors to lead and, to a certain extent, their entitlement to the 
perks of power. It is a process through which both political power 
and obedience are justified” (Charlesworth, H. and Coicaud 2010: 
17). 
 
The core of these definitions is the perceptions of the actors, which is quite 
similar to Weber’s (1968) understanding that a rule is legitimate when its 
subjects believe it to be so. Zelditch Jr. (2001) employs the Weberian 
approach to formulate three theories of legitimacy – consensus, conflict and 
mixed theory. Parsons Consensus Theory that is similar to Aristotle’s 
Politics or Rousseau’s The Social Contract relies on consent to arrive at 
legitimacy. Though consent is a function of legitimacy, it is based on a 
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shared belief, between rulers and ruled, in norms and values (Zelditch Jr. 
2001).  
 
Machiavelli’s conflict theory is based on pure power because the interests of 
the rulers and ruled are in conflict. Nevertheless, there has to be a 
justification for the use of pure power. This is where Machiavelli invokes the 
process of masking pure power in ideology, which would legitimate pure 
power over time or social order would collapse. The third ‘mixed’ proposition 
is drawn from Weber’s 1918 speech on ‘Politics as a Vocation’ where he 
outlines some of his thoughts on legitimacy. His basic question was, “when 
and why do men obey?” However in answering his question, Weber focuses 
on the legitimate forms of dominance taking for granted the inherent 
legitimacy of his ideal-types (Blau 1963).  
 
It is Weber’s legitimacy of dominance that forms the core of the mixed 
theory of legitimacy where it is not just individual consent that is required but 
collective processes of validation.16 Only some like Franck (1990) assert that 
legitimacy is a defining characteristic of norms. Franck’s indicative 
ingredients of legitimacy are: determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence 
and adherence.  
 
Franck’s formulation focuses on meaning, its logic and clarity and its 
execution that is symbolic and compliance with the rules itself. Meanwhile 
Clark (2005) stipulates a more dynamic approach to legitimacy as consisting 
of rightful membership and rightful conduct. He calls this the two faces of the 
practice of legitimacy and deems it essential that the dual aspects are 
studied for a complete understanding of the concept. Clark’s view of 
legitimacy adds process(es) of legitimation together with actor’s perception 
which are seen in the behaviour of the actors.  
 
                                                        
16
 Also see Beetham (1991) on collective legitimization 
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The idea of perception is central to the Finnemore and Sikkink constructivist 
view on legitimacy. In their life cycle norm development framework, 
legitimacy is one of the motivations of norm cascading whereby states 
accept or follow norms as a sign of seeking approval from the international 
society together with reputation and esteem. Here there is loose use of the 
concept of legitimacy as it is conflated with process of legitimation. And 
international legitimacy and legitimation are linked to a government’s 
domestic legitimacy, which also urges states in their capacity as 
international agents to adhere and comply with norms.  
 
In a later article, Finnemore (2009: 61) conceptualizes legitimacy, as “by its 
nature [to be] a social and relational phenomenon. One’s position in power 
cannot be legitimate in a vacuum. The concept only has meaning in a 
particular social context.” In Florini’s (1996: 365) evolutionary theory of norm 
development, legitimacy is integral to accepting norms as norms: “Norms 
are obeyed not because they are enforced, but because they are seen as 
legitimate.” Legitimacy in the Finnemore constructivist framework is either a 
factor of adherence or a factor that creates or reinforces an actor’s identity, 
which then stipulates that the actor has to accept, comply with and/or 
adhere to normative standards and behaviour to be or continued to be 
considered legitimate. Therefore in this constructivist framework, legitimacy 
is held by actors or states in the first instance.  
 
It is conferred on other members of the collective who are intersubjectively 
recognized as legitimate or on their acts/behaviour – this means that norms 
(structures) are not directly legitimate or legitimated, because legitimacy is a 
motive to accept a norm and it is identity centric. When states behave or act 




For instance, the decision of Myanmar’s Junta government to hold elections 
in 2010 was a legitimizing move to gain acceptance into the international 
community. But the lack of full compliance saw a barrage of rejections of the 
actions of Myanmar as illegitimate. A statement following the November 
2010 elections from the Spokesperson of UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-
Moon, said, “The voting was held in conditions that were insufficiently 
inclusive, participatory and transparent…Consistent with their commitments, 
the authorities must demonstrate that the ballot is part of a credible 
transition towards democratic government, national reconciliation and 
respect for human rights.  
 
He also urges the Myanmar authorities to ensure that the process of forming 
new institutions of government is as broad-based and inclusive as possible, 
and calls for renewed dialogue among all stakeholders in this regard as part 
of any process of national reconciliation. The international community will 
look to the Myanmar authorities to provide greater assurances that the 
current process marks a genuine departure from the status quo. The 
Secretary General reaffirms the United Nations' commitment to work with 
the Government and people of Myanmar to help them achieve such a 
transformation.”17  
 
The United Nations and the international community denies Myanmar 
legitimacy because of the symbolic compliance to the norms of 
democratization that are defined by appropriate behaviour – in this case to – 
democratic government, national reconciliation and respect for human rights 
as noted by the UN Spokesperson. So appropriate behaviour through 
compliance with international norms by authorities in Myanmar would bring it 
legitimacy as an international actor, which the UN and the international 
                                                        
17
 Statement attributable to the Spokesperson of the Secretary-General on Myanmar 
elections, 8 November 2010, http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=4911, accessed 20 
November 2014  
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community as bearers of legitimacy is willing to help Myanmar and its new 
growingly democratic government achieve.  
 
The socializing need for legitimacy and its motivational effect on states to 
adhere to international norms and standards is also elaborated in the Risse, 
Ropp and Sikkink’s (1999: 38) seminal book, The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change. They claim that states, “in 
addition to securing domestic consent and legitimacy…also seek 
international legitimacy.”  
 
An interesting case that speaks to this constructive and motivating 
perception of legitimacy in states drawn by the legitimacy of international 
institutions is that of the independent World Commission on Dams (WCD), 
which cannot be considered strictly a case of successful state adherence, 
therefore norm cascading, primarily because of the lack of international 
legitimacy of the Commission as perceived by states and international 
institutions such as the World Bank.  
 
Beginning with the politics of undemocratic decision-making on issues 
related to river and water rights and development projects involving the 
construction of large dams, there was a growing movement against dams as 
early as 1994 (Dubash 2009) and increasingly louder protests (not yet a 
movement) targeted at the World Bank’s promotion of large dams even 
earlier (Goodland 2010). Though the WCD was formed in 1998 and 
concluded its work by 2000 with a report18 that tabled new guidelines and 
procedures for the construction of dams, “Over the next nine years the 
Bank, along with the hydropower industry, resisted the guidelines and 
struggled with reformers” (Goodland 2010: 384).  
 
                                                        
18
 WCD (2000), Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making, The 
Report of the World Commission on Dams, London and Sterling: Earthscan Publications 
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In the constructivist terms of the Finnemore and associates school of 
thought, “the WCD has fallen far short of reaching “a tipping point” that 
would have led to a cascading effect (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). States 
such as South African and Uganda were among the first to launch national 
dialogues on internalizing some of the recommendations of WCD Report, 
meanwhile others, such as India and China, resisted because of the 
distancing of states from the deliberative process that limited and, perhaps 
even, delegitimized the Commission and its rules (Dubash 2009). 
 
3.4. Internalizing Norms: Completing the Life Cycle  
Once the meaning, power and legitimacy of a norm are sufficiently accepted 
by a critical mass of states, the final stage of norm development is 
internalization in the Finnemore and Sikkink ‘standard’ model. This may lead 
to domestic institutionalization of norms and habitual compliance on the part 
of the actors. Internalization is seen as the end of the norm’s life cycle 
because as an accepted norm it has been normalized or becomes 
normative practice. This is considered a successful cycle. This taken-for-
granted stage makes conformity with norms almost automatic. 
 
This is not to say that violations or normative breaches indicate a collapse in 
the life cycle. Violations can be as much an indication of normative strength 
as is adherence because it demonstrates a collective recognition and 
reminder of standards of behaviour. In this life cycle model, the focus in the 
internalization stage is also on agency. Here the model focuses on the 
agency of professionals who “often serve as powerful and pervasive agents 
working to internalize norms among their members.” These include 
economists, doctors, bureaucrats and other decision makers (Finnemore 
and Sikkink 1998: 905).  
 
Relatedly, “iterated behaviour and habit” is also another powerful 
mechanism. This is not in reference to adherence to norms, but a process of 
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trust creation amongst members of a collective. “Frequent interactions 
among people involving joint work on technical tasks would ultimately create 
predictability stability and habits of trust. As trust became habitual, it would 
become internalized and internalized trust would, in turn, change affect 
among the participants. Changed affect meant changed identity and 
changed norms as empathy and identification with others shifted” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 905). And so the cycle continues. 
 
3.5. The Gaps: Missing Dynamics of Norm Development 
The life cycle model developed and used by Finnemore and their associates 
provides a sound foundation for developing understanding the construction 
of social knowledge and social practices in international relations. However, 
it is limited in that it does not capture and reveal the dynamic nature and 
complex richness of norm development.  
 
As Finnemore (1996: 185) herself remarks, there is a need “to clarify the 
mechanisms whereby norms are created, changed and exercise their 
influence.” This thesis agrees; it contends that constructivist accounts of 
how norms spread and develop are deficient in terms of the mechanisms by 
which these processes occur. In this sub-section we provide a critique of this 
life cycle of international norms model from this perspective. The limitations 
and challenges discussed below also set the agenda for the rest of this 
thesis:  
 
3.5.1. Overlooking Centrality of Norms 
Interestingly, Finnemore et al’s life cycle model is not focused on the norm 
itself, where it emerges from, and when and how. This is perhaps the main 
critique – that the norms themselves are not central to the theoretical 
building blocks of the model, though they are central to constructivism itself, 
as explored in the previous chapter. This is an overarching limitation that 
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correlates to the agent-centric scope of the theory, its synchronic nature, the 
linear view of norm development, and more.  
 
This is not to say that in this thesis we are arguing that the primacy of the 
agent be replaced by the primacy of structure. On the contrary, it is 
important to more systematically include structural elements. A better 
theoretical approach would perhaps require appropriate space for interplay 
of both agency and structure. There are some constructivists, such as Florini 
(1996) who focus solely on the structure. Through an evolutionary approach, 
she claims that norms “wax and wane over time,” and her theoretical work 
seeks to explain why and how. This evolution model is all about the 
structure, which uses the agent only as intervening variable. It is not an 
investigation about how norms influence agents’ identities and interests, but 
an exploration of the mechanisms that influence norms themselves. Her 
theory claims that norms are like genes and that norms too follow an 
evolutionary pattern. Not only do genes direct the behaviour of their 
constituent individual but this neo-Darwinian theory also indicates that the 
norms, like genetic inheritance, “culturally transmits sets of beliefs, attitudes 
and values.”  
 
However, one of the crucial elements of this theoretical approach is also its 
most contested. Florini contends that norms, like genes, are in constant 
competition with other norms and the most fit norms survive through a 
process of natural selection or the new norm must at least “fit coherently 
with other existing norms,” thereby not only lending it coherence but also 
legitimacy. Meanwhile, she is unable to sustain the neo-Darwinian 
approach, as she introduces the norm entrepreneur – similar to the life cycle 
model – as integral to the evolution process. The theory also leaves 
unexplored the reasons for an actor to promote a norm unless they already 
identify with it thereby reinforcing the actor’s identity. Problems remain in 
norm-centric theories as well.  
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This leads to an understanding that an improved framework to capture the 
development of a norm would make appropriate space for both structure 
and agency, and for dynamic processes in which these inter-relate. This 
research proposes a mid-level modification of Finnemore et al’s approach, 
which allows for a deeper theoretical grounding through norms, and not just 
agency.  
 
This is developed in the next chapter. However, we argue that moving 
beyond the present framework requires three key steps. Firstly decompress 
the life cycle. Secondly situate the norm being studied within broader and 
other structures, or at least as far as applicable or appropriate, that frame 
international community. Thirdly, understand norm cascading beyond just 
state adherence to include other key types of actors in international society. 
Each of these is now discussed in turn.   
 
3.5.2. Compressed Life Cycle 
Finnemore et al’s life cycle model enables are useful examination of norm 
development, but it is a synchronic assessment. The concern here is that by 
starting the life cycle with the norm entrepreneur, the framework delinks the 
emerging (or new) norm from existing structures. From entrepreneur to 
tipping point, cascading and internalization, the life cycle is a compressed 
and linear exposition of how an international norm is constructed, and 
disregards the significance of structure.  
 
It is useful to lean on Giddens’ (1979) theory here; his theory recognizes the 
existence of knowledge as a measure of how things are to be done, the 
recursive mobilization of this knowledge through social practices and that 
the production of certain practices assumes certain respective capabilities. 
Therefore structure is not only patterns of interactions but also continuity of 
interaction in time. Structures have motivational force, or are realized only 
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through the socialization of agents and their interaction in collective 
knowledge (Wendt 1992).  
 
This process of interaction and socialization reinforces structures and 
reproduces them. At the same time as structures are being reinforced, they 
also reproduce the identities of agents that are socializing in the system of 
shared understanding. Giddens’ patterning of interaction only partly answers 
questions in relation to how a norm emerges, or how states come accept 
and to adhere to certain norms. The missing dimension is that of the 
continuity of interaction in time. This temporal dimension that is missing in 
Finnemore’s life cycle model is not only indicative of how states will behave 
or behave as time goes on, but also of how they behaved in the past.  
 
So a compressed view of norm development as in the standard life cycle 
model that understands it as a process from point A to point B is too 
reductionist. Social knowledge and social practices cannot be studied in a 
single moment or period in time. This implies that the further development of 
the model (in chapter 4) needs to add a temporal dimension that allows for a 
better understanding of norm construction in a more dynamic way. It will 
place the emergence of a norm along a genealogical continuum that not 
only allows a diachronic examination of its meaning, power and legitimacy, 
but also embeds it in existing normative structures, knowledge and 
practices.  
 
3.5.3. Delinked from Norm Ecosystems 
We now turn to the second concern identified above: the need to enable 
situating norms in existing structures and agency. Finnemore et al’s life 
cycle model’s linear approach in this context seems to delink the 
construction of norm, and present it in a theoretical vacuum. What this 
means is that when studying the life of a norm, only that particular norm is 
examined without linkages to existing normative structures or norm 
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ecosystems. It does not examine the life of a particular norm in the context 
of existing agency and structures, their existing relationship and dialectical 
dynamic, and the interaction created between them in the case of the 
emergence of a new norm or continued development of an existing norm.  
 
For instance, how do the conflicting norms of sovereignty and colonization 
coexist? Over fifty years since the 1960 Decolonization Declaration19, the 
Special Committee on Decolonization admits that there are still 1720 Non-
Self-Governing Territories (the politically correct terminology for colonies) 
across the globe, home to nearly 2 million people. International human rights 
norms are even more complex, as demonstrated by some instances.  
 
The destruction of the World Trade Center and the twin towers in 2001 
brought the very foundation of the Convention on Torture into the 
international spotlight. America’s response in the form of the ‘Global War on 
Terror’ questioned the very foundations of the international system that 
recognized that “the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family are the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” 
It was not only a violation of the torture convention and human rights laws, 
but also, as some scholars called it, an assault on the Geneva Conventions 
itself: 
 
“Now, torture has been brought out from the darkest corners of recalcitrant 
regimes and become another ‘issue’ to be considered. It is justified not only 
on prudential grounds, but also on moral and legal ones, or fenced off with 
definitional niceties – so ‘waterboarding’ (coerced, simulated drowning) is 
declared to be within the bounds of acceptable interrogation methods. But 
                                                        
19
 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 14 
December 1960, UNGA Res 1514 (XV) 
20
 Decolonization of the Western Sahara still remains to be complete. Spain withdrew on 26 
February 1976, however in 1990, the UN left it to the people of Western Sahara to complete 
the process of decolonization. Therefore Western Sahara is still on the list but Spain is no 
longer listed as the administrating power, effecting making it 16 NSGTs. 
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the real measure of the damage brought about by reintroducing torture into 
state conduct can be seen in the way that is now features in the media…and 
legal argument in favour of codification has even appeared in the non-
specialist press” (Whitman 2010: 205-206).    
 
Quite often, conflicting norms coexist; long-standing norms regress, evolve 
or devolve causing praxis ruptures. An emerging norm – old or new – has to 
be situated in an existing norm ecosystem to truly grasp its significance in 
meaning, power and legitimacy. In such a dynamic environment, the existing 
beliefs and attitudes of the norm entrepreneur should, perhaps, also come 
into question. And as per the life cycle model, at the international level a 
norm entrepreneur becomes active or activated only when there is enough 
support to do so through international or transnational organizations, 
advocacy groups or governments. It would seem that the cascading of a 
norm is already in play when the entrepreneur emerges.  
 
These issues have implications for a crucial aspect of norm development – 
that of norm cascading, which substantially informs the main hypothesis and 
lines of argument for this thesis. Firstly norm cascading cannot be 
analytically confined to the point of state acceptance and adherence. It is a 
more complex process. Secondly, discussions thus far seem to imply that 
norm emergence, evolution, devolution and normative shifts are all part of 
the cascading process. It is not only one stage of the life cycle, but an 
overarching whole. And to better understand norm cascading, as a more 
complex and dynamic process, one needs to step back from the agent-
centric focus of the life cycle model and move away from state adherence.   
 
3.5.4. The Limitations of Equating State Adherence and Norm Cascading 
By restricting norm cascading to a single dimension of state adherence, 
leaves the study of a norm’s development theoretically and analytically 
wanting. Models, such as Risse et al’s spiral model (discussed above) delve 
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deeper into the processes of norm cascading, but they still essentially 
provides a linear framework of the “induction of new members…into the 
ways of behaviour that are preferred in a society” (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 
1999: 11). The understanding here is that norms can influence the identity 
and interests of states and continually do so, but norms do not change.  
 
On the other hand, Florini (1996) contends that norms do change because 
of the natural processes of evolution. In stating that competing norms can 
emerge and co-exist, she inevitably questions the inherent legitimacy of 
norms till the surviving norm gains legitimacy through the process of natural 
selection. Cascading is characterized by the conscious acceptance of a new 
norm or the conscious reproduction of a social practice. These schools of 
constructivist scholars do not elaborate on the concept of cascading as a 
static or continuous process. Theoretically and analytically, cascading is 
limited to state acceptance and adherence.  
 
This present research argues that norm cascading is more than state 
adherence. It is better understood as the framing of meaning, creation of 
power and establishing of legitimacy in international society, as the 
extracted and discussed in the earlier part of this chapter. It characterizes 
the patterns of interaction, to use Giddens’ phrase. It can also lay out the 
framework to understand continuity of interaction over time. A thick 
understanding of norm cascading will thus not only include the continuity of 
interaction of agents, but also the continuity of interaction of structures and 
the continuity of interaction between agents and structures. This continuous 
and cyclical process may take place alongside the patterning of interaction.  
 
Continuity of interaction over time would involve processes or set(s) of 
processes that contribute to the dynamic advancement of existing norms, or 
the processes of embedding emerging norms within existing structures and 
thereby capturing the various layers of normative shifts, or both. These 
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could include, but is not limited to, a constant process of norm diffusion of 
existing or through emerging norms, gradual intensification and 
reinforcement of the power of a norm – existing or emerging, incremental 
universalization or increasing reach of an existing norm because of an 
emrging norm, etc.  
 
This thesis will develop the analysis and frameworks particularly in relation 
to two such processes: replication and particularisation. Using a cluster 
approach, each of these processes, explored and operationalized in the next 
chapter, examines dynamic norm cascading before state adherence. 
 
3.5.5. Taking More Account of Change and Order 
Deliberating on the processes of norm cascading leads to the challenge of 
capturing what Finnemore and Sikkink call norm shifts, change by another 
word. “Shared ideas, expectations, and beliefs about appropriate behavior 
are what give the world structure or, order and stability. The problem for 
constructivists thus becomes the same problem facing realists – explaining 
change” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 894)   
 
Finnemore’s life cycle model faces the same problem. Though order and 
stability is revealed to some extent, it is limited in that it does not capture 
change, except through state adherence and shifts in agents’ behaviour. 
The framework does not encourage or facilitate an exposition of norm shifts. 
In fact, this also leaves the understanding of constructivist order incomplete 
because the framework also does not clarify on the dymanic between 
change and order.  
 
Koslowski and Kratochwil (1994: 223-224) briefly bring out this linkage 
between change and order in his outlining of the two types of change. On 
the one hand, change is that which occurs “within the framework of well-
established conventions,” and on the other hand a more fundamental type of 
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change alters “the practices and constitutive conventions of a social 
system.” He goes on to demonstrate that international change is a 
“multilevel phenomenon in which precedence cannot be accorded a priori to 
either domestic or international structure.” Though this is a useful 
determination, which also comes through the case of study on the UN 
Guiding Principles used in this research (see chapters 6 and 7), we argue 
that Kratochwil’s separation of minor and major changes is unduly limiting.  
 
Norm shifts also have to be embedded in existing web of relevant structures. 
Ripple effects are may occur within well-established conventions due to 
fundamental alterations in practices and conventions of a social system, in 
this case international society. For instance, decolonization not only 
disrupted a social system, but also helped to strengthen  international 
human rights. To cite another example used earlier in this chapter – the 
resurgence of the use of torture  not only creates norm shifts within the 
related well-established convention, but also creates ripple norm shifts in 
practices of sovereignty, human rights and more. 
 
This clarifies and locates another key aim of this thesis – to develop and use 
a framework for international norms development and cascading that takes 
better account of stability and change within two processes – cyclical 
change and catalytic change. As will become clear, these form an 
overarching layer in the revised norm life cycle elaborated in the following 
chapter. They are not mutually exclusive processes, but overlap and 
interplay.   
 
3.6. Conclusion 
An examination of the life cycle framework in this chapter, and the nature 
and scope of the concept of norms and constructivism itself in chapter 2 
demonstrate that the complexity and dynamism of ideational international 
relations is missing. This research contends that Finnemore and associates’ 
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constructivist accounts of how norms spread and develop in international 
society are inadequate for supporting understandings in terms of the 
mechanisms by which these processes occur.  
 
By explaining norm development in a linear, agent-centric and agent-driven 
framework, the life of a norm seems flat. The nature, role and scope of the 
structures, and of agency-structure dynamics, which are central to 
constructivism is not adequately addressed in Finnemore et al’s life cycle 
model. An acknowledgement, or incorporation of how norms exercise 
influence of any kind on existing or emerging normative structures, or on 
agency is inadequately developed.   
 
The conceptual and theoretical development of cascading – the core of 
norm development and diffusion – is also restricted. Here too, agency is 
dominant, and state adherence is the driving force for norm cascading. Most 
importantly, the explanation of change is also limited. Though change is a 
core tenet of constructivism, as discussed in chapter 2, the dynamism of 
change is not fully explored or captured. One reason is perhaps the focus on 
the impact of agency on structure and not the other way around. This is not 
only a one-sided view, but also overlooks a crucial constructivist tenet – the 
mutually constitutive nature of agency and structure. 
 
The examination of the life cycle model and its limitations open up the 
potential to expand the framework, and explore norms and their 
development in a more complex and dynamic manner. A more dynamic 
understanding of the development of international norms provides a clearer 
picture of the power of norms, i.e. the structure and how they become 
powerful and not just the power of agency that empowers norms by state 
adherence. It also contributes to rethinking the understanding of change and 
progress in international relations.  
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The key to a better multi-dynamic comprehension of norm development is to 
delve deeper into norm cascading, as an overarching life cycle process and 
not just one stage in it. It will set the stage to explore their ‘continuity of 
interaction’ conceptually and theoretically. The rest of this thesis lays out the 
revised framework by introducing small but significant changes to the life 
cycle framework. It is not an attempt to address all the limitations, but a 
micro-paradigmatic shift that sheds light on the complexity of norm 



























DYNAMIC NORM CASCADING:  
AN ENHANCED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
“It is my purpose here to bring to light, not what this ideal has done, but 
simple what it means; what it indicates; what lies hidden behind it, beneath 
it, in it; of what it is provisional, indistinct expression, overlaid with question 
marks and misunderstandings…What is the meaning of the power of this 
ideal?” 
- Friedrich Nietzsche (1887, 1913: 107) 
 
 
As examined in the previous chapter, Finnemore and associates’ life cycle 
framework of norm development lays out how international norms come to 
be formed, accepted and adhered to in a simple and neat linear model. 
Though groundbreaking, their theoretical proposition does not allow 
examination of the complex nature of norm development – their 
intersubjective dimension, the diffusion of norms within existing structures 
and across time and space. The life cycle model provides a compressed 
and blackboxed view of the development of international norms.  
 
This present research contends that (hypothesis):  
Constructivist accounts of how norms spread and develop are deficient in 
terms of the mechanisms by which these processes occur. Norm cascading 
is more dynamic and multi-dimensional. Norms extend their reach and 
reinforce their power and legitimacy through replication and particularization 
before state acceptance and adherence, and do not merely cascade through 
state acceptance and adherence. 
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To borrow Nietzsche’s words, there is something “hidden,” and something 
“beneath” not just at the tipping point stage but also before state acceptance 
and adherence. The aim of this research is to inserts mid-level theoretical 
building blocks to the life cycle model in an effort to reveal and enable better 
understanding of the more intricate and dynamic nature of norm cascading 
through the specific processes of replication and particularization.  
 
With this proposed mid-level theoretical framework, the research aims to dig 
beneath the standard model of norm cascading – ontologically and 
epistemologically – to understand what a norm means in a decompressed 
state when it is conceptualized, accepted by states and is adhered to or 
violated. It also reveals the meaning behind the processes of cascading and 
how they cascade. This will allow for a better understanding of where the 
power of norms comes from, and how they diffuse, are maintained and 
legitimized. This will also reveal how norms are applied and sustained over 
time, despite their inapplication and, more often than not, outright disregard 
and violation. The question leading the investigation is: How do international 
norms cascade before state acceptance and adherence?  
 
This chapter is organized into three sections: It starts with a discussion on 
the scope of the proposed mid-level theoretical framework, followed by the 
section elaborating the framework, its processes and operationalization. The 
concluding section maps outs a step-by-step application of the framework, 
which is set out in three phases. The proposed mid-level framework is 
tested in the following chapters 5-7 in two stages – preliminary and in-depth 
testing. In the preliminary stage, two different international norms are used 
in the test run, which will strengthen the framework and in-depth study of the 
main case study of this thesis – the 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement. 
 
4.1. Scope of the Enhanced Framework  
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Drawing inspiration from the life cycle model, taking its conceptualization of 
norm cascading further by stepping away from and looking before state 
acceptance and adherence, and addressing some of the limitations 
discussed in the previous chapter, this research’s proposed theoretical 
framework is a mid-level building block that rethinks the creation, 
development and diffusion of international norms in five ways: 
 
4.1.1. Decompressing the Life Cycle of a Norm:  
The appeal of a synchronically compressed life cycle is obvious. It presents 
a clear and uncomplicated picture of stability, order and cohesion. In the 
standard model, change is also simply, characterized by state acceptance 
and adherence at least in the first instance of accepting a new norm. In a 
decompressed approach we can proceed to understand the development of 
an international norm as “continuity of interaction” in time and “patterning of 
interaction” across time as Giddens (1979: 62) rightly insisted as 
fundamental to understanding social structures. In this, his “ non-
functionalist manifesto,” Giddens argues that temporal-spatial elements are 
crucial to the understanding of structures and how they work without which 
any analysis is a synchronic, ahistorical and static view of not only society – 
the international society in the case of this thesis – but also of change.  
 
A diachronic and dynamic approach (see Figure 2 below) reveals the 
complexity of international norms and their role in understanding both order, 
cohesion and structural and systemic change at the international level. The 
most important aspect of a decompressed approach is its ability to move 
away from a state-centric condensation of norm cascading, and understand 
the life cycle of a norm before state acceptance and adherence. As reflected 
in figure 2 below, norm cascading is not a phase between norm emergence 
and internalization as explained in the diagrammatic representation of the 
life cycle model in figure 1, but norm cascading begins at the stage of 
emergence itself.  
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4.1.2. Relinking to Norm Ecosystems: 
The reformulated norm life cycle also seeks to situate emerging or evolving 
norms within existing normative structures. The processes of replication and 
particularization will also reveal how the norms being studied are linked to 
existing structures, how the former influence, conflict with, coexist, or 
change the latter, or vice versa. This approach adds to the dynamic 
understanding of norm life, development and diffusion.  
 
4.1.3. Rethinking Norm Cascading Before State Adherence 
Such a revised framework also allows a deeper examining of norm 
development beyond an agent-driven approach that is singularly focused on 
state adherence. A thick understanding of norm cascading will not only 
include the continuity of interaction of agents, but also the continuity of 
interaction of structures and the continuity of interaction between agents and 
structures. This continuous and cyclical process may take place alongside 
the patterning of interaction. 
  
4.1.4. Exploring the Mutual Constitution of Agents and Structures: 
The primacy of agency of states as indicated by the sole measure of norm 
cascading is also a problematic that is addressed by our proposed building 
blocks. Though one of the tenets of constructivism is the mutual constitution 
of agent and structure, the life cycle model is agent-centric. In the words of 
Fierke (2001: 117), “This is overly agentic in so far as it does not sufficiently 
embed these state actors in a historical context and raise questions about 
how their agency became possible.” This research’s proposed framework is 
in this respect structure driven, which when linked to the existing life cycle 
model provides both a structure and agency driven understanding, which is 




















Figure 2: Enhanced Life Cycle of International Norms 
 
 
Norm Emergence is a cascading 
process in itself 
Each concentric space denotes norm cascading 
over time (ongoing processes that draw from a 
common core understanding) through processes 
of replication and particularization. 
Internalization (also a continuous 
process over time as indicated in 
the literature) 
The shadow demonstrates power and legitimacy 
by association through processes of replication 
and particularization 
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4.1.5. Reexamining Change and Order: 
The possibility of change is an important tenet of constructivism and its 
understanding of normative international relations as discussed in an earlier 
chapter. However, it cannot merely be hinged to state acceptance and 
adherence and explained as a smooth transition from one life cycle phase to 
the next – from non-existence to existence, from old to new, or from violation 
to adherence. Change is destructive and conflictual, but also stabilizing and 
cohesive – two sides of the same coin. Change has to be understood in 
relation to order. With the insertion of this mid-level theoretical framework, 
normative change and order can be understood and examined in more 
comprehensively. 
 
4.2. Dynamic Norm Cascading Framework 
This section that focuses on the thesis’ proposed dynamic norm cascading 
framework is set out in three sub-sections: First the processes that define 
the framework are explained, followed by an exploration of the 
operationalizing variables in the second sub-section. This section concludes 
with a theoretical exploration and dynamics of normative change and order.  
 
4.2.1. Replication and Particularization: Processes of Proposed Framework 
The table below visually sets out the insides of the proposed mid-level 
building blocks. This thesis proposes two processes to better reveal the 
dynamic nature of norm cascading. These are replication and 
particularization, and they are not mutually exclusive processes. The table 
lists the elements and its operationalization under each process. The 
elements that define each process are drawn and extended from the same 
features that characterize norm cascading in the life cycle model – meaning, 


































Table 1: Analytical Matrix of the Processes in Enhanced Framework 
  
4.2.1.1. Replication 
This is a process that involves the creation of practice(s) through the 
emulation of elements of previously existing social structures. Though the 
creation of practice signifies norm creation or norm emergence, the nature 
of process of emulation signifies cascading in that it reiterates, reinforces 
and strengthens what the community of states knows, understands and 
accepts. This means that new norms do not always take the place of 
existing norms. And various norms are not always in conflict with each other. 
A continuous process indicates that the emergence of a norm is not always 
a result of the dramatic competitive upheaval and elimination of an existing 
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norm. They may be more cross-links and associations between norms than 
accounted for. It also indicates that cascading begins from the emergence of 
a norm making it a more continuous process. The process of replication in 
norm development could (a) reinforce broader shared understandings (b) 
increase the power of existing norms and assume some degree of this 
power by association and (c) reiterate the existing parameters of legitimacy 
in a collective. Indicators of replication lie in the clarity of meaning, control of 
power and perception of legitimacy.  
 
4.2.1.2. Particularization 
This process is defined by its characteristic to specify or streamline existing 
norms to narrow focuses. Particularization can also be a micro-process 
within another process. For instance, the Convention on the Rights of a 
Child replicates existing international human rights and humanitarian norms, 
but the emergent norm has also been narrowed down to only focus on 
children. Therefore the creation of the Convention is not only a replicative 
process but it also particularizes the accepted standards and practices of 
human rights to children. The process of particularization in norm 
development could (a) specify an issue area and create and integrate issue-
specific practices within a broader collectively shared framework (b) focus 
on a group of people or community (c) assume the power and legitimacy of 
existing norms by concentrating the same on a specific issue or group. 
Indicators of particularization are specificity of meaning, power by 
association and the process of legitimization.  
 
Only two processes have been identified in this thesis. This is not to say that 
these are the only processes that can explain norm cascading dynamically. 
Scholars such as Richard Price have used a constructivist approach to 
study the ban on chemical weapons through what he calls grafting of 
meaning – in this case from an understanding and meaning of poison. 
However, Price’s (1997) primary objective is not to understand the process 
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of norm cascading itself but to study “the relationship between technology 
and morality” genealogically. Others such as Berger and Luckmann (1996) 
theorized about sedimentation, institutionalization and legitimization as 
processes of normalization but they were referring, again, to reproduction of 
practice through what agents/actors or persons said or did – their behavior 
through words or deeds – and the verbal or active conformity to norms, 
normative standards or even laws. 
 
It is also necessary here to recognize the difference in the processes 
proposed in this thesis and that of reproduction of practice as understood in 
the constructivist literature to avoid any conceptual confusion between 
reproduction and replication and particularization. Reproduction is the 
conscious application of a practice within a context as seen fit by the agent 
involved. Replication and particularization are different, firstly, because 
though reproduction may be considered a form of cascading, it only 
reaffirms the existing structure in its current form through the execution of an 
act. Secondly, replication and particularization also does not involve the 
application of practice; there is no execution of an act. These processes are 
defining, elaborating or integrating practices; i.e. making practices available 
for application in reinforced or specified forms. Finally, replication and 
particularization are processes in the development of a norm that initiate or 
enable change, while reproduction is an indication of the existence of order.  
 
4.2.2. Operationalizing Replication and Particularization 
Gain meaning and reach, create power and establish legitimacy are the 
three elements that form the core nature and scope of norm cascading as 
has been extracted in the previous chapter. But what does it involve in a 
decompressed and dynamic form?  
 
Therefore, as a continuing process of interaction across time and space 
before the tipping point of state adherence, this research proposes a re-
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understanding of norm cascading as: (i) Extending meaning and reach (ii) 
Reinforcing existing power and creating power by association (iii) 
Strengthening existing legitimacy and creating legitimacy by extension. In 
characterizing norm cascading as a continuous process, a dynamism is put 
in motion from the very stage of norm emergence – from the very initiation of 
the framing and affixing of meaning, defining and conceptualization, and 
(re)construction of social reality.  
 
(i) Extending Meaning and Reach by Reinforcing Existing Intersubjective 
Structures 
The creation and affixing of meaning - persuasive messages - is an 
important element of norm cascading. However, this affixing of meaning is 
not done in a vacuum as Roger Payne (2001: 38) points out: “Persuasive 
messages, however, are not transmitted in an ideational vacuum.” It is 
perhaps because of this that it is said that only parents can understand what 
their babies, who have just begun to talk, are saying. The world of parents 
and their baby is a mini ideational vacuum in which parents extend the 
boundaries of their understood meanings and intersubjectivities, and are 
more liberal with the newly talking child. Nobody apart from the parents may 
be able to comprehend the child. This is more so that parents can 
encourage babies to talk, and in time socialize them – through school, pre-
school group interactions, interaction with the larger family, neighbourhood, 
community and so on – into the constructs of their world where more than 
just parents can comprehend a child’s words and utterances.  
 
Payne, Barnett and other constructivist scholars are right in assuming that 
new meaning comes from, is inspired from and, sometimes, even directly 
copied from existing meanings. Otherwise no one would understand or 
accept what is being said. New ideas are said to “resonate” because of 
some ideational affinity to other already accepted normative frameworks 
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(Keck and Sikkink 1998a). Dynamic norm cascading begins with framing 
within existing constructs of social reality. 
 
For instance, Raphael Lemkin, as described above, created a new word to 
comprehend the heinousness and brutality that the world witnessed during 
the Second World War. But by bringing together existing concepts – geno 
and cide – Lemkin was essentially doing two things: replication and 
particularization. Onuf (2013: 40) calls this “metaphorical extension.” He 
says “Through predication new concepts acquire names already in use, and 
they give their names to yet newer concepts…Metaphorical extension is an 
inevitable consequence of predication - of speech itself – and the engine for 
changing what we think we know.” Onuf’s metaphorical extension also 
extends to his understanding of how structures are made, “…agents make 
models with institutional effects by resorting to models with institutional 
effects.”  
 
What Onuf fails adequately to recognize in his agent-centric formulation is 
how and why agents resort to the institutions they resort to in the first place - 
because structure also constitute the agent; they are embedded in each 
other. Meanwhile, Lemkin also compiled existing laws and norms to frame 
his concept so that the community of states could act upon it, not just 
understand it. This is an important aspect of dynamic norm cascading - not 
just the creation of meaning, but also the creation of intent. And in a 
politically charged environment such as international relations, meaning and 
intent are equally important.  
 
No one explains this interesting relationship better than Richards and Ogden 
in their famous 1923 book, The Meaning of Meaning. In it they quote an 
important question from another scholar, Alan Gardiner (1922), from his 
article published a year earlier:  
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“Is the meaning of a sentence that which is in the mind of the 
speaker at the moment of utterance or that which is in the mind of 
the listener at the moment of audition? Neither, I think. Certainly not 
that which is in the mind of the listener for he may utterly 
misconstrue the speaker’s purpose. But also not that which is in the 
mind of the speaker, for he may intentionally veil in his utterance 
the thoughts which are in his brain, and this, of course, he could not 
do if the meaning of the utterance were precisely that which he held 
in his brain. I think the following formulation will meet the case: The 
meaning of any sentence is what the speaker intends to be 
understood from it by the listener” (Ogden and Richards 1923: 192-
193) 
 
Ogden and Richards (1923: 193) further explain Gardiner by expanding his 
use of the phrase ‘to be understood as follows: “It stands for: (a) to be 
referred to + (b) to be responded with + (c) to be felt towards referent + (d) 
to be felt towards speaker + (e) to be supposed that the speaker is referring 
to + (f) that the speaker is desiring, etc. etc.”  
 
But it is not always as easy as uttering what one intends to mean to get the 
listener to understand your intention. For instance, if a member state were to 
say in a UN meeting, “We are with Iran.” This statement does not only mean 
that the hypothetical member state supports Iran, but it also extends to 
mean, “We are ideologically opposed to the United States.” Sometimes it is 
not in the words that are said but in those that are not – a member state’s 
act(s) is also a statement of intention and meaning because each norm is 
further defined by what is considered appropriate behavior by member 
states.  
 
For instance, a veto by Russia and China on the need for an intervention to 
investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity in Syria and hold the 
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Syrian government accountable is a clear statement of intention and their 
stand that sovereignty trumps human rights violations and war crimes for 
these P5 countries and a stand against a resolution brought forth by the 
United States.21  
 
There were four such vetoes. However, the vote on UN Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) reiterating that it was Syria’s responsibility to protect its 
own people was unanimous. UNSC Res 2139 “Also demands that all parties 
take all appropriate steps to protect civilians, including members of ethnic, 
religious and confessional communities, and stresses that, in this regard, the 
primary responsibility to protect its population lies with the Syrian 
authorities…” 22  However this resolution’s primary aim was to ensure 
unrestricted humanitarian access to the victims who were caught in the 
midst of the civil war, and this R2P insertion in paragraph 9 seemed more an 
assertive reminder to the international community to uphold the norm of 
sovereignty.  
 
R2P is perhaps one of the most contested and conflictual international 
norms that exist today. It sits at the cusp of the inviolable norm of 
sovereignty and extensive and ever-growing norms of human rights. Its 
insertion into the realm of international norms was made when Francis M. 
Deng, Zartmann and other scholars proposed an academic shift in 
understanding sovereignty as responsibility, and not just a right, in 
addressing issues of conflict management and conflict resolution. Their 
1996 thesis specifically looked at the many violent crises in Africa especially 
those on a genocidal scale, such as in Rwanda. Sovereignty as 
responsibility soon became R2P with the international report initiated by the 
Canadian government and brought together by an eminent group of experts 
                                                        
21
 Global Centre for R2P (regularly updated), Populations at Risk: Syria, 
http://www.globalr2p.org/regions/syria, accessed on 20 January 2015  
22
 UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2139 adopted by the Security Council at its 
7116th meeting on 22 February 2014 
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– International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) – 
through consultations and deliberations across the world.  
 
The ICISS’ 2001 report sat on the fence when it came to deciding whether 
sovereignty in its present form was useful any longer or if a reformulated 
understanding should replace the old. It endorsed the old and the new or 
reformulated norms of sovereignty with equal importance: “…the conditions 
under which sovereignty is exercised – and intervention is practiced – have 
changed dramatically since 1945,” the reported stated in paragraph 1.33. 
But in the immediately following paragraph, the report states, “All that said, 
sovereignty does still matter. It is strongly arguable that effective and 
legitimate states remain the best way to ensure that the benefits of the 
internationalization of trade, investment, technology and communication will 
be equitably shared.” Having positioned themselves in the middle, the ICISS 
proposed that sovereignty is not just about intervention or non-intervention23, 
but also about a responsibility to protect.  
 
The reformulation was intended to change the meaning of intervention – 
necessitated by human protection grounds, as would have been the case in 
Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenica or Kosovo24 – and not in any way meant to 
disorient international relations that is rooted in and founded on the 
solemnity of sovereignty. The ICISS experts tabled the need to establish 
clear rules, procedures and protocols to establish the need for human 
protection, establish the legitimacy of intervention, ensure that military 
intervention sticks to the purpose to protecting civilians in need, and 
eliminate the causes of the conflict and lay the ground for durable peace.  
 
                                                        
23
 Sovereignty is the organizing principle of the United Nations as stated in Article 2.1 of the 
UN Charter, and characterized by non-intervention in domestic affairs as prescribed by 
Article 2.7 of the same charter. 
24
 The international community has been criticized time and again for sitting back and 
watching as hundreds and thousands were massacred in each of these countries, every 
time only parroting “never again!” The ICISS report has rightly cited these cases as 
examples of instances that would necessitate intervention on human protection grounds. 
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This close to 100-page ICISS report was reduced to a three paragraphs in 
the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. Paragraph 138 accepts R2P 
as an international norm to protect civilians against genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleaning and crimes against humanity; paragraph 139 lists the 
existing measures provided for in the UN Charter in the case of intervention 
through peaceful or forceful means; and paragraph 140 indicates the global 
community’s support for the work of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-
General on the Prevention of Genocide.25  
 
A 2009 Report by the UN Secretary General on the implementation of R2P 
was able to elaborate on some of its conceptual and operational aspects 
with three normative pillars – the responsibility to protect lies with the state; 
the international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist 
states in fulfilling this responsibility; and The international community has a 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means 
to protect populations from the aforementioned crimes in a timely manner.26 
It can be seen in this brief summary of the emergence of the norm of R2P, 
its meaning and intention has become progressively clearer. But the 
elaboration in meaning and the operationalization has not made the R2P 
norm any less contested or confusing or any more adhered to. Since 2005, 
there have been several instances of unilateral military action that violates, 
often blatantly breaches, the norm of sovereignty – US intervention in Libya, 
unilateral US strikes in Syria, to name a couple of the most recent such 
instances. These are cases of taking the meaning and intention of the R2P 
norm too far to the extent of diluting its accepted understanding.  
 
Dilution of meaning is also a concern of importance to creators of meaning. 
Extension of meaning and reach may not always have the intended positive 
                                                        
25
 UN General Assembly Resolution A/60/L.1, Integrated and coordinated implementation of 
and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the 
economic, social and related fields: Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit 
26
 Report of the UN Secretary General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect to the 
United Nations General Assembly A/63/677 
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effect. Such debates over meaning have taken place in trying to stretch the 
meaning and reach of genocide to protect more victims. Following Lemkins’s 
construction of the category of genocide with the intention to protect national 
groups who were being intentionally annihilated through a coordinated plan, 
several legal scholars successfully, and some not so successfully, extended 
the construction of genocide to include many more political groups and 
classes. The not-so-successful attempts involved expanding the intention of 
the acts such as, “mass bombardment, effects of occupation, depopulation, 
famine, disease, and gross negligence (Bhopal, Chernobyl) have led some 
scholars like Henry Huttenbach to propose either eliminating these actions 
entirely or distinguishing degrees of intent. The danger here is, of course, 
that the word can easily become emptied of meaning, degraded by 
excessive and needless repetition, finally reaching the stage of what Alain 
Finkielkraut called “verbal incontinence”” (Rabinbach 2005: 71).  
 
There has to be control over meaning, its diffusion and extension; a lack of 
meaning control can cause meaninglessness. And then there are times 
when creating meaning also involves stating what a concept or creation 
does not mean. And what something is not emerges from what is and what 
already exists. For some norms, even the most specific and clear meaning 
and intention cannot achieve the critical mass of states needed for common 
acceptance and adherence. Anti-whaling is one case that did not gain reach 
because it did not achieve the required number of states needed to support 
it to be accepted as an international norm that was defined by a shared 
intersubjective meaning. Jennifer Bailey titled this arrested development:  
 
“The International Whaling Commission’s moratorium on 
commercial whaling took effect in 1986…The effort ran aground 
because the norm proved unexpectedly ambiguous, a supporting 
epistemic community failed to emerge, the norm conflicted with 
other powerful norms, the prestige of the key anti-whaling states 
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declined relative that of whaling states, and NGO tactics failed to 
win over the publics in key whaling states and instead created a 
counter-boomerang effect” (Bailey 2008: 289) 
 
Bailey subscribes to Florini, Franck and Finnemore and Sikkink’s 
prescriptions for a successful norm – specificity and clarity – to understand 
the reason behind the failure of the anti-whaling norm. This thesis also 
subscribes to these same elements to characterize extending and 
reinforcing meaning and reach as a determinant of dynamic norm 
cascading. Specificity of meaning and clarity of structure are crucial factors 
in the success or failure of a norm gaining reach, and, in turn, power and 
legitimacy. But Bailey does not recognize that specificity and clarity have to 
come from existing social reality or it is bound to fail despite the conflicted 
nature of the emerging norm. If the emerging norm stems from existing 
normative structures, the likelihood of norm cascading even before state 
adherence maybe more. To ensure acceptance of an emerging norm, it is 
perhaps necessary that the norm be rooted in existing social reality – 
established identities and structures. This means that states already identify 
with them, and in turn initiate cascading and adherence.  
 
The process of creating meaning by subscribing to existing normative 
structures is the process of replication, which is characterized by clarity of 
meaning. It not only reinforces existing normative structures – in itself a 
cascading without adherence – but also extends meaning through specificity 
of meaning through the process of particularization. Clarity and specificity 
does not imply the duplication of normative texts or texts that provide rules, 
but also an extension of these or replication and particularization of the 
intent and objectivation of the norm being drawn from.  
 
This implies that norms are developed by using existing structures of 
meaning; i.e., existing norms, to draw acceptance for a new practice. Or, 
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rather, the new norm is subsumed into existing structures of accepted 
intersubjective meaning. The aim is to get state actors to expand or shift 
their collective understanding to include a broader definition, or accept an 
appended dimension due to a shift in the environment. At times this might 
be smooth process that almost seems natural but at times it could be 
conflictual between, perhaps, norms that are more fundamental to the 
existence of the international collective and subordinate or secondary 
norms. The conflict could also be between two or more fundamental norms, 
such as between establishing effective measure of implementing the norms 
of human rights without infringing on the norms of sovereignty.  
 
Therefore, replication is fundamentally conceptual where the structures of 
meaning in the international system experience slight shifts and are 
resettled without much, most often any, damage or devastation. Tectonic 
movements in the structures of the international system are an ongoing and, 
often, continuous process. These shifts and movements are crucial in 
capturing the dynamic nature of norm cascading as a continuity of 
interaction in time. They demonstrate that the emergence of a norm 
unavoidably enables the interaction of norms, thus dialectically initiating 
norm (re)cascading from the point of emergence itself of both the existing 
and emerging norms. In the present constructivist theory of norm 
development reach only follows the framing of meaning, critical support for 
the emerging norm, which begins defining the reach of a particular norm 
followed by norm cascading and internalization, which can be seen as a 
strengthening of this reach.  
 
But in the dynamic model proposed here, reach is already implicit in the 
emerging norm as it is firstly a reinforcement of existing normative 
structures. Secondly reach is also characterized by the extension of 
objectivations that the emerging norm intends to address or for which the 
emerging norm was created in the first place – such as specifying the rights 
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of a child in a convention though most international human rights norms also 
apply to children. Reach is also the limiting of conceptual boundaries – it is 
as much about exclusion, as it is about inclusion. For instance, the adoption 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention led to the exclusion of those not falling 
under any state’s protection and thereby had no rights but were not 
considered refugees under the 1951 definition. This leads to the second 
aspect of reinforcing the power of existing norms and creating power by 
association.  
 
(ii) Reinforcing Existing Power and Creating Power by Association  
Emerging new norms take on the meaning of existing norms through clarity 
and specificity as discussed in depth in the section above. Additionally, they 
also reinforce the power of the already known, already understood and 
already intersubjectively accepted norms through ongoing and existing 
discursive means. Therefore the process of replication and particularization, 
dynamic norm cascading is already in play even before state adherence 
through the replication and particularization of meaning, which reinforces the 
power assumed – considered almost natural – to define existing normative 
and extends it to the new norm by association. This is perhaps better 
explained through an extension of Giddens’ characterization of norms as a 
“medium to exercise power” to existing norms are also a medium of power 
for the emergence and embedding of new norms – a medium to exercise the 
processes of normalization or norm cascading. It is in the same vein as 
Manner’s (2002: 239) “normative power” which is a power that is able “to 
shape conceptions of the normal.”  
 
But Manners too is talking about state adherence. This embedded and 
dependent nature of new/emerging norms is not captured in the 
constructivist approach in studying the development of international norms. 
And for a better and deeper look at power and what it does, constructivism 
must wear its critical goggles and abandon its safe “middle ground” (Adler 
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1997) and go beyond what power is. The emphasis should be, as Guzzini 
(2005) rightly points out, on what power does and how has power come to 
do what it is able to do, or in the case of this research what power of norms 
does, and how has the power of norms come to do what it is able to do. 
 
No one has better dealt with the complexity of power than Michel Foucault – 
though some, like Guzzini, complain that Foucault has been overused in 
constructivism’s conceptual analysis of power, this research contends that it 
is not sufficiently overused – through his archeological approach to the order 
of things, genealogical exploration of the histories of the present power, and 
understanding of the all-pervasiveness of the power through and in the self. 
In examining power from order to panoptic discipline to biopower, Foucault 
also recognizes the importance of norms and normativity. In his thesis on 
biopower, Foucault identifies a norm as “an enabling link between the 
seemingly universal categories of populations or demography and the 
individual idiosyncrasies of everyday life” (Nealon 2008: 46).  
 
Of course in Foucault’s initial expression of norms began as a negative, 
isolating, and divisive feature of his idea of a normalizing society. These 
normative structures of society are derived from the human sciences – a 
body of knowledge or subject of study in which the man is the subject of 
study – which sets out the parameters of what is normal. In so doing, “The 
discourse of disciplines is about a rule: not a juridical rule derived from 
sovereignty, but a discourse about a natural rule, or in other words a norm. 
Disciplines will define not a code of law, but a code of normalization, and 
they will necessarily refer to a theoretical horizon that is not the edifice of 
law, but the field of the human sciences. And the jurisprudence of these 
disciplines will be that of a clinical knowledge” (Foucault 1997: 38).  
 
It must be noted here that this discussion on foucaultian power is limited to 
its application to constructivist norm cascading and a reformulated 
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understanding as proposed in this research. It is not an attempt to 
(re)understand Foucault, but to understand and employ his approach to 
power as relevant in this thesis. And Foucault on power is relevant in three 
ways: First is his understanding of power as a capacity to normalize through 
discourse and institutions and institutionalization, as theorized in Discipline 
and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. This emphasis on structure is refreshing 
and is a fertile ground to continue this research’s view of the mutual 
constitution of agency and structure fundamental to constructivism.  
 
Secondly, in both disciplinary panoptican power and biopower, Foucault 
talks about power not being vested in the agent but passing through them, 
and that power is not imposed from above. “Power has its principle not so 
much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, 
lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the 
relation in which individuals are caught up” (Foucault 1977: 202). It 
highlights the embeddedness of agents in structures as much as agents 
constitute structures through mechanisms of production or reproduction. 
This point reiterates the importance of understanding the mechanisms 
through which norms develop and cascade, which is the core of this thesis.  
 
Finally and most importantly, Foucault’s genealogical approach to laying 
bear the discontinuous history of how power came to be as we know, accept 
and understand it today is methodologically significant to this thesis. It helps 
to understand how the concepts in a norm pass through time and space 
having transformed epistemologically and operationally, yet remaining 
conceptually true to its original intent. For instance, in Foucault’s own 
exploration of punishment, a summary view would reveal that punishment 
was exercised through “torture” in the age of the king, as “social” in the age 
of enlightenment, and as “panopticism” in the present (Nealon 2008). These 
are all changing forms of punishment and changing targets of the practice 
with an unchanging intent to rectify abnormalities in respective societies. 
 106 
 
This thesis employs the foucaultian approach to get a better sense of how 
power is operationalized in dynamic norm cascading. It is being proposed 
here (see table 1 above) that power within the constructivist remodeling of 
norm development, specifically in the understanding of norm cascading is 
realized through ‘control’ and ‘capacity’. Through the process of replication 
of meaning of existing norms that are accepted as powerful, power’s 
dimension of control is set in motion. Meanwhile as the extension of 
meaning is specified and targeted through particularization, the dimension of 
power that generates capacity is initiated. Though this dual nature and 
realization of power may seem like binary opposites, they are in fact 
mutually constitutive. Control and capacity can be seen as the two elements 
of power in dynamic norm cascading or as the two natures of power as 
described by Lukes (1986) and others, as ‘power over’ and ‘power to’ 
respectively.  
 
In section 3.3 that discussed the standard understanding of norm cascading 
in constructivism, it was noted that Weber’s characterization of power was 
not necessarily hierarchical. But in dynamic norm cascading and the dual 
nature of power, it is proposed here that power is also always hierarchical. 
Power over and power to can co-exist and operate at the same time. It is as 
Tony Evans (2005: 1065) has said of the human rights as both a regime of 
“freedom and domination.” He says that for optimists, it is “power to the 
people” and pessimists see it as “power over people by promoting particular 
modes of thought and practice that support market discipline.” Because 
meaning transcends time and space, it is also a medium of power that can 
overcome power over relationships creating a momentary dialectic condition 
of power with or power of. The hierarchy of power is reflected in a hierarchy 
of norms, which will be dealt with in the section on the understanding of 
international change and order when dynamic norm cascading is inserted 
into the present linear view of norm development.  
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A brief look now into the development of the 1951 Refugee Convention aims 
to clarify empirically some of the theoretical propositions on power made in 
this present research. Looking at the development of the Refugee 
Convention only from the late 1940s when states, through the Commission 
on Human Rights, initiated the move to create a new convention and a new 
organization for refugees would give an incomplete picture of the 
development and cascading of the refugee norms. One would have to look 
further back, much further back, in history to get a deeper and thorough 
grasp on the cascading of not only the Refugee Convention, but also the 
norms that are embedded (replicated and particularized) in this normative 
instrument.  
 
There are three norms that weaved into the Refugee Convention – 
protection of refugees, protection itself and sovereignty. And each of these 
has a deep, long and thickly documented history that goes back further than 
the late 1940s. “Whereas the history of protection of refugees dates back at 
least a few centuries, not to mention refugee situation in Antiquity, the 
history of international protection starts with the League of Nations. No one 
would be surprised to learn that the International Committee of the Red 
Cross was the initiator of the international protection system set up by the 
League of Nations.” Jaeger (2001: 727), a former Director of Protection of 
the UNHCR, has rightly traced this genealogy of protection – specifically the 
protection of those affected by armed conflict – but has left out the more 
complex norm of sovereignty from his discussion. One cannot look at 
protection without sovereignty in this case. To be able to deliberate the 
normative conflict between sovereignty and protection, and how the power 
of these norms and their conflict normative power have also cascaded, the 
starting point would be a genealogy of the protection of refugees.  
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In the period before the creation of the League of Nations, the norm of 
protection and its application was limited to material assistance – 
humanitarian protection. And the protection of refugees was limited too 
meaning the power to protect was inadequate. It could be inferred that as 
the power lie solely with sovereign authorities at this time, elements of 
power – control and capacity – were both vested or assumed for a singular 
all-powerful authority who may or may not grant protection or could force 
those who fled from its persecution to return through population exchanges 
– 1913 Treaty of Constantinople, the 1913 Turco-Bulgarian Treaty, the 1914 
Greek-Turkish Agreement (Jaeger 2001).  
 
The First World War and its associated battles that caused a massive 
fleeing of nearly two million people from the Russian Empire compelled the 
Red Cross and related organizations and societies in 1921 to propose the 
appointment of a High Commissioner for Refugees, which led to the election 
of Dr. Fridtjof Nansen as the first high commissioner (Feller 2001). Here the 
power to protect refugees – capacity – was transferred to the international 
and bestowed with the Office of the High Commissioner and its related arms 
of operation. The primary task was the definition of refugees from the 
Russian Empire, extended later to cover the Armenian refugees and 
providing them with identity certificates or Nansen Passports (Jaeger 2001).  
 
Herein lies the framing of the meaning of a refugee, but limited to the case 
of Russian refugees, Armenian refugees and later the German refugees, 
which in turn frames the meaning of protection at that time limiting it to those 
fleeing from specific countries. Though capacity was created, power’s 
dimension of control remained with sovereign territories and their ruling 
authorities, which can be seen from the definition itself, and the obligation of 
issuing of travel documents.  
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The intergovernmental arrangement of 1926 stated that, "any person of 
Russian origin who does not enjoy or no longer enjoys the protection of the 
Government of the U.S.S.R. and has not acquired another nationality” 
(Simpson 1938: 608). In this definition, the norm of protection is subsumed 
to not having rights in one’s country of origin or this case Russia, but it says 
nothing about protection from what – persecution, forceful eviction, ethnic 
cleansing, etc. It was only an attempt to replace sovereign protection with a 
form of transient protection as recognized by the international community.  
 
A similar definition was provided for the Armenian refugees. However, the 
norm of sovereignty continued to be more pervasive than the norm of 
protection through treaties between states – 1919 Treaty of Neuilly, 1923 
compulsory exchange of Greek and Turkish populations (Jaeger 2001). It is 
clear that in the period prior and during the phase of the League of Nations 
phase protection and sovereignty existed side-by-side – not antithetical to 
each other but co-existed indifferently. Bilateral treaties and agreements 
marked their normative separation. But the clash lies in the counter-intuitive 
nature of this co-existence because refugees were returned to territories of 
their persecution in contradiction to the normative meaning and intention of 
protection.  
 
The nature of refugee protection changed in the period during the League of 
Nations, in 1933 to be more precise with the introduction of non-
refoulement. Added into the 1933 Convention on the International Status of 
Refugees, this “served as a model for the 1951 Convention” (Jaeger 2001: 
730). But everyone did not benefit from this principle. The 1938 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany states that, 
"Persons possessing or having possessed German nationality and not 
possessing any other nationality who are proved not to enjoy in law or in fact 
the protection of the German Government, and stateless persons not 
governed by previous Conventions or Agreements who have left German 
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territory after being established therein and who are proved not to enjoy in 
law or in fact the protection of the German Government."27 This special 
convention, however, did not include the non-refoulement provision 
(Simpson 1938).  
 
This temporary nature of protection of refugees shifted more dramatically in 
the period after the League of Nations and the fleeting period of the 
International Refugee Organization in the aftermath of the Second World 
War with the creation of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. The 
establishment of a more permanent structure for the protection of refugees 
also shifted the meaning, intent and power of the international norms of 
protection itself. By the time the refugee convention was being drafted, it 
had a wealth of international normative standards and practices to draw 
from, especially that of human rights.  
 
“The 1951 Convention was the first, and indeed remains the only, binding 
refugee protection instrument of a universal character. It was actually an 
instrument of rather limited intent, addressed particularly to the question of 
the status of refugees, not to solutions or to causes. While it traced its 
origins broadly to human rights principles, it was more about states’ 
responsibilities than individuals’ rights” (Feller 2001: 131). The 1951 
convention draws on Article 14 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries 
asylum from persecution.”28 But the intent of the convention is towards what 
states should do and how they should go about assigning status to those 
who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted...is outside the country 
                                                        
27
 Convention Concerning the Status of Refugee Coming from Germany, adopted by the 
League of Nations on 10 February 1938, League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. CXCII, No. 
4461, page 59 
28
 UN General Assembly Resolution on Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on 
10 December 1948, 217A (III) 
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of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country…”29  
 
Together with replicating and particularizing the meaning and intent of 
previous norms of refugee protection, the 1951 Convention also reinforces 
the power of existing norms, especially of sovereignty, also thereby 
establishing its own power by association. “The 1951 Convention does not 
provide any detailed indication as to the manner in which the refugee 
definition is to be interpreted and applied-a matter which is therefore left to 
the sovereignty of the State parties. It follows that the application of the 
refugee definition is couched in very broad terms permitting different 
interpretations which may all be correct from a purely legal standpoint” 
(Bertrand 1993: 497).  
 
The continuing cascading of the norms of sovereignty, protection of 
refugees and international protection can be inferred even before state 
adherence because of the 1951 Convention is an extension of the already 
accepted meanings, intentions and practices of the community of states. 
Though it gives states the capacity – power to – to act for and with those 
seeking asylum and grants capacity to asylum seekers to seek refuge, it 
also grants states control – power over – over refugees by deciding whether 
or not to grant asylum. This continuous dynamic nature of norm cascading 
leads to questions of legitimacy of existing as well as emerging norms.  
 
(iii) Strengthening Existing Parameters of Legitimacy and Creating 
Legitimacy by Extension 
As normative meaning and power are replicated and particularized in the 
dynamic processes of norm development and cascading, legitimacy – 
degrees, levels and types – is also a crucial influencing factor, and dynamic 
                                                        
29
 This is drawn from Article 1 A(2) of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 
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norm cascading also influences existing and emerging legitimacy of agents 
and structures – meaning it is also an outcome of norm cascading. It is an 
essential element in understanding not only the cascading of norms, but the 
parallel reinforcement of the intersubjective – individual and collective – 
identity of states. Though constructivist theories of norm development and 
constructivism itself include legitimacy as a significant element of normative 
international relations, legitimacy is reflected as inherent in the construct of 
norms – legitimacy lies in the fact that a norm is considered legitimate – and 
an agentic property.  
 
This means that, as Finnemore (2009: 61) says, “Legitimacy can only be 
given by others. It is conferred either by peers, as when great powers accept 
or reject the actions of another power, or by those upon whom power is 
exercised.” This is only one aspect of legitimacy, whether in a society of 
persons or a society of states. It needs further conceptualization and there is 
yet “a convincing account of how legitimacy works,” as Ian Hurd (1999: 380) 
notes. And how it works is best studied in the international arena according 
to Franck (1990: 21): “if one is ever to demonstrate the existence of the 
legitimacy factor in securing obedience to norms, the global polis is where 
the elusive factor may be found, isolated and studied by social scientist,” 
especially considering the lack of a global sovereign authority which is not 
the case in a society of persons where the coercive sovereign always lurks 
in the background (Clark 2005). 
 
But, without an overbearing sovereign, legitimacy is more than just the 
acceptance or rejection – positive or negative perception – of the actions of 
another. It is important to, in the first instance, recognize and account for the 
legitimacy vested in an agent – where does it comes from if not from the 
existence of an authority, then from where? Political science and 
international relations scholars have come to accept that at the global level, 
legitimacy is “conferred upon international political institutions” (Claude Jr. 
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1966: 370). Some, like Hurd (2007), go as far as to say that sovereignty – 
legitimizing factor – from the domestic realm is transferred to international 
institutions such as the United Nations Security Council and other such 
global bodies. As theories of constructivism already claim (see chapter 3) 
the organizational platform is an important factor in the development and 
cascading of international norms, not just the norm entrepreneur. Hurd has 
theoretically and empirically proven this point.  
 
Does each agent have the same degree of legitimacy to have and give? 
This brings into question the power of an agent itself. Having discussed the 
conflicted nature of norms and their power conflicts in the section above, are 
agents able to confer the same degree of legitimacy for different norms, 
especially those that are conflictual – for instance are norms of human rights 
as legitimate or perceived as legitimate as the norms of sovereignty and 
non-intervention? Are the same degrees of legitimacy conferred on 
emerging norms within the dynamic norm cascading model? Sometimes, 
there are different forms and degrees of legitimacy are conferred on the 
same norms. For instance, if democracy is considered the most legitimate 
form of government, government formation and governing, then, why is the 
“Kingdom” of Saudi Arabia not considered illegitimate? Why is a military 
coup not a legitimate way of claiming power? An interesting observation by 
a political adviser at ICRC, Andre Pasquier (2001: 3), may provide some 
answers to the origins of the perception of legitimacy as he reflects on the 
legitimacy of the organization. This is what he says:  
 
“The ICRC occupies a unique place among humanitarian 
organizations. Founded well over a century ago, it has played a key 
role in the development of the modern concept of humanitarian 
action. Although a private institution, the ICRC has a humanitarian 
mandate conferred on it by States and sanctioned in international 
law. Its legitimacy as a humanitarian agency is therefore soundly 
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established. This legitimacy is upheld by three elements: the first is 
a set of principles that lend the ICRC's work its moral legitimacy; 
the second is a legal framework, made up today of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols of 1977, legal 
instruments drafted on the initiative of the ICRC and now enjoying 
universal acceptance; and the third is the product of time, the 
legitimacy acquired through activities conducted in the long term. 
Indeed, while the notion of legitimacy suggests the recognition of 
competencies, it is also directly linked to the way in which those 
competencies are exercised. Hence the importance for 
humanitarian action to affirm itself by a constant practice that 
guarantees moral legitimacy, which is by nature more subjective.”  
 
Pasquier’s observations about the ICRC provide some insights into where 
legitimacy comes from. Unlike Claude Jr. (1966) who suggests that legality 
and morality are conflicting principles of the concept of legitimacy and do not 
on their own, or in combination exhaust the field; Pasquier indicates that it is 
both morality and legality that gives ICRC its legitimacy. His third element of 
time is an important element of the concept of legitimacy, which is not only 
characterized by the length of time that the ICRC has been in existence but 
also by the length of time the ICRC has carried out its mandate and how it 
has carried out its mandate in that time. The same observations could be 
made of the United Nations as an organization that has moral and legal and 
temporal legitimacy conferred by the states that are also its constituent 
members. It almost seems tautological. But if, as Pasquier notes, morality 
and legality are legitimizing, then where do the legitimacy of the structures of 
morals and laws come from?  
 
Legitimization is not a one-time process; it is a product of time as Pasquier 
notes, but not only through continued compliance to norms – or mandate in 
the case of the ICRC – and adherence to stipulated practices of a norm – 
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moral or legal – but also because of the emergence of norms that are 
embedded in already legitimate normative structures and institutions. 
Legitimacy, like meaning and power, is strengthened and extended through 
the processes of replication and particularization. Perception is the 
operationalizing element in the process of replication, and process is the 
operationalizing element in the process of particularization. States are able 
to accept and adopt emerging norms because of its existing social meaning 
that is not different from their existing normative understanding or it is an 
acceptable extension of an existing meaning. The process(es) by which the 
perception is reinforced or extended is also important in this dynamic 
construction of normalization.  
 
For instance, the World Commission on Dams may not have been entirely 
successful in garnering the necessary cascading support for intersubjective 
universal adoption or adherence. But after the disbanding of the WCD at the 
end of its stipulated period of work, the Dams and Development Project 
(DDP) took on the job of promoting and persuading states to conduct the 
business of dams in conformity with the WCD recommended regulations. 
This was because “the WCD…did ultimately produce a set of regulative 
recommendations based on decision making procedures, but these were 
embedded within a constitutive shift of considerable scope: locating the 
underlying basis for decision making about dams (and infrastructure in 
general) within a rights discourse rather than technoeconomic calculus” 
(Dubash 2009: 230).  
 
By embedding the dams discourse within the rights framework, the issue of 
legitimacy was no longer just limited to being perceived from the institutional 
perspective but also from the normative perspective – it was no longer 
vested only in the agent but also drawing agents because of the normative 
legitimacy that already existed in the rights framework. The Commission, in 
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its final report, clearly situated the dams debate, its findings and 
recommendations as such: 
 
“In moving forward the Commission recognizes that the dams debate is 
rooted in the wider, ongoing debate on development. The emerging global 
vision of equitable and sustainable development provides the foundation for 
the Commission’s findings and recommendations, as elaborated in its report 
of 2000. This foundation relates to: 
 the framework of internationally accepted norms on human rights, 
the right to development, and sustainability 
 global trends and the emerging development paradigm; and 
 a rights based approach where recognition of rights and 
assessment of risks provides the basis for negotiated decisions on 
dams and their alternatives.” 
 
It also called upon the globally accepted human development framework 
based on a growing number of norms, frameworks, conventions and 
standards: Economic development during the first half of the 20th century 
was dominated by an approach that emphasized harnessing and 
appropriating water and other natural resources for economic activities. 
Since the United Nations Charter (1945) and The Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights (1948), a globally accepted development framework setting 
out universal goals, norms, and standards has been gradually emerging. 
These declarations have been augmented over time by the Convention 
Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal 
and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (1959), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, (1966), the 
UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1986), and the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), among others. 
Together they form the current framework for sustainable human 
development.” Recognizing the existence of competing rights and normative 
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frameworks to apply to these situations, the WCD tackled any institutional 
legitimacy concerns by drawing attention to the normative, indicating the 
legitimacy of norms and their exertion on agents.   
 
4.3. Applying the New Enhanced Framework 
Having explored the conceptual and operational aspects of what constitutes 
the processes of the proposed mid-level framework of this thesis, this final 
section of the chapter sets out the guidelines (or manual) we have adopted 
in implementing this proposed framework in a three-stage procedure.  
 
4.3.1. Stage 1: Synchronic Diagnostics 
The first step is a simple symptomatic diagnostic – look and seek for the 
obvious – of the norm itself. Sticking to what has been defined as norm 
cascading in this thesis – meaning, power and legitimacy – the first step 
involves understanding: 
 the meaning of the norm as it has been accepted 
 powers – capacity to act and possible actions – generated by the 
norm 
 perception of legitimacy of the norm 
 
In the moment of creation and development of a norm, what did the norm 
mean? What is its scope? What powers does it allow/disallow? What 
particulars does it legitimize or not? The answers to this investigation comes 
from two sources – the first would be the norm instrument itself in whatever 
final form it was accepted by states, whether a convention, treaty, protocol, 
guiding principles or a resolution by one of the globally-accepted 
international bodies or institutions. This source needs to be unpacked for its 
language, structure and norm entrepreneurship. This first step is closely 
linked to the life cycle stage of norm emergence as it is at this stage that the 
dynamics of the norm’s intended meaning, power and legitimacy is best 
observed through the process of persuasion, negotiations and lobbying (see 
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figure 1 above) because the phase between norm emergence and norm 
cascading is the synchronic period. It provides the best possible synchronic 
diagnostic space.  
 
As explained in the previous chapter, it is in this initial phase of the life cycle 
that the framing (Barnett 1999) or objectivation (Berger and Luckmann 
1996) of the norm takes place. The scope and characteristic boundaries – 
meaning – of a norm that are defined and negotiated here would provide a 
few answers in this first stage. To identify the power of the norm, the life 
cycle uses the tipping point of state support, acceptance and adherence as 
an enumerative indicator. This quantitative qualification can be used, but 
only as an additional validating measure. In the first instance to get a 
baseline reference for norm power, one can refer to the instrument where 
provisions or what states can and cannot do or how state must or must not 
act can be extracted. Identifying or extracting legitimacy at this stage is not 
easy as it is meshed in with state identities and the inherent notion of 
legitimate emergence of norms, almost as if legitimacy existentially 
precedes the emergence of norms. However for the purposes of this 
framework, the initial deliberations about the conceptualization and 
development of a norm could be used to assess perceptions of legitimacy 
amongst states.  
 
The inferences from an examination of the norm instrument itself can be 
further padded with the second source, which is secondary literature that 
has already deliberated the respective norm in depth revealing its 
connotations, capacities and perceptions. The secondary literature is also 
helpful in instances where the norm instrument may be vague in its scope 
and provisions. It is also a way to validate and verify the accuracy of one’s 
own assessment and evaluation of the norm. This first stage not only sets 
the baseline against which the next genealogical step is executed, but it also 
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marks the point to which the framework has to return in stage 3 where a re-
evaluation is carried out.  
 
4.3.2. Stage 2: Genealogical Exploration 
The second stage is the core of the proposed framework. Having identified 
the basic scope of nature of the norm in question, the first step of this stage 
is finding answers to the following:  
 What elements or provisions in the norm instruments are new 
(particularization)? Are these absolutely new or an extension of 
existing norms and normative frameworks? 
 What elements or provisions are not (replication)? Which norms or 
normative structures are being replicated? 
 
The elements or provisions are thematic indicators for the next step in this 
stage, which is a genealogical exploration. For instance, on 14 December 
1960, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1514 (XV) 
solemnly proclaimed “the necessity of bringing to a speedy and 
unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.” 30  This 
resolution hinges, as the document states, on the understanding that “the 
subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation 
constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter 
of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace 
and co-operation.”31 This was the creation of the norm of decolonization, 
which by 1960 was already an increasingly accepted international normative 
standard irrespective of whether states practiced or adhered to this norm.  
 
However to estimate the depth of cascading of the norm of decolonization 
and its associated practices, one would have to draw out thematic clusters 
                                                        
30
 Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, 14 
December 1960, UNGA Res 1514 (XV) 
31
 Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, 14 
December 1960, UNGA Res 1514 (XV) 
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from the 1960 declaration. The clusters are not determined by any particular 
measure of legality, but more through a broad categorization of a norm’s 
meaning and scope extracted in the first stage and assessing what and how 
much of the norm is a replication or a particularization of existing normative 
structures. In case of the declaration on decolonization, the thematic 
indicators could be sovereignty, international peace and security or 
peacebuilding, the fundamental norms of human rights or a more specific 
human right, such as the right of peoples to self-determination, and so on.  
 
Each cluster will provide a point of departure for a genealogical analysis of 
the respective norm cluster. Conceptualized by Nietzsche (1887, 1913) and 
popularized by Foucault, the genealogical method not only provides a 
historical perspective to the development of an international norm and its 
cascading but does so in a non-linear, non-causal manner. In Nietzsche’s 
(1887, 1913: 50) words: “The cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual 
utility, its actual employment and place in a system of purposes, lie worlds 
apart; whatever exists having somehow come into being, is again and again 
reinterpreted to new ends…the entire history of a “thing,” an organ, a 
custom can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of ever new 
interpretations and adaptations whose causes do not even have to be 
related to one another but, on the contrary, in some cases succeed and 
alternate with one another in a purely chance fashion.”  
 
However this research is not looking for origins of norm clusters as much as 
it is seeking “to reestablish the various systems of subjection: not the 
anticipatory power of meaning, but the…play of dominations” (Foucault 
1980: 83) whether in the normative structures itself or in the dialectical 
nature of agency, and most often both. This dynamism and complexity is 
revealed through a history that emphasizes “contestation,” (Klotz and Lynch 
2007: 31) “chance occurrences, fortuitous connections and reinterpretations” 
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(Price 1995: 86) that have sometimes led to change and at other times 
maintained order and as this research proposes, both. 
 
This historical tracing entails understanding the dynamic nature and scope 
of cascading of a respective norm cluster over time as they may have 
evolved or regressed or may have even ceased to have been recognized as 
a norm in certain time periods in its own right or in relation to other norms or 
chosen clusters. Indicators of such significant historical moments or periods 
could be emergence or reinforcement of norms that relate to he cluster or 
the programmatic implementation of norms, and the debates and literature 
that follow from it. A cluster-based genealogical analysis not only 
demonstrates that norms are embedded in and interlinked to multiple 
existing norms, but also that life cycles of norms are not linear, and solely 
dependent on state acceptance and adherence. However, in a research with 
limited space and time, there needs to be a limited number of clusters, but 
enough to solidify the purposes of the research.  
 
This thesis uses three clusters. A cluster approach also helps narrow the 
genealogical period of analysis. How further back a genealogy must travel 
depends on the nature and purpose of the research and the answer to the 
question: does half a millennia vs. half a century make a significant 
difference to the findings? In the case of this research, the period of 
genealogical exploration varies between 50 and 500 years in the preliminary 
testing phase that uses two cases. A set or pre-defined time period cannot 
be prescribed, but a researcher must define such time period as is feasible 
and valid to substantiate the research.  
 
The genealogical approach here serves two purposes. Firstly it reveals the 
replication and particularization of norms and normative clusters through 
time and space. Secondly, in doing so normative instruments – ones 
preceded the norm under research – that enable such replication and 
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particularization are identified. This allows for an additional cascading 
indicator – the number of states that accepted the norm in a particular 
moment in time. The other indicator – perhaps harder to trace – would be 
finding programmatic evidence within, for instance, UN institutions such as 
UNDP, UNHCR or other multilateral organizations. At this stage, country-
specific domestication of international norms through laws or programmes 
cannot be chosen as programmatic indicator One of these additional 
cascading indicators concretizes the genealogical findings. This research 
uses the number of states as the indicator as it lays the groundwork for the 
final stage of the application of the proposed theoretical framework. 
 
4.3.3. Stage 3: Unpacking Norm Internalization 
This final stage links the framework back to the norm life cycle model. 
Having revealed the cascading of related and dominant norms replicated 
and particularized through norm clusters extracted from the norm being 
researched, stage 2 lays out a historical map of what all the previous 
periods of cascading means for the cascading of the new norm in the 
present, and how the norm being researched has actually cascaded in the 
present. So, if a state has not accepted a new norm but has accepted 
previous related norms and norm clusters, it can be assumed that this 
respective state has also accepted the new norm, at least in its replicated 
parts. This, in turn, means that certain parts of the norm can be considered 
to have cascaded more than the entirety of the norm.  
 
To execute this stage 3, one or two states and their acceptance of previous 
norms against their acceptance or non-acceptance of the new norm have to 
be analyzed. Beyond signing and ratification of norms, internalization 
involves legalization through domestic laws or national policies, or 
programmatic implementation that sets achievable and measurable targets. 
The choice of the country case in stage 3 can be determined with the help of 
the cascading indicator of number of states used in stage 2. If programmatic 
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evidence was used as the cascading indicator in stage 2, one could choose 
a state that has accepted one of the norms from the clusters and analyze its 
acceptance and adherence, or lack thereof, against the same state’s 
acceptance of the new norm.  
 
Borrowing from Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) the dynamic norm 
cascading framework can be said to bring about a first boomerang effect 
leading to a second boomerang effect in the stage of state compliance and 
adherence influenced by national and transnational actors as suggested in 
The Power of Human Rights. The rethinking norm internalization stage 
enables a closer reevaluation of norm cascading from the international to 
the national sphere not just theoretically but also empirically, thereby 
shedding more light on norm cascading and its dynamics.  
 
4.3.4. Change and Order 
This more dynamic exploration of a norm’s life cycle not only reveals the 
complexity of normative structures and its power on state agency and vice 
versa, but also leads this research to look at the dual existence and 
operationalization of change and order.  
 
Change, though pertinent to the constructivist view of international relations, 
is two-faced. It would be difficult to ignore the fact that while increasing 
reach and reinforcement of social structures, the elaboration and integration 
of focused practices into existing norms and the shifting parameters of 
legitimacy and more may all indicate change; it also signifies that this 
change is actually “rooted in existing social structures, maintained by the 
power of practice and quite impervious to change” because constructivist 
power is also the power “to reproduce, discipline and police” (Hopf 1998: 
180). Therefore change can be progressive and enabling as well as 
hegemonic and disciplining in the Foucaultian sense, thereby also impacting 
methodologically in rethinking the study of change in international relations. 
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A critical approach needs to be adopted in exploring the processes of 
replication and particularization as processes of change. 
 
A dynamic norm cascading allows this research to categorize cascading as 
relevant to the proposed processes of replication and particularization – 
cyclical norm cascading and catalytic norm cascading. The first is 
characteristic of order while the latter demonstrates change or shifts in 
normative structures. In replicating the meaning, power and legitimacy of 
existing norms, the emerging norms are reinforcing the normativeness of the 
existing understanding of that which is accepted thereby creating a cyclical 
cascading effect, which demonstrate the ongoing process of normalization 
and continuity and continuous strengthening of order. Meanwhile, the 
extension of existing meaning, power and legitimacy through 
particularization leads to catalytic cascading, which demonstrates change.  
 
The co-habitation of international order and change also reflects and 
reinforces an important feature of normative international relations – a 
hierarchy of norms. There are fundamental norms that lay the foundation to 
normative international relations, such as sovereignty, peace and security, 
human rights to name a few. It is the tension between these fundamental 
norms that cause the, sometimes, conflicted compliance with and adherence 
to, or lack thereof, these and other norms in the hierarchy. It is not the 
purpose of this research to elaborate on this hierarchy but it is worth flagging 
here for future further research. Understanding norm cascading in such a 
dynamic manner also has far reaching implications for understanding 
international policy development, how it works and how to improve the 
processes involved in international political institutions, and perhaps gain 
better state acceptance and adherence. 
 
Change and progress in international relations seldom means to “climb 
towards the top, but mainly away from the abyss,” to quote Emmanuel Adler 
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(1991). Change is not always a dramatic big bang; sometimes it is slow, 
gradual and an ongoing process. This process is revealed in the dynamic 
norm cascading framework proposed in this research. In the following 
chapters, this framework will be tested, first in a preliminary phase of two 




























CHAPTER 5.  
PRELIMINARY TESTING OF THE ENHANCED MODEL 
 
The previous chapter set out a revised life cycle model that aims to reveal a 
more critically insightful and dynamic development of international norms. 
Before studying and examining the development and life of the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement using the new model, it will be first 
tested in this chapter using two cases – the 2000 UN Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Preliminary testing helps in three ways: it demonstrates how the renovated 
life cycle model can be applied, it reveals any strengths, weaknesses or 
difficulties in applying such a model, and it also provides an opportunity to 
adjust or rectify the model. This chapter moves from one case study to the 
next, starting with the UNSCR 1325. Each case is examined according to 
the three overall stages of the developed model, as formulated in previous 
chapter.   
 
There are several reasons for selecting these two test cases. Firstly, the 
cases present different types of international norms and normative 
instruments, which make for robust testing of the proposed model, and 
hypothesis. While the first is a UN Security Council resolution, the second is 
a treaty instrument. It examines the extent to which the model can be used 
to test the development and spread of any type of international norm. 
Secondly, they touch on different areas of international relations, while one 
relates to issues on women and peace, gender equality, and humanitarian 
law, the other relates to the non-use of chemical weapons. This also adds to 
the robustness of testing as the model and hypothesis can then be applied 
to different normative spheres, and across norm ecosystems demonstrating 
the dynamic nature of norm development and life.  
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Thirdly, the test cases chosen are theoretically of varying degrees of legal 
obligation and adherence. Many scholars have argued that the degree of 
legality of an international normative instrument bears little weight on its 
application or realization, and it is more a question of perception and 
accepted understanding within the international community (Kratochwil 
1989; Finnemore 2000; Abbott, Keohane, et al. 2000; Whitman 2010). This 
thesis will not delve into the impact of the legal nature of a norm on its 
development or life, except to note its legal standing within the international 
community as one of the potentially relevant factors. Meanwhile, it also has 
to be noted that each preliminary testing case will not unpacked to its 
entirety owing to lack of space. Emphasis will be laid on learning how to 
operationalize the model effectively, and examine the cases to a reasonable 
extent. 
 
5.1. CASE I: UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, 2000  
 
Policy and development practitioners, human rights and women’s activists, 
national and international non-governmental organizations and countries 
across the world, and the UN itself have hailed the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 as a milestone, a historic landmark (Pratt 
and Richter-Devroe 2011), not only for women all over the world, but also for 
the progress of human rights, human development and peace and security. 
It marked the first time that the UN Security Council dealt specifically with 
gender issues and women’s experiences in ‘conflict’ and ‘post-conflict’ 
situations and their contributions to conflict resolution and prevention (Cohn 
2008).  
 
Adopted in October 2000, UNSCR 1325 brought women’s rights and related 
issues, specifically with respect to peace and security processes in conflict 
and post-conflict societies, to the forefront of international relations and 
practice, coming as it did from one of the highest international political 
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institutions – the UN Security Council (UNSC). It is considered one of the 
most authoritative international normative instruments in the area of women 
and peace. However, many practitioners and scholars have criticized the grit 
and effectiveness of the resolution. The next few subsections will investigate 
the normative depth and significance of UNSCR 1325 through the 
reformulated life cycle model to understand better what it means of and by 
itself, and what it means for international normative change and progress.  
 
5.1.1. Stage 1: Synchronic Diagnostics of UNSCR 1325 
5.1.1.1. From Entrepreneurship to Creation 
“Members of the Security Council recognize that peace is inextricably linked 
with equality between women and men. They affirm that the equal access 
and full participation of women in power structures and their full involvement 
in all efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts are essential for the 
maintenance and promotion of peace and security.” 32  This statement by 
then President of the UNSC, Ambassador Ankur Chowdhury, on 8 March 
2000 provided the much-needed boost to the already simmering issue of the 
role of women in peace and security.  
 
Since 1998, organizations working on women’s issues around peace and 
security were seeking such a normative entry point because of the lack of 
means and ways to implement, actualize and realize what was to be 
achieved following the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action. Ambassador 
Chowdhury, and several NGOs – especially the Women and Armed Conflict 
(WAC) Caucus – working on and promoting women and peace issues could 
be considered the norm entrepreneurs in this case. At one of the many 
events organized by WAC to advocate for women and peace issues, 
                                                        
32
 UNSC (2000), Peace Inextricably Linked with Equality between Women and Men says 
Security Council, in International Women’s Day Statement, Press Release SC/6816, 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000308.sc6816.doc.html, accessed on 15 February 
2015 
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Security Council members were invited. 33  Delegations from Bangladesh, 
Canada, China, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States accepted the invitation – that is four out of five of the 
permanent members. It was at this meeting that Ambassador Chowdhury 
made an open declaration that “reinforced his support for the role of women 
in peace efforts. He also informed the women that he was working with other 
colleagues to devote a session of the Security Council to discussing the 
roles of women in armed conflict and peace and requested their help in 
garnering support from the fourteen other Security Council members on the 
issue” (Hill, Aboitiz, and Poehlman‐ Doumbouya 2003: 1257).  
 
Ambassador Chowdhury and the NGO members did not have to wait long 
for this support. The formation of a NGO Working Group on Women and 
International Peace and Security led to more targeted persuasion for two 
specific objectives: to encourage women’s participation in peace 
agreements, and to push for the convening of a special session of the 
Security Council on women, peace, and security (Hill, Aboitiz, and 
Poehlman‐ Doumbouya 2003). The UNSC special session was finally called 
for in October 2000 under the presidency of Namibia held by Ambassador 
Martin Andjaba, which led to the tabling and adoption of the UNSC 
Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women and Peace and Security. This 
condensed period of a few months in 2000 witnessed the emergence, the 
persuasion, unanimous adoption, and acceptance/cascading of the norm 
that is considered debatably transformative.  
 
The legitimacy of the UNSC will not be deliberated here, except to note that 
it is accepted in the global community as a body of exceptional importance, 
and its resolutions carry the same weight. This authority and power is vested 
                                                        
33
 Informal meeting between NGOs and UNSC, started in 1993 by Diego Arria, Venezuela’s 
ambassador to the United Nations when he invited members of the UNSC to listen to the 
views of a Bosnian priest over coffee. This has since come to be known as the Arria 
Formula Meeting. The Arria Formula Meetings are a discursive space that, though informal, 
feeds the formal discursive processes within the UN. 
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in the UNSC through articles 24 and 25 of the UN Charter34. They not only 
confer the UNSC with responsibility for and authority on international peace 
and security, but also state that it is the duty of all members of the UN to 
accept and carry out all decisions made by the UNSC. Therefore in the case 
of UNSCR 1325, as is with any UNSC resolution, once adopted, its 
cascading is a given, at least in theory, and especially through programmatic 
implementation at the national or local levels. This means that the cascading 
of UNSC resolutions are incumbent upon its adoption at the international 
level, and not on its “tipping over” by the individual acceptance of a critical 
mass of states. The analysis of the country case of Somalia in stage 3 will 
reveal this cascading nuance. However, first to complete the synchronic 
examination the following sub-section explores the normative foundations of 
the Women, Peace and Security resolution.  
 
5.1.1.2. UNSCR 1325 and its Normative Foundations  
UNSCR 1325 links women, peace and security into a succinct global 
commitment like no other document before. As a succinct 18-point landmark 
document, it gave practitioners, researchers and other professionals in the 
fields of peace, security, and gender issues the reinvigorating boost they 
needed in the post-Beijing years to keep their overlapping agendas moving 
forward. It is also the only resolution of its kind to be adopted by the UN 
Security Council.  
 
The resolution is normatively hinged on four pillars – prevention, protection, 
participation, and relief and recovery. The Security Council introduced these 
pillars retroactively in an attempt to assess the progress of the programmatic 
implementation of the resolution in a standardized way.35 The four pillars 
have, however, also come to be accepted as the most common thematic 
understanding of UNSCR 1325. The normative purpose of the resolution 
                                                        
34
 Charter of the United Nations, adopted on 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI 
35
 Paragraph 17 of UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1889 (2009), adopted on 5 
October 2009 
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was to boost the role of women internationally as agents of peace, 
preventers and resolvers of violence and conflict, and thus on both counts 
needing greater and deeper participation in the various dimensions of 
peacekeeping, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict resolution.  
 
Portraying women as peacekeepers, peacebuilders with ability to prevent 
and resolve conflicts was a much welcome normative development through 
the pillars of prevention and participation. However, it reflects a top-down 
imposition of the agency of women that is symbolic and limited to political 
participation and decision-making in conflict and peace processes. Ellerby 
(2013: 456) highlights that “women’s physical presence at formal talks is not 
enough to guarantee (en)gendered security, especially when there are 
norms and strategies used to marginalize their activities and ideas.” Others 
like Bjarnegard and Melander (2013) warn against the oversimplification of 
the relationship between women’s participation in parliament and peace. 
 
Though the resolution makes an attempt to highlight women’s engagement 
in peace and security, it is overshadowed, some criticize, by an emphasis on 
their vulnerability and victimhood through the remaining two pillars of 
protection and recovery and relief, starting from the opening paragraph of 
the resolution itself: 
 
Recalling its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1265 
(1999) of 17 September 1999, 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000 and 
1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000, as well as relevant statements of its 
President, and recalling also the statement of its President to the 
press on the occasion of the United Nations Day for Women’s 
Rights and International Peace (International Women’s Day) of 8 
March 2000 (SC/6816) 
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Resolutions 1261 (1999) and 1265 (1999) both relate to children in armed 
conflict, while the latter, 1296 (2000) and 1314 (2000), relate to protection of 
civilians in armed conflict. Situating women in this background by choosing 
to recall these resolution in the very first instance portrays women as weak, 
vulnerable and needing protection. The perception of women as equal 
actors in peace, security and development is only raised in paragraph two 
with reference to the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and 
the outcome of the review five years later in Beijing +5 called Women 2000: 
Gender, Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty First Century. But 
even in these discursive documents the primary identity of women is that of 
victims.  
 
A focus on the protection of women, mostly in association with children, has 
had a special place in international humanitarian and human rights laws for 
centuries. And despite a debatable overemphasis on ‘women as victims,’ it 
would only thus seem prudent for resolution 1325 to include protection, and 
relief and recovery as important pillars in the norm creation of women, 
peace and security, thereby also fitting into existing normative frameworks. 
The following section extracts three norm clusters within which the 
resolution is embedded. 
 
5.1.1.3. Embedding in Existing Normative Frameworks and Extracting 
Clusters  
Though a landmark resolution, the 18-point international commitment is not 
new. The recalling a few of the earlier such resolutions and treaties relating 
to protection of women, elimination of discrimination against them, and 
reaffirming their participatory role are indicative of this fact. There are also 
more generic – non-gender specific – international commitments of 
prevention of, and protection from violence that also apply to women, such 
as the UN Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva 
Conventions, and many more treaties and resolutions. 
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Nevertheless UNSCR 1325 is significant in scope and purpose in its own 
way. It is an important extension of the existing international normative 
structures that apply or can apply to women, and their role in promoting and 
maintaining peace and security. Of the 18 points, nearly half refer to some 
aspects of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. For instance, the first provision 
in the resolution calls for an increase in the participation of women in 
decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes. 
Meanwhile, the resolution also emphasizes the need for training member 
states on the importance of involving women in peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding. Further below in the list of provisions is an emphasis on the 
responsibility of states to prosecute those responsible for genocides, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity; and specific consideration for the 
needs of male and female ex-combatant in DDR.  
 
A few of other paragraphs in UNSCR 1325 refer to international 
humanitarian laws and practices, such as the call to parties of armed 
conflicts to take special measures to protect women and girls against 
violence, or the call for respect of the humanitarian nature of refugee camps 
with particular emphasis on the needs of displaced women and girls, and so 
on and so forth. Meanwhile, the overarching scope of the resolution aims at 
gender equality, or at women’s equality, in the limited sense of the term 
gender, within the peace and security framework.  
 
This brief synchronic and content examination of UNSCR 1325 reveals that 
its meaning, power and legitimacy – construct and cascading – situates the 
normative framework of women, peace and security within broader ones. It 
would seem that women, peace and security is being embedded into larger 
existing international normative frameworks or clusters, through 
reaffirmations or replication and extension through particularization of 
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accepted norms and practices, as will be demonstrated in the genealogical 
cluster examination below.  
 
The emphasis on protection of women is based in the replication of existing 
international humanitarian standards and practices. Meanwhile, much of the 
focus on participating in UNSCR 1325 bears a liberal peacebuilding shadow. 
The overall agenda of gender equality and gender balancing also has long 
and deep normative roots. Therefore the three norm clusters extracted here 
for the next stage of genealogical exploration of UNSCR 1325 are: 
humanitarian protection of women, liberal peacebuilding, and gender 
balancing. A exploration of these clusters provide a better genealogical 
grasp of the meaning, power and legitimacy that has enabled or influenced 
the construct and cascading of the Women, Peace and Security resolution.  
 
5.1.2. Stage 2: Re-understanding UNSCR 1325 – A Genealogical 
Approach  
 
5.1.2.1. Cluster 1 – Upholding Humanitarian Law 
Timeframe: 1863-1949 
During wartime, if a woman cannot find sustenance in her own home due to 
the capture of someone, she is free to go to another’s house and will be 
blameless. This may seem like an odd legal provision, but it is from one of 
the first known codes of laws written in any human civilization – the 
Hammurabi Code. Code 134 is the only mention of war and women in the 
Code of 282 provisions. The few other provisions related to women and their 
culpability is situated in various peacetime situations. Fractionally 
humanitarian in nature, code 134 reflects the status of women in Babylonia, 
and the complete disregard of their wartime need for protection of any kind. 
However, as the nature and laws of war changed, so did the accepted 
standards of behavior during war, including the protection of persons in or 
affected by war – armed and unarmed.  
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5.1.2.1.1. The Honour in Early Humanitarian Laws  
“…The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed 
citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the 
exigencies of war will admit.”36 As contemporary as this rule of war may 
seem, it dates back to 1863, and the American Civil War. Drafted by Prof. 
Francis Lieber, the Lieber Code is said to be the foundation of International 
Humanitarian Law. This early recognition of the protection of unarmed 
citizens or civilians during war is indicative of two things – firstly, that women 
were afforded humanitarian protection without special mention from the 
earliest respective laws and practices, but secondly, that women were also 
imposed with the unique, if perhaps stigmatizing, social status of upholding 
personal, familial and societal honor.37  
 
The recognition of honor as something to be spared in battles and wars is 
considered specifically aimed at protecting women against war violence of a 
sexual nature. This is true even today, and has much to do with the 
perception of women in times of peace, as scholars such as Olujic (1998: 
31-32) state: “War rapes in the former Yugoslavia would not be such an 
effective weapon of torture and terror if it were not for concepts of honor, 
shame and sexuality that are attached to women’s bodies in peacetime.”  
 
5.1.2.1.2. Trapped in a Biological Construct 
Protection of women during times of war continued through the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries too. However, the perception of the needs of women 
was not always only through a biological lens. With the birth of the ICRC, 
and that of international humanitarian law as we know it today, women “had 
had the same general legal protection as men,” says Françoise Krill (1985: 
                                                        
36
 United States of America, Article 22 of The Lieber Code: Instructions for the Government 
of Armies of the United States in the Field, 24 April 1863   
37
 For more on the stigmatizing construction of honour, see Gardam, J. (1997) Women and 
the Law of Armed Conflict: Why the Silence? International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
Vol. 46, p. 57 
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337). If they were wounded, women were protected by the provisions of the 
1864 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded in Armies in the Field; if they became prisoners of war, they 
benefited from the Regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions of 1899 
and 1907 (Krill 1985). 
 
In 1929 however, the protection of women, once again, became more 
specified to their needs in biological terms. Articles 3 and 4 of the 1929 
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War state that, 
“prisoners of war are entitled to respect for their persons and honour. 
Women shall be treated with all consideration due to their sex.” And 
“Differences of treatment between prisoners are permissible only if such 
differences are based on the military rank, the state of physical or mental 
health, the professional abilities, or the sex of those who benefit from 
them.”38  
 
The biological focus on the humanitarian protection of women remains intact 
to this day through the four 1949 Geneva Conventions adopted in the 
aftermath of World War II, and the ensuing two Additional Protocols to the 
Geneva Conventions. They contain a score and more provisions that relate 
specifically to the protection of women. Though scholars such as Krill (1985) 
and others describe it as a feature of equality, this research contends that 
there is a tension within international humanitarian law, specifically in the 
Geneva Conventions, in trying to balance the special protection needs of 
women and reiterating non-discrimination in general humanitarian 
protection. While there are provisions that emphasize that the execution of 
humanitarian treatment should be “without any adverse distinction founded 
on sex…”39 and treatment of women “as favorable as that granted to men,”40 
                                                        
38
 Articles 3 and 4 of the 1929 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War 
39
 Article 12 of Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Article 12 of Geneva 
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provisions in the Conventions also emphasize that “women shall be treated 
with all the regard due to their sex.”41  
 
The humanitarian protection of women has increasingly laid more emphasis 
on the treatment of women with due regard to their sex, such as the needs 
of pregnant women, special treatment for mothers and children, ensuring the 
protection of women against sexual violence (Gardam 2010), and other 
similar provisions.  
 
5.1.2.1.3. An Analysis 
This genealogical exploration of women in international humanitarian law 
demonstrates that the identity of women as victims was a construct of the 
early twentieth century. It is this meaning, power and legitimacy together 
with existing humanitarian normative framework that is reinforced through 
UNSCR 1325.  
 
However contested or fraught the identity of women are in international 
humanitarian law, they have been under its protection for more than a 
century. It is this protection, and their victimized identity that is replicated in 
the millennial resolution as well. Though women are primarily portrayed as 
victims within the purview of international humanitarian law, they are 
                                                                                                                                                           
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; Article 16 of Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135; 
Article 27 of Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287; Article 75 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3; Article 4 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 
40
 Article 14 of Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 
August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 
41
 Article 12 of Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Article 12 of Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; Article 14 of Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 
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projected as proponents and agents of peace in the normative structures of 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  
 
5.1.2.2. Cluster 2 – Reaffirming Faith in Liberal Peace  
Timeframe: 1975-1995 
The beginning of the post-Cold War era brought with it shifts in international 
peace and conflict norms. It was no longer limited to maintaining a ceasefire, 
but also extended to peacebuilding – the action to identify and support 
structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid 
a relapse into conflict.42 This definition in Boutros Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for 
Peace in 1992 set the tone for the practice of liberal peacebuilding, which 
included among other structural reforms institutionalizing democratic 
governing systems, elections, rule of law, and people’s participation in it and 
market-oriented economics for better growth and development (Tschirgi 
2004; Newman, Paris and Richmond 2009; Paris 2010). 
 
5.1.2.2.1. Women and Liberal Peace 
Scholars such as Chinkin and Charlesworth (2006: 938) note an important 
omission in the origins of the liberal peacebuilding agenda: “One striking 
omission for these accounts was the impact on women and their role in the 
processes of peace-building.” This omission was rectified, they claim, in 
Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. This is 
not an accurate understanding of women and their role as proponents of 
peace. The link between women and peace goes back decades, even 
before 1992 and the official promotion of norms and practices of liberal 
peace.   
 
                                                        
42
 Report of the UN Secretary General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit 
Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive 
Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992. An 
Agenda for Peace was adopted by resolution of the UN General Assembly on 8 October 
1993, A/RES/47/120B 
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As early as 1975, at the World Women’s Conference in Mexico, a few 
resolutions linking women and their role and impact on peace were adopted: 
Women’s participation in promoting world peace and international 
cooperation; Women’s participation in the strengthening of international 
peace and security and in the struggle against colonialism, racism, racial 
discrimination and foreign domination; and Women’s contribution to world 
peace through participation in international conferences.43 This is, however, 
not to say that there were no links between women and peace before 1975 
but that this research will limit the genealogical examination.  
 
In fact, the resolutions adopted in Mexico recall and reaffirm related 
resolutions adopted in the early 1970s and prior at the UN General 
Assembly or Security Council. For instance, the resolution on Women’s 
Participation in Promoting World Peace and International Cooperation, 
adopted in Mexico, recalled the UN General Assembly resolution 3010 
(XXVII) of 18 December 1972 that recognized the importance of women's 
increasing contribution to the development of international peace and 
cooperation. The latter that was unanimously adopted without a vote in 1972 
was further reiterated through replication in the former at a conference that 
was attended by 133 member states.  
 
World leaders at Mexico recognized women’s normative role in promoting 
and maintaining peace and security, and that more needed to be done to 
strengthen their capacities and responsibilities: “A number of speakers felt 
that as a result of the new international order44 and the internal structural 
                                                        
43
 Report of the World Conference of the International Women’s Year, Mexico City 19 June-
2 July 1975, E/CONF.66/34 
44
 The new international order is in reference to the adoption of the UNGA resolution on the 
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 1 May 
1974, A/RES/S-6/3202. This resolution set the normative framework for international 
economic relations between nations for better lives for all peoples. The Declaration 
adopting the new world order stated that “the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order…[would] make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the 
developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and 
social development and peace and justice for present and future generations…” UNGA 
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changes as well as of their traditional role and functions, particularly those 
related to parenthood, the care of children and the family, women had 
developed qualities that made them particularly well suited to participate in 
efforts to achieve a better life for the weak and the helpless, and to 
strengthen peace…”45  
 
5.1.2.2.2. Making Stronger and Deeper Links 
The Mexico conference also laid the groundwork for the United Nations 
Decade for Women from 1976, aimed at ‘Equality Development and Peace.’ 
This decade further highlighted women’s role in, and work for peace as a 
few of the resolutions adopted at the 1980 World Women’s Conference 
show, such as the role of women in the preparation of societies for a life of 
peace.46 The late 1970s and early 1980s were not only about linking women 
and peace but also about interlinking peace and development, which was 
also reflected at the 1980 World Women’s Conference at Copenhagen: “On 
the assumption that the three main objectives of the Decade – Equality, 
Development and Peace – are closely interlinked with one another, the 
purpose of this Programme of Action is to refine and strengthen practical 
measures for advancing the status of women, and to ensure that women’s 
concerns are taken into account in the formulation and implementation of 
the International Development Strategy of the Third United Nations 
Development Decade.”47 
 
The next World Women’s Conference in Nairobi in 1985 echoed similar 
sentiments.48 The promotion and enhancement of women’s role in efforts to 
                                                                                                                                                           
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, A/RES/S-6/3201, 
1 May 1974 
45
 Ibid.  
46
 Report of the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality 




 Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United 
Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, Nairobi, 15-22 July 1985, 
A/CONF.116/28/Rev.1 
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promote and maintain peace at national and international levels continued at 
the fourth and last World Women’s Conference in Beijing in 1995 that 
adopted a new declaration and platform for action. The platform for action 
identified 12 areas through which women’s national and international status 
could be improved. Cutting across political, economic and social spheres, 
strategic objectives and actions were laid out in poverty, education, health, 
violence against women, armed conflict, economy, power and decision-
making, institutional mechanisms, human rights and more.   
 
5.1.2.2.3. An Analysis 
It is clear from the brief examination that firstly women played a significant 
role not only in building peace, but also in effecting equitable growth, and 
development through participation, inclusion and other liberal norms. 
Secondly it is also evident that links between women and peace were not 
first established in 2000 through UNSCR 1325. It has been deeply rooted 
and recognized since the 1970s, with emphasis on the increasing role of 
women in decision-making, democratic institutions, and better economic 
conditions for women. These are the fundamentals of liberal peace as well. 
UNSCR 1325 reiterates some of these normative links, its meaning, power 
and legitimacy between women and liberal peace, with a particularization in 
the specific context of peace and security in conflict and post-conflict 
phases.  
 
5.1.2.3. Cluster 3 – Balance of Genders: Discrimination vs. Difference 
Timeframe: 1915-1995 
One of the significant challenges women face even today is that of equality. 
The problematiqué arises in the tension between promoting gender equality 
theoretically and pragmatically, and eliminating differences between the 
sexes yet upholding essential differences, especially in the context of peace 
and security. This is compounded by the normative misconceptions attached 
to the term ‘gender,’ and its synonymity with women often translated as the 
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weaker sex, such as provision in international humanitarian law (Barrow 
2010), also highlighted in the first cluster above.49 Barrow (2010) and others, 
especially Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (2013: 613), claim that UNSCR 1325 
has responded to this issue with its central underlying theme of gender 
balancing, which “has to do with equal rights and the number of men and 
women engaged in international peace and security policies”. 
 
5.1.2.3.1. Beginning the Balancing Act 
However the problematiqué and the response are not entirely unique to the 
peace and security context, or UNSCR 1325. The “gender” question has 
been an ontological and epistemological tug of war between eliminating 
discrimination and highlighting differences since women began fighting for 
their rights. And a balancing act has been the response in one form or 
another through the centuries.  
 
Political recognition within a governing realm was the beginning of women’s 
struggle for equality. Fraser (1999) credits the French feminists with starting 
the “debate about women” (querelle des femmes), and to Mary 
Wollstonecraft's book, Vindication of the Rights of Women, in the English-
speaking world, which was in response to the promulgation of the natural-
rights-of-man theory. Stanton’s gender balancing proposal was highlighted 
in many suffragist meetings nationally, and later internationally. Soon the 
international meetings revealed the need for many other women’s issues to 
be addressed, such as participation and inclusion through women 
representation in government and government bodies (Fraser 1999).   
 
An international gender balance was struck with the Covenant of the League 
of Nations in 1919 at the end of the First World War. Women are mentioned 
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 Also see: Gardam, J. (1992) A Feminist Analysis of Certain Aspects of International 
Humanitarian Law, Australian Yearbook of International Law, Vol.12, pp.265-278; Gardam, 
J. (1997) Women and the Law of Armed Conflict: Why the Silence? International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 46 No.1, pp. 55-80 
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thrice in the Covenant, as having equal opportunity to League positions, fair 
and humane labour regulations, and monitoring and execution of regulations 
concerning trafficking in women and children.50 And so it was that women’s 
rights came to be sown in international normativity, with the exclusion of the 
nationality of married women.51  
 
5.1.2.3.2. The UN-balancing of Women’s Issues 
The status of married women was also resolved with the birth of the United 
Nations, and the demise of the League of Nations. The Charter of the United 
Nations, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) reflected 
the equality of women in the preambles of both documents and four 
separate articles of the Charter. The equality of married women to that of 
married men is stated in Article 16 of the UDHR.52 However, the creation of 
a Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) was seen by some as 
disturbing the balance because it segregated women’s rights and issues 
from the work of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) (Skard 2008), 
and perhaps even placed women’s rights subordinate to human rights 
(Eisler 1987; Bunch 1990).  
 
This was also evident in the number of conventions promoted by the CSW 
pertaining to specific women’s rights, such as: the Convention on the 
Political Rights of Women, adopted by the General Assembly on 20 
December 1952, the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 
adopted by the Assembly on 29 January 1957, the Convention on Consent 
to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages 
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 The relevant articles in the 28 April 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations are Article 
7(3), Article 23(a) and Article 23(c) respectively.  
51
 One of the substantial issues that women’s groups could not convince the Leagues of 
Nations to support was the nationality of married women, which in an indirect way reflected 
similar concerns as the issue of self-determination of nations colonized by the great powers 
at the time. The League’s solution was to take upon itself the protection of people from 
colonizes territories and “appoint various nations as guardians” (Barkin and Cronin 1994). 
52
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 
December 1948, 217 A (III)s 
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adopted on 7 November 1962, and the Recommendation on Consent to 
Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages adopted 
on 1 November 1965.  
 
The UN itself recognized this systemic flaw: “Although these instruments 
reflected the growing sophistication of the UN system with regard to the 
protection and promotion of women's human rights, the approach they 
reflected was fragmentary, as they failed to deal with discrimination against 
women in a comprehensive way…”53 The UN General Assembly moved to 
balance the situation with a 1963 resolution54 that proposed the drafting of a 
declaration on the elimination of discrimination against women that brought 
under a single document all laws that grant women equal rights, including all 
laws that would pertain to all human beings irrespective of sex.   
 
Close to two decades later, the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was adopted. Whether or not 
CEDAW equates women’s rights with human rights, a few scholars claim 
that it is definitely a document that deals “with women's (read secondary) 
rights, not human rights” (Eisler 1987; Bunch 1990).   
 
5.1.2.3.3. An Analysis 
This tension in the meaning, power and legitimacy of the gender balance 
problematiqué is replicated and particularized in UNSCR 1325, and the 
context of peace and security. The desire to enable gender balance is clear 
in the DDR provision in paragraph 13 that encourages that special needs of 
both men and women ex-combatants be considered in DDR measures, 
including the needs of their dependents. However, in other instances the 
intention is constrained by generations of socialization of stereotypes. 
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 United Nations, Short History of CEDAW Convention, available online: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/history.htm (emphasis added), accessed on 15 
February 2015 
54
 UN General Assembly, Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, 5 December 1963, 1921 (XVIII) 
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Paragraph 10 calls for the protection of women and girls against gender-
based violence, and not men. And though the UN would like to promote 
women in field-based operations, and include gender consideration in UNSC 
missions, it hesitantly encourages an increase in the number of women in 
peacekeeping missions by urging, “where appropriate, a gender 
component”55 demonstrating reluctance rather than a resonance towards the 
balance of genders. 
 
5.1.2.4. Overall Cluster Analysis  
The genealogical examination of UNSCR 1325 demonstrates the dynamic 
nature of norm construction and cascading. To add to the discursive 
perspective proposed in the revised model, numerical validation of state 
acceptance as used in the original model is added in this section to offer a 
richer analysis. To take the humanitarian cluster, for instance, the number of 
state parties stood at over 50 states and European kingdoms for the original 
1864 Geneva Convention on the Condition of the Wounded.56  
 
The original convention was updated in 1906 and state parties remained at 
52, which then increased to 60 state parties when it was updated in 1929.57 
Meanwhile the prisoners of war Geneva Convention of the same year had 
53 state parties.58 By the late 1940s, humanitarian protection of men and 
women was not the only global concern; it also included international peace, 
security and equal rights for all. The drafting and acceptance of the UDHR, 
UN Charter, and four Geneva Conventions laid the groundwork for this. 
Though not legally binding, the UDHR was ratified through a proclamation 
by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948 with a count of 48 votes to 
none with only 8 abstentions. 59  As for the UN Charter and Geneva 
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Conventions, 196 states are party to these treaties. 60  This further 
demonstrates the gradual cascading of norms, including those specific to 
women that were replicated and particularized since 1864. Meanwhile, 
acceptance of the extensions of the Geneva Conventions in the Protocols 
that were adopted in the late 1970s and early 2000s varied. Additional 
Protocols I, II and III had 174, 168 and 72 state parties respectively.  
 
Cascading of norms relating to women and peace can be validated through 
the resolutions, actions plans and programmes adopted at the four World 
Women’s Conferences between 1975 and 1995; these garnered good 
support. There were 133 member states present at the 1975 Mexico 
Conference.61  This increased to 145 member states at the Copenhagen 
Conference in 1980.62 This is a reflection of the growing global commitment 
to various women’s issues, including those related to peace and security.  
 
Meanwhile, CEDAW that came into effect in 1981, tying together an array of 
international norms as specifically applicable to women, fared well with 189 
state parties.63 In Nairobi in 1985, a forward-looking strategy for the future of 
women to the end of the century was adopted by 157 participating member 
states by consensus.64 The 1995 Beijing Conference was claimed to be the 
most successful of the four World Women’s Conferences with a substantive 
declaration and action plan adopted by 189 member states followed by a UN 
General Assembly endorsement. 65  Then came the 1998 Rome Statute 
criminalizing, among three major crimes, many related to those against 
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women and girls. This was signed and ratified by 123 state parties.66 And 
UNSCR 1325, as is with any UNSC resolution, is legally binding on all UN 
member states by virtue of being a state party to the UN Charter. 
 
UNSCR 1325 brings together norms, normative principles and practices of 
at least 200 years together. It reiterates, re-endorses and further cascades 
these norms. The qualitative analysis shows, through a cluster approach, 
how normative meanings, power and legitimacy have cascaded – in whole, 
or part – over the years. The analysis looked at some of the normative 
instruments and structures in which the resolution is embedded to reveal the 
dynamic nature of norm cascading. The additional quantitative evidence – 
focused on state acceptance alone – validates norm cascading, though 
perhaps in a more linear way.  
 
5.1.3. Stage 3: Rethinking Norm Internalization – Somalia 
Though UNSCR 1325 has normative lineage and was hailed as historic, its 
realization through domestic internalization remains wanting as reviews 
have shown. In a review of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 according to 
de Jonge Oudraat (2013: 613), “…the women, peace, and security agenda 
has suffered from a lack of political commitment at the highest levels; the 
lack of strong systematic empirical evidence to infuse policy and inform best 
practices; and the lack of integration into mainstream international relations 
and security studies, including the lack of conceptual frameworks other than 
feminist conceptions of peace and security.”  
 
However, de Jonge Oudraat (2013: 612) also noted that the September 11 
attacks on the World Trade Center in America eclipsed “the importance and 
meaning of UNSCR 1325, as well as related concepts such as human 
security.” A 15-year review of UNSCR 1325 by UN Women (2015) made 
similar critiques of the “ever-changing and ever evolving reality” posing 
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“major dilemmas for the four pillars of Security Council resolution 1325 and 
its subsequent resolutions.” It would seem that implementation of the historic 
women, peace and security resolution was not in line with expectations at 
the time of its adoption. Though there were instances of good practice cited 
in the 2015 UN Women report and though major challenges still remain, 
norm internalization is as equally dynamic as norm cascading.   
 
As the case of Somalia shows, not having ratified CEDAW does not excuse 
it from programmatic implementation of UNSCR 1325, which includes and 
emphasizes CEDAW. The case shows that internalization is not based on 
the acceptance of a single norm, standard or practice, but it involves the 
cascading of much more, even perhaps of those norms that a state may not 
have accepted. It also demonstrates that state acceptance is of symbolic 
value, and internalization, as is norm construction and cascading, is a 
dynamic process.   
 
5.1.3.1 Somalia: A Brief Background 
Somalia is fragile country, scathed by colonialism and recurring conflict 
(Kleppe and UN_INSTRAW 2008). Women and girls make up about 50% of 
the Somali population and the gross inequalities and inhuman conditions 
they endure both as a result of the conflict, and in general, is a key factor 
contributing to Somalia’s extremely poor human development index. 
According to the UNDP, Somali women bear an unequal brunt of the 
hardships occasioned by poverty, conflict, natural disaster and a deeply 
clan-based culture, which promotes strict male hierarchy and authority. They 
suffer cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment including Sexual and Gender 
Based Violence (SGBV), a general lack of access to formal justice 
mechanisms and extreme marginalization and repression under the 
traditional justice system or harsh implementation of Sharia law.67  
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In 1960, Somalia became party to the UN Charter, followed by the four 
Geneva Conventions in 1962. However, it is not party to any of the 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Somalia has also not 
ratified CEDAW. But UNSCR 1325 is obligatory on Somalia as a member 
state of the UN. This mix of normative acceptance makes Somalia an 
interesting country case, revealing the dynamic nature of norm 
internalization. 
 
5.1.3.2. Internalization Outcomes and Analysis 
Policy and programmatic overviews indicate that despite a poor record, the 
Somali government are initiated and enabled several gender-focused 
projects and responses. They draw on normative principles stated in 
CEDAW, its many subsidiary provisions, and/or UNSCR 1325 that also 
invokes CEDAW. For instance, one of the outcomes of the UNDP gender 
strategy 2011-2015 states, “Somali women and men attain greater gender 
equality and are empowered.”68  
 
Firstly this outcome addresses both men and women, which is a welcome 
departure from the international gender focus that often highlights only 
women’s issues as seen in the cluster analysis above. However, the 
benchmarks set for this outcome are women centric such as gender equality 
and the empowerment of women implemented through advocacy initiatives, 
women’s participation in peacebuilding, or women supported by 
appropriately designed, implemented and enforced legal and policy 
frameworks in line with CEDAW and Security Council Resolutions 1325 
(2000), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1820. It is interesting that outcomes 
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are measured against CEDAW, though the country is yet to be ratified the 
international convention.  
 
There are several other programmes in Somalia that address concerns of 
women’s inequality and violence against women, despite not ratifying 
CEDAW. As stated in a report by the UN Mission in Somalia, “Although FGS 
[Federal Government of Somalia] is yet to ratify CEDAW, it has 
signed/ratified numerous international covenants and conventions thereby 
committing to combating all forms of discrimination against women, 
including violence against women…”69 CEDAW brings together international 
norms that can respond to women’s issues. Not ratifying it does not excuse 
states from their existing obligations that stem from other international 
norms that CEDAW draws from, such as International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, and others. 
 
Meanwhile, for the first time in August 2013 a Ministry of Women and 
Human Rights Development was created. An inter-ministerial coordination 
mechanism on gender and implementation of the Government’s National 
Plans on Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict is also being established. There 
are many gender-specific programmatic initiatives in play in Somalia that are 
rooted in many overlapping and interlinking international normative 
structures. At the stage of internalization, the overlap seems less significant 
than national priorities and strategies that almost always draw from 
international obligations. It is important to note that the dynamic nature of 
international norm cascading makes it challenging for states to avoid their 
obligations in practice.  
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5.1.4 Summative Case Conclusion: Change and Order Through UNSCR 
1325  
Though UNSCR 1325 is a replication and particularization of existing 
international normative understandings and obligations in many ways, it 
pushes the boundaries of change further through re-emphasis and 
extension. As Krill (1985: 360) notes, “The international community will not 
succeed in remedying this situation merely by adopting new rules [speaking 
of the humanitarian protection of women], Most of all, it must see that the 
rules already in force are respected.” This is what UNSCR 1325 
demonstrates. New norms, rules and laws are, in whole or in part, a 
reiteration of existing intersubjective structures – a reminder to the 
community of states to respect and uphold what they have, in principle, 
already agreed to follow, practice, adhere to, and a reinforcement of their 
obligations.  
 
UNSCR 1325 is an important normative tool for women’s groups, NGOs and 
even the UN to push forward the promotion of women as agents of change, 
and not just victims of their circumstances, continuing to advocate not only 
for the need for protecting women, but also to look beyond their victimhood 
and empower them to be agents of their own and others protection 
(Naraghi-Anderlini 2000; Hill, Aboitiz, and Poehlman-Doumbouya 2003). 
The cluster analyses show that though norms of liberal peace push for 
increased women’s participation and inclusion, their continued need for 
protection is reiterated in the replication of international humanitarian laws, 
and practices. This is further complicated by the need to encourage gender 
balance, equality, and yet address gender-specific needs thus maintaining 
the normative gender divide. From a cluster perspective, the norms 
underpinning UNSCR 1325 represent cyclical and catalytic change.  
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Even from a chronological perspective (see table below), the dynamic 
nature of norm cascading can be seen. Women found their place and voice 
internationally with the League of Nations, which continued and grew with 
the UN and a myriad of international laws and conventions. At the same 
time it also meant that states gained more power over individuals – including 
women – when applying and adhering to normative standards and practice. 
With the establishment of the UN, women created their own international 
sphere. But “the price of creating separate institutional mechanisms for 
women has been the building of a "women's ghetto" with less power, 
resources, and priority than the "general" human rights bodies” 
(Charlesworth 2005). 
 
However, the international space women carved out for themselves also 
meant that they could enable the further cascading of norms related to 
women’s issues, as seen from the 1975 up until the millennium resolution. 
Over the decades starting with the setting up of the UN, women’s rights and 
related issues gained legitimacy through international acceptance, 
institutionalization – from the UN Charter, UDHR to CEDAW and the 
UNSCR 1325 – and ongoing two-way legitimation. On the one hand, 
international political institutions – such as the UN and the UNSC – 
expanded and enhanced their legitimacy by adopting and intersubjectively 
accepting women’s rights and women’s issues. On the other hand, women 
delegates, women’s groups and organizations enhanced their own 
legitimacy and of their agenda (Otto 2010). 
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Table 2: Chronological View of Dynamic Cascading of UNSCR 1325 
Dynamic Norm Cascading of UNSCR 1325 Before State Adherence 
Time Period Meaning Power Legitimacy 






























































































Status of women defined 
and redefined over the 
years – CYCLICAL & 
CATALYTIC. 
Always subordinate to 
prevailing broader contexts 
– CYCLICAL.   
Increased legitimacy for 
women’s rights over the years 
– CATALYTIC.  
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Nevertheless, norms relating to women have always fallen within the larger 
normative framework of the respective period – be it the primacy of 
sovereignty, or international peace, or human rights, or peace and 
development, or human development. This indicates both catalytic 
movement towards the demands and agenda of women’s rights, and also 
cyclical movement of the broader normative and hierarchically frameworks 
considered to be of higher priority. It is clear from the case study of UNSCR 
1325 that it represents decades, and in the case of some norm clusters 
centuries, of norm cascading. The construction of a norm represents the 
creating and continuation of meaning, power and legitimacy through 
replication and particularization embedded in existing norm ecosystems, 
thereby maintaining order and enabling change. Similar dynamism can also 
been studied in other norm types, such as an international convention, as 
the next preliminary test case shows. 
 
5.2. CASE II: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 1993 
 
It was easy in the case of the UNSC resolution 1325 to demonstrate the 
insignificant nature of state acceptance of a norm, and its quantitative value 
to norm cascading. Meanwhile, an international convention by definition 
demands the mandate of a critical mass of states in order to come into 
normative and legal effect. Yet, as the case of the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention shows state acceptance and adherence by numbers is not 
enough to understand norm cascading. This case also provides the 
opportunity to test the revised model on a different norm type and examine 
clusters embedded in other ecosystems.   
 
As long as there has been war, warfare technology has grown and 
advanced, and continues to do so. But one specific warfare medium caught 
the international glare of condemnation and collective opprobrium – 
chemical weapons. In this sense, the Convention on the Development, 
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Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and their 
Destruction (CWC) is considered unique in the history of arms control. 
Kellman and Seward (1994: 221) claim that, “The CWC, the most 
complicated and intrusive international arms control agreement ever signed, 
is an unprecedented multilateral effort to eradicate an entire category of 
catastrophic weapons.”  
 
If the CWC is a normative breakthrough, the process that led to the 
emergence of this hardcore international norm was equally, if not more, 
daunting. Unlike the UNSCR 1325, the negotiating process that led to the 
CWC took a score years and more – 24 years to be precise (Robinson 
1996), while others say more than 25 years (Krutzsch, Myjer and Trapp 
2014) – for the international community of states to come to a consensus. 
But this research, using the reformulated norm life cycle model takes a 
deeper look at the CWC, examines, and rethinks its normative 
underpinnings. It must be noted here that due to lack of space, the CWC 
case will be tested with brevity with the primary aim being to demonstrate 
that the model can be applied to different norm types. 
 
5.2.1. Stage 1: Synchronic Diagnostics of CWC 1993 
 
5.2.1.1. The Long Road to the Convention 
In 1968 Sweden paved the way for an international dialogue on chemical 
and biological weapons, for seizing the opportunity to propose that chemical 
and biological weapons “be placed on the agenda of the Geneva multilateral 
disarmament conference…” Egypt’s resort to poisonous gas warfare in 
Yemen, and America’s chemical warfare in Vietnam was what prompted the 
Swedish proposal. The proposal, once accepted by the leading powers of 
the Cold War U.S. and U.S.S.R., was placed on the agenda of the then 
international disarmament negotiation forum – the Eighteen Nation 
Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) (Robinson 1998: 22-23). This 
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committee, as did all its predecessor and successors, worked under the 
guidance of, and reported to the UN General Assembly.70  
 
A cursory review of the reports of the ENCD conferences shows that 
deliberation of the prohibition of chemical weapons and warfare mostly 
came tied to deliberations on the prohibition of biological weapons and 
warfare.71 And several political debates were spent on this very fact – unified 
or separated prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons and warfare. 
Bothe and others (1998: 23) believe this may have been “perhaps with a 
view to taking the anti-American sting out of the talks…” which also may 
have prompted a British-sponsored drafting and tabling of a biological 
disarmament treaty in July 1969.  
 
At about the same time, a group of socialist – non-aligned and neutral – 
states drew up a draft convention that combined measures against both 
chemical and biological weapons. These states led by the U.S.S.R. thought 
a combined instrument would be the most effective. But the U.S., UK and 
others favored separate instruments.72 A few more drafts appeared in the 
early 1970s, prominent among those where the ones drafted by Japan in 
1974, and a later one by the UK in 1976 that combined constructive 
elements of earlier drafts (Detter 2013). By the 1970s, the ENCD 
transformed into the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) 
up until 1978, and then to the Conference on Disarmament since 1979.73  
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It was a 1985 draft convention (Detter 2013), and what the then negotiators 
considered bridging of the significant gap between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. 
over rapid investigation procedures of complaints of treaty violations 
(Dickson 1987) that gave the process some more girth. However, the 
endgame came in the early 1990s with the end of the Cold War and Iraq’s 
threat to use chemical weapons in the First Gulf War. This led to the tabling 
of a compromised draft that led to a flurry of negotiations that brought about 
a general consensus. The CWC opened for signature in early 1993, and 
came into force in the first quarter of 1997 (Tucker 2001).  
 
5.2.1.2. CWC and its Normative Foundations 
The Convention consists of the preamble, 24 articles and annexes on 
chemicals, implementation and verification, and the protection of confidential 
information. The meat of the CWC lies in the first 14 articles that deals with 
matters ranging from general obligation of states, definitions, activities not 
prohibited under the convention, to national implementation measures, 
protection against chemical weapons, investigations, sanctions and related 
measures.  
 
In Robinson’s (2008: 224) analysis, “The draft treaty…was a delicate 
structure in which compromises – on six central matters: the scope of 
obligations, verification of compliance, safeguards, disarmament, executive 
procedures, and international cooperation in chemistry – were balanced 
against one another without, however, precluding for their future 
implementation any adaptation, if all state parties agreed, to a changed 
environment.” 
 
To date, 192 states are party to this environment-changing convention or at 
least hope to make it a world free of the scourge of chemical warfare. How 
the CWC hopes to accomplish this is by prohibiting the development, 
production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of chemical 
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weapons. This multilateral norm not only demands this of state parties, but 
also prohibits state parties from assisting, encouraging or inducing others in 
these outlawed activities. Most importantly, state parties are required to 
destroy existing stockpiles of chemical weapons, and the related production 
facilities located on their territory or under their jurisdiction or control. 
Compliance of all these and more obligations under the CWC is monitored 
through an intricate verification system (Kenyon, Gutschmidt and Cosivi 
2005). As the Chairman of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, 
Adolf Ritter von Wagner, mandated with ensuring the speedy adoption of the 
CWC said when presenting the draft convention in September 1992: “…The 
chemical weapons Convention provides for a cooperative, non-
discriminatory legal instrument to eliminate the spectre of chemical warfare 
once and for all.” 74  It was unprecedented in this sense. However the 
intersubjective meaning, power and legitimacy of the normative structures 
and practices reflected in the CWC were replicated and particularized from 
existing understandings and practices. 
 
5.2.1.3. Embedding in Existing Normative Frameworks and Extracting 
Clusters 
Though the CWC is groundbreaking in its efforts to set normative standards 
and practices in the field of chemical warfare, it is more importantly a much-
needed extension of the broader international framework on arms control. 
As stated in its preamble, the CWC is: “Determined to act with a view to 
achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and 
elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction.” 
 
It enables the international community to come a step closer to the world’s 
normative goal of ensuring the elimination of all weapons of mass 
destruction, which included nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. As 
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 United Nations Yearbook on Disarmament 1992, p.29 
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contained in the resolution of the Commission for Conventional Arms, the 
definition of weapons of mass destruction was reaffirmed by the UN General 
Assembly “as atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, 
lethal chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the 
future which might have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to 
those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.”75 The CWC 
completes the trifecta in an unprecedented way. However this does not 
mean that it establishes new normative understandings and standards. A 
quick scan of the convention’s provisions will help situate them in existing 
frameworks.  
 
Through general obligations and definitions of a range of chemicals, Articles 
I and II set out the scope and purpose of the Convention. Ensuring 
disarmament were the verifiable steps stated in Articles III, IV and V. Article 
VII sets out the provisions for state parties to ensure national 
implementation of the Convention, while the next Article established the 
international organization that would oversee the global implementation of 
the Convention. Article VI is a provision for activities not prohibited under the 
CWC. Articles IX, X and XI deal with consultations and cooperation, 
protection against chemical weapons and economic and technological 
development respectively. The rest of the Articles are procedural.76  
 
These provisions are drawn from, or extend existing behavior and 
obligations from states in relation to arms control. The CWC reiterates and 
emphasizes the existing norms of control over arms in many ways. Many 
norm clusters can be extracted to examine how arms control norms 
cascades through the construct of the CWC; three have been chosen here. 
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 UN General Assembly Resolution on the Prohibition of the Development and 
Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such 
Weapons, 32/84B (1977) 
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 Explanations of the articles of the CWC can be found in the 1992 UN Yearbook on 
Disarmament; Krutzsch, W., Myjer, E., and Trapp, R. (2014) The Chemical Weapons 
Convention: A Commentary, Oxford: OUP; and others. 
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The first cluster relates to the overall global objective of complete 
disarmament. The second is the expected standard of not using poison in 
warfare, and the final cluster examines the thorny cluster of the control and 
balance of dual use of prohibited substances. A genealogical study of 
these clusters will demonstrate the depth of the normative roots of the CWC, 
the dynamic norm cascading of this Convention, and the continued 
cascading of the normative frameworks in which the convention is 
embedded. 
 
5.2.2. Stage 2: Re-understanding CWC 1993 – A Genealogical 
Examination 
 
5.2.2.1. Cluster 1 – Achieving Complete Disarmament 
Timeframe: 1915-1990 
General and complete disarmament (GCD) is the core of the international 
arms control normative framework, and it is reflected in many of the treaties, 
resolutions, and other hard and soft international laws, including the CWC. 
Predecessors to the CWC also reiterate this international normative goal on 
GCD, such as in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, which 
mentions twice that states undertake the obligations in the NPT to work 
towards general and complete disarmament.77 But GCD is not unique to the 
modern-day arms control normative framework. Scholars such as Jonas 
(2012) claim that GCD has a history that dates back further than the NPT, 
while others like Rydell (2010) claim that it dates back centuries and 
millennia.  
 
5.2.2.1.1. Early Friction between Security and Disarmament 
As history shows, GCD did not always begin as general and complete. It 
was simply disarmament, which in its strictest sense “means the physical 
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 United Nations, Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 July 1968, 729 
UNTS 161, GCD is mentioned in the preamble and Article VI of the treaty. 
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destruction or elimination of certain types of weaponry” to a more fluid 
understanding that includes measure “various confidence-building 
measures, limitations of range or yield, reduction in numbers…more 
appropriately called arms control” (Rydell 2010: 227). So disarmament 
began with control, and grew to include a whole spectrum of measures that 
would eventually be general and complete.  
 
Nevertheless control was not all encompassing. Its normative underpinnings 
were linked to the normative and practical necessities of national security as 
far back at Woodrow Wilson’s 1918 Fourteen Point Speech to Congress, 
which was also adapted in the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations. 
While Wilson’s Fourth Point suggested that, “national armaments will be 
reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety,”78 Article 8 of 
the Covenant not only linked reduction in armaments to levels required for 
national safety but also to “…the enforcement by common action of 
international obligations.”79 
 
However this was not always the case. In the mid to late 1800s, instances of 
arms control were more absolute than practices in the early 1900s indicated 
above. The earlier, more prohibitionary, norms were rooted in the collective 
agreement on avoiding unnecessary human suffering, and not on the need 
for national or international security. For instance, in 1868 the St. Petersburg 
Declaration renounced the use, in time of war, of explosive projectiles.80 In 
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 President Woodrow Wilson, Address to Joint Session of Congress on the Conditions of 
Peace (Fourteen Points Address) on 8 January 1918, available online on Yale Avalon 
Project: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp, accessed on 3 February 
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 Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 April 1924, Available online at the 
Yale Avalon Project: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp, accessed on 3 
February 2016  
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 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles, adopted at St. 
Petersburg, on 29 November / 11 December 1868. Available online: 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=3C02BAF088A50F61C12563
CD002D663B&action=openDocument, accessed on 3 February 2016  
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1899 a Hague Declaration on Expanding Bullets was made in the effort to 
prohibit the use of these weapons that inflicted unnecessary cruel wounds.81  
 
Though there are normative breaks in the international objective of GCD, it 
continues to cascade through replication of various practices, and 
particularized to different kinds of warfare and arms. It allows for measures 
such as declaration, verification and even sanctions in an effort not only to 
maintain arms control, but also to allow for accepted use of prohibited 
materials (discussed in the third cluster). These processes form the 
foundation of GCD together with prohibition and destruction of globally and 
collectively renounced weapons. International norms that came before the 
CWC paved the way in establishing these foundations, such as in the 
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, and Biological Weapons Convention.  
 
However, there are claims that earlier approaches of these processes in the 
NPT and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) were weak, biased and 
ineffective. In Tucker’s (2001: 2) words, “In contrast to the NPT, which 
grants a small number of nuclear powers the right to possess the same 
weapon denied to other states, the CWC imposes equal rights and 
obligations on all members, whether or not they possess chemical weapons 
at the time of joining. Compared with the BWC, whose lack of formal 
monitoring provisions has made it easy prey for violators…the CWC breaks 
new ground in the extent and intrusiveness of it verification regime.” In this 
way, the CWC extends the normative boundaries of GCD.  
 
5.2.2.1.2. Sanctions and GCD 
However not all measures conform to the full normative meaning of GCD, 
such as sanctions. Here, the examination will devote further space on the 
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 Declaration (IV, 3) concerning Expanding Bullets, adopted at The Hague, on 29 July 
1899. Available online: 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=D528A73B322398B5C12563
CD002D6716&action=openDocument, accessed on 3 February 2016  
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norms on sanctions as relevant to GCD. It is a useful precursor to the 
country case study explored in stage 3 below. As for the norms of 
international sanctions, Davies and Engerman (2003) claim that the modern-
day sanctions may be linked to the use of pacific blockades of the early 
nineteenth century, the first of which was recorded in 1827.82  
 
This lineage was borrowed from the League of Nations as stated in Article 
16 of its covenant without mentioning the word sanctions. It stated that, if a 
league member resorted to war, allowed other league members to “subject it 
to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all 
intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-
breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal 
intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the 
nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.”83 It 
also allowed for collective military action.  
 
5.2.2.1.3. An Analysis 
Thus from using sanctions as a tool of coercion in the 1800s, the meaning, 
power and legitimacy of sanctions shifted to being a response to inter-state 
wars during the League years. Drafters of the UN Charter considered the 
normative foundations of sanctions a bit more thoroughly than did the 
drafters of the League Covenant. They expanded the scope of the League’s 
Article 16 when drafting the UN Charter, vesting it with powers to respond to 
threats to not just inter-state wars, but more importantly threats to 
international peace and security as stated in Chapter VII of the Charter. It 
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short of war, designed to compel recalcitrant nations to pay their debts (often reparations) 
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 Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, adopted on 28 April 1924 
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provides for a whole host of sanction measures – though here too the word 
is not used – including military retaliation.84  
 
Many treaties since then, including the NPT, BWC and CWC allow for 
breaches and acts of treaty violations to be submitted for consideration 
before the UN Security Council who can then suggest measures of 
response in accordance with the UN Charter. The brief genealogical 
overview on sanctions show that disarmament measures can vary on their 
conformity to the broader framework thus causing friction within norm 
ecosystems, which is an accepted aspect of norm co-existence.   
 
5.2.2.2. Cluster 2 – Extending the Construct of Poison as Taboo 
Timeframe: 1600-1990 
Together with being embedded in the normative framework of GCD, CWC 
has strong links to the history of norms that prohibit the use of poison as a 
weapon of war (Price 1997; Jefferson 2014). Prohibitions on the use of 
poison in warfare were already an accepted norm as early as the 1600s, 
and even in the ancient laws of war as prescribed in Greek and Hindu texts 
(Price 1997).  
 
In more recent times, norms on the prohibition of poison were set in writing 
as early as 1863. “Military necessity does not admit of cruelty...It does not 
admit of the use of poison in any way…” states Article 16 of the Lieber 
Code. In 188085 , the Oxford Manual of the Laws of War on Land also 
prohibited the use of poison in any form in Article 886. The notion of cruelty 
attached to the use of poison is not the only reason for such a long history of 
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24 April 1863. Available online: 
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prohibition on poison. If the use of poison were allowed, it would deflect from 
the very characteristic of wars – the use of force by those in control of the 
most powerful means of force. Price (1997) contends that this is one of the 
fundamental norms that have sustained the ban on poison over the 
centuries and millennia. Poison, he argues, is a weapon of the weak that 
can level the battlefield against those in power.   
 
A first collective international renouncing of poison came in 1899 at The 
Hague. It was not renounced once, but twice – first, in Article 23(a) of 
Section II of the Hague Convention, and second in a Declaration concerning 
Asphyxiating Gases. Article 23(a) prohibited poison and poisoned arms, 
while the declaration made an abstention “from the use of projectiles the 
sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.”87 
Here the use of poison, and its technological application were collectively 
abstained from.  
 
5.2.2.2.1. An Analysis 
The separate treatment can be understood as a reiteration of the existing 
taboo on poison, and an extension in accepting the possibility of 
technological advancements that used poison. This is especially interesting, 
according to Jefferson (2014) and Price (1997), because the prohibited 
projectiles or shells were not yet developed at the time. Similarly, it is the 
combination of the prohibition on poison as a weapon and technological 
advancements that could be used as poisoned weapons that are the 
normative lineage of the CWC (Price 1997). Therefore, the convention 
continues the existing taboo on poison by replication and particularizes the 
practice to chemicals. However, technological progress is a grey area in the 
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1899. Available online: 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=2531E
92D282B5436C12563CD00516149, accessed on 3 February 2016  
 167 
normative framework of arms control, as seen in the examination of the next 
cluster. 
 
5.2.2.3. Cluster 3 – Controlling and Balancing Norms of Dual-use 
Timeframe: 1905-1990 
This cluster can be considered an extension of the two clusters above. The 
cluster of controlling and balancing dual-use technologies and their 
advancements are perhaps more important in the international frameworks 
that govern weapons of mass destruction because technological 
advancements are not stoppable. As Meier and Hunger contend, “Efforts to 
stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) increasingly focus 
on preventing the proliferation and misuse of dual-use technologies” (Meier 
and Hunger 2014: 6).  
 
The normative meaning of dual-use is not special to the weapons of mass 
destruction; its origins lie in a more conventional means of warfare. “The 
Contracting or Acceding Parties reserve to themselves to come hereafter to 
an understanding whenever a precise proposition shall be drawn up in view 
of future improvements which science may effect in the armament of troops, 
in order to maintain the principles which they have established, and to 
conciliate the necessities of war with the laws of humanity.”88 This is the 
closing statement in the 1868 declaration prohibiting a rather conventional 
weapon of war – explosive projectiles.   
 
5.2.2.3.1. Dilemmas of Technology in Arms Control 
The belief and understanding that science can appease the laws of war with 
laws of humanity seems to have extended to the possibility that 
advancements in prohibited materials – as those used in WMDs – can have 
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positive benefits. This, as Price (1997: 17) argues, is because of “the 
dominant interpretation of technology as a value-neutral phenomenon.” It 
means that the collective meaning, power and legitimacy lie in the use of the 
technology, not in the technology itself. This normative underpinning has 
often raised the dual-use dilemma in the history and discourse of arms 
control.  
 
Perhaps not through the direct use of the term dual-use, but declarations 
and prohibitions on arms – conventional and non-conventional – have 
treaded the normative acceptance of certain uses of certain types of arms. 
For instance in the case of submarine mines, a fine line was drawn on what 
uses were forbidden: unanchored automatic contact mines, anchored 
automatic contact mines that do not become harmless on release, and 
torpedoes that do not become harmless after missing a mark. This 1907 
Hague Convention was an attempt to “mitigate the severity of war,” as 
stated in its preamble.89 These early provisions are a reflection of the value 
neutrality of technology with focus on the limits of its use.  
 
5.2.2.3.2. Poisoned Technology 
This understanding of the dual nature – harmful and harmless – of 
technology has permeated today’s international framework of arms control. 
However, there are slight normative shifts. Certain weapons are prohibited 
as a whole, including those that make the list of the WMDs. This means that 
the prohibition is also on the technology itself. Meanwhile dual-use now 
focuses on the materials that are used in the prohibited weapons – a shift 
from the ends to the means.  
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This shift came with the inclusion of poison into the international arms 
control agenda in the international debates of 1925, with the realization “that 
nearly all materials used in chemical weapons were to be found in non-
military industrial products and processes” (Bryden 2013: 21). This led to the 
expansion of the normative boundaries of dual-use in that the materials 
used in harmful technology could have positive use. Dual-use norms of both 
materials and machines have made arms control, especially achieving GCD 
more complicated.  
 
5.2.2.4. Overall Cluster Analysis  
The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention is a replication, strengthening and 
particularization of at least 100 years of normative understandings even 
before state acceptance of the CWC, as the examination of the norms 
clusters above demonstrates. The overlapping layers of norms, as seen in 
this genealogical examination demonstrate that norm cascading is dynamic, 
and in the case of the CWC more complex than in the UNSCR 1325. In 
many ways, even the grey areas of international arms control are reiterated 
in the CWC, for instance in the understanding of the actual extent and 
nature of general and complete disarmament, and provisions for dual-use 
research and development.  
 
To validate the genealogical examination, here is a brief look at the state 
acceptance by numbers of the some of the CWC predecessors from which 
its norms are drawn. The Second Hague Convention of 1899 that set down 
the provisions of the Laws of War on Land had 51 state parties. However 
the Hague Declaration concerning Asphyxiating Gases of the same year 
and resulting from the same conference had only 33 state parties. By the 
end of the First World War, 138 states became party to the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.  
 
 170 
It became near universal with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1968 
and a tad short of universal (173 state parties) for the Convention on the 
Prohibition of Biological Weapons. The CWC was accepted by 192 states, in 
effect not only cascading the convention but all the norms it replicates and 
particularizes irrespective of whether individual states are party to the 
preceding instruments. It could even be said that the cascading of norms 
within the CWC may have already been in diffusing before the acceptance 
of the convention itself because of its embedded construct. In fact, the 
country case in stage 3 demonstrates that the international community first 
condemnation against chemical weapons came in 1982, over a decade 
before the chemical weapons convention.  
 
5.2.3. Stage 3: Re-examining Internalization of CWC – Iraq and Agent 
Yellow 
The near universal acceptance of the CWC is often cited as a good case of 
international norm compliance. However, the global acceptance of the 
Convention does not mean that its implementation and internalization are 
challenge-free. Some, like Robinson (2008: 223), highlight the need to 
address technological advancements and the “absence of effective 
measures of technology governance” to ensure the long-term sustainability 
of the CWC. Budgetary constraints, reinterpretation of treaty provisions that 
hinders inspections, lack of political will to confront non-compliance, and 
refusal of a few to join the treaty are some more challenges that could 
undermine the ability of the Convention to eliminate chemical weapons from 
the planet (Tucker 2001).  
 
But as the genealogical examination has demonstrated norm cascading is 
long term and dynamic, and not dependent on a single treaty. Norm 
internalization must not only be seen as following state acceptance, but also 
at time preceding it, and even influencing norm cascading, as demonstrated 
in the case of Iraq nearly a decade before the CWC was adopted.  
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5.2.3.1. Iraq: A Brief Background 
In the 1980s, Iraq and its use of chemical weapons drew the glaring 
contempt of the international community. In late 1983, Iran first complained 
to the UN alleging that Iraq employed chemical weapons in their attacks on 
them (McCormack 1991). After several more complaints that led to UN 
investigations, Iraq was officially accused of using mustard gas, and 
reluctantly for the use of nerve gas. UN investigations also revealed the use 
of chemical weapons by Iran, however not conclusively proven.  
 
But despite sufficient proof, the reaction of the international community was 
far from ideal. In 1986 came the first disapproval against the use of chemical 
weapons, as stated in UNSC Resolution 582: “…deplores the escalation of 
the conflict…the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws of 
armed conflict and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to 
obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol.”90 This was further reiterated in 
UNSCR 58891, and then condemned in UNSCR 61292. Neither party was 
singled out for the violations despite the UN investigation reports.  
 
5.2.3.2. International Internalization Before Acceptance 
UN’s reaction to the international law violating use of chemical weapons was 
limited to condemnations even in the years of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. 
However, sanctions were imposed on Iraq 93  for invading Kuwait and 
threatening international peace and security, and not for using chemical 
weapons that killed thousands during the Iran-Iraq War or the threat of using 
chemical weapons in Kuwait.  
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It was only after the end of the Iraq invasion of Kuwait that another UNSC 
resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that not only 
required Iraq to comply with its obligation from the 1925 Geneva Protocol, 
but also “Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, 
removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of: (a) All 
chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related 
subsystems and components and all research, development, support and 
manufacturing facilities related thereto…”94  
 
5.2.3.3. An Analysis 
On both occasions, it was the Sanctions Committee on Iraq that was 
mandated with the respective responsibilities (Conlon 1995). In the latter 
instance, decisions on dual-use were left to the discretion of the committee. 
The case of Iraq is especially interesting because of this UNSC action under 
Chapter VII that demanded the destruction and removal of chemical 
weapons even before the creation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
and because the 1925 Geneva Protocol does not stipulate such measures; it 
only prohibits. The case of Iraq demonstrates that state acceptance and 
adherence may not always follow the construction of a norm. As the revised 
life cycle model shows, norm cascading is dynamic and thus diffusion too 
can occur in non-linear ways.  
 
5.2.4. Summative Case Conclusion 
As the application of the revised model effectively demonstrates, CWC is a 
replication and particularization of many layers of existing norms that it not 
only re-emphasizes, but also extends. The continuation, shifts and changes 
in meaning, power and legitimacy can also be presented in a chronological 
view thus triangulating the analysis together with the genealogical  
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Table 3: Chronology of Dynamic Cascading of CWC 1993 
Dynamic Norm Cascading of CWC 1993 Before State Adherence 
Time 
Period 
Meaning Power Legitimacy 
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examination and quantitative validation. As the CWC is closely linked to 
warfare, the timeline used is the chronology table below is associated to 
periods of major global wars. 
 
The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention replicates the taboo on poison 
and extends it to include a taboo on its development, production, stockpiling 
and not only use. However the inclusion of poison in the arms control debate 
in the League period also extended to the dual-use discourse. By the 
construction of the CWC, norms of dual-use expanded to include not only 
technological uses, but also the substances used in the technologies. In 
some cases, the prohibition was absolute. The interlaced layers of norms 
make arms control dynamic but complicated. This may mean that 
implementation of the convention is not easy, but it is nuanced. The most 
unique aspect of the CWC is that its adoption makes possible the 
international normative ambitions for general and complete disarmament of 
WMDs.  
 
5.3. CONCLUSION: Reflections on the Application of the Model 
First and foremost, the applicability and feasibility of the model has been 
successfully demonstrated through the preliminary testing. The model has 
revealed the dynamic norm cascading before state adherence in the cases 
of UNSCR 1325 and the CWC 1993. It substantiates the hypothesis set out 
in this research that the classic constructivist accounts of how norms spread 
and develop are deficient in terms of enabling sufficient elaboration of the 
mechanisms by which these processes occur. Norm cascading is more 
dynamic and multi-dimensional. Norms extend their reach and reinforce their 
power and legitimacy through replication and particularization before state 
adherence, and do not merely cascade through state adherence.  
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Before examining the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in 
depth in the next two chapters, the rest of this conclusion reflects the 
advantages, challenges and discoveries made in applying the revised model 
in this chapter. A discussion of these will improve its application on the in-
depth case study.  
 
(1) Choosing Norm Clusters – One operational aspect that was challenging 
in this preliminary testing phase was in choosing three norm clusters before 
the genealogical examination. In the first case on UNSCR 1325 the choices 
were made based on the 18-point resolution, and provisions therein that 
roughly could be categorized into the clusters of peacebuilding, 
humanitarian law and gender equality. It was based on these categories that 
the clusters were chosen. Meanwhile, in the case of CWC the clusters were 
chosen from within the broader framework of arms control and its various 
subsets. The choices in the second case made the genealogical 
examinations interconnected in many ways, and more dynamic. A 
combination of both methods can be used in the in-depth study of the 
Principles. 
 
(2) Triangulating the Cluster Analysis – Multi-dimensional layers of analyses 
is a major advantage from this dynamic model. The cluster genealogies 
provide an embedded, and intricate view of the meaning, power and 
legitimacy of the selected normative foundations. This can then be further 
validated by the quantitative overview of the number of states that have 
accepted the norm being studied. The numeric analysis also allows a 
statistical view within the genealogy. Though the quantitative perspective 
was separated from the cluster examination in the preliminary testing, in the 
in-depth study, each step of the genealogical examination will be validated 
quantitatively for a more systematic approach. Finally, the triangulation of 
the analysis takes place with a chronological perspective of the dynamic 
cascading thus enhancing a case study. In designing the revised model, this 
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final analysis feature was not included. It was an addition that this research 
developed in testing UNSCR 1325 and finding a way to make the finishing 
touch to the case comprehensive and concrete.   
 
(3) Textual Examination – It was noted in the case of the CWC that there 
were many drafts of the convention before the final one was adopted. Given 
more space, the preliminary testing could have studied the various drafts for 
shifts in focus, provisions, language and meaning. This is enrich the 
synchronic analysis and may enable a more nuanced choice of clusters. In 
the study of the Guiding Principles, the many drafts in possession of this 
researcher will be examined in stage 1.    
 
(4) Choosing Country Test Cases – The primary factor that influences the 
choice of the country case in stage 3 must be to further reveal the dynamic 
nature of norm cascading. As in the case of Somalia and UNSCR 1325, the 
study showed that despite not ratifying CEDAW, its outcomes and targets 
were being programmatically internalized and implemented following the 
adoption of the resolution. Meanwhile, the sanctions on Iraq for the use of 
chemical weapons before the adoption of the CWC demonstrate that norm 
cascading and diffusion does not take place in a linear way.  
 
The preliminary testing phase has revealed some interesting aspects that 
strengthen the application of the model. It also demonstrates that the model 
can be applied to different types of norm instruments, be it a UNSC 
resolution or a convention. The model will be made more robust in the 
following chapters as it will be applied to yet another type of international 







INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: FROM CRISIS TO NORM CREATION 
 
“You think of yourself as a citizen of the universe. You think you belong to 
this world of dust and matter. Out of this dust you have created a personal 
image, and have forgotten about the essence of your true origin” 
- Maulana Jalal al-Din Rumi (as cited in Shiva 2000: 30) 
 
 
6.1. Internal Displacement: The Crisis 
Internal displacement is one of the most complex crises the world faces. It is 
a global and local crisis; it is an individual and collective crisis; it is a 
humanitarian and human rights crisis. It manifests itself in many ways, 
especially in its most violent form, whether in natural or man-made situations 
of internal displacement. It is a crisis of global proportions that has claimed 
millions of lives, including fatalities. 
 
The international community has tried to address the increasing 
complexities of internal displacement over the decades without much 
success, and continues to do so without any real commitment, especially in 
relation to the well-established laws of protection of civilians. Eventually in 
1998 the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (henceforth the 
Guiding Principles or GPs) were developed. Nevertheless, the crisis 
persists. The situation demands a deep examination of the normative 
foundations on which Guiding Principles are constructed, their meaning, and 
the collective understandings they cascade.   
 
These are the aims over chapters 6 and 7, which examine the Guiding 
Principles in depth in order to situate them within the broader international 
normative framework and better understand their impact not only on internal 
displacement, but also on international order and change. This chapter – 
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first part of the case – lays out the first stage of the model proposed in this 
present thesis, which synchronically studies the development of the 
Principles that begins in the years soon after the end of the Cold War. Such 
a study has not been done before, let alone an exploration of the dynamic 
cascading of the norms embedded in the Principles, which will be examined 
and analyzed in the next chapter.  
 
6.2. The Development of International Norms on Internal Displacement 
The end of the Cold War brought the growing and glaring problem of internal 
displacement to the forefront of international affairs posing “a challenge to 
the international community to develop norms, institutions, and operational 
strategies for preventing such dislocation, addressing its consequences, and 
finding durable solutions” (Deng and Cohen 1998: ix). The world’s attention 
was drawn to internal displacement not only because of the large numbers 
of those forced from their homes within borders, but also because of the 
masses of people forced to flee across borders seeking asylum. 
Additionally, the political climate following the end of the Cold War was 
shifting making it conducive for the international community to consider such 
sensitive issues and mobilize enough concern and support to initiate action.   
 
6.2.1. Stage 1 Synchronic Diagnostics 
Timeframe: Early 1980s-1998 
 
6.2.1.1. Paving the Way for Norm Emergence 
By the mid-1980s, the US Committee on Refugees was providing data and 
information for a distinct category of people it recognized as internally 
displaced in its World Refugee Surveys. Though the Committee’s 
categorization may not have been officially accepted as an international 
standard, it raised the issue to international attention. A 1986 report for the 
Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues (ICIHI) 
states, “There is no official estimate of the number of people who currently 
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find themselves in this situation. No international agency is responsible for 
collecting such data, and it is sometimes difficult to make a realistic 
distinction between displaced people and other migrants and nomads.” The 
ICIHI report went so far as to say, “few people realize that the plight of 
internally displaced people is often much worse that that endured by 
refugees” by citing evidence from cases such as Ethiopia, Guatemala, 
Bangladesh, Nigeria and more. Though by the mid-1980s, internal 
displacement was becoming an increasing challenge for the international 
community, response to the crises remained diplomatic and within the 
normative realms of humanitarianism, and collectively still accepted as an 
internal matter.  
 
One of the first successful attempts that made the UN more than ‘take note 
of’ or ‘express deep concern for’ at an internal displacement situation was at 
the International Conference on the Plight of Refugees, Returnees and 
Displaced Persons in Southern Africa (SARRED). Called for by the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in a resolution in March 198495, which 
was then passed by the council of ministers in 198696 then led to the three-
day conference in Norway in August 1988. Though African nations were 
troubled by a growing number of IDPs, it was the refugee crisis faced by 
countries in Southern Africa owing to decolonization, apartheid and ongoing 
civil wars97 that led to the call for an international conference. This was also 
despite the earlier efforts taken by the OAU, including drafting and adopting 
a more comprehensive refugee convention98, to address the needs and 
issues of African refugees. 
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Statements by the then Prime Minister of Norway, then President of Mali 
and Chairman of the OAU, and the then Refugees Commissioner at the 
SARRED Conference respectively highlighted the IDP crisis by mentioning 
the lack of an international mechanism, the lack of a specific legal 
framework, and the need to address the inhumane causes that had driven 
the one million refugees and five million IDPs out of their homes. The OAU 
conference adopted the Oslo Declaration and Plan of Action at the close of 
their session. Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Plan of Action specifically 
addressed the IDP concern. However it did so only from a humanitarian 
perspective: 
 
“In view of the absence of a United Nations operational body 
specifically charged to deal with the problems of and assistance to 
internally displaced persons, the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations is requested to undertake studies and consultations in 
order to ensure tile timely implementation and overall co-ordination 
of relief programmes for these people. 
 
To ensure the effective implementation of relief programmes for 
internally displaced persons, the international community is called 
upon to co-operate in efforts designed to ensure the safe transport 
of relief and emergency goods.”99 
 
A similar concerted plan of action was adopted by the Central American 
countries in Guatemala City that also specifically addressed the 
humanitarian needs of the IDPs in the region.100 The 1989 Central American 
conference, called CIREFCA, was also building on existing earlier efforts, 
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especially the 1984 Cartagena Declaration 101 . These regional efforts 
provided the much-needed momentum for a loose coalition of non-
governmental actors to set and push the international normative agenda on 
IDPs. By the late 1980s to early 1990s, the World Commission of Churches 
(WCC) and its affiliates, the Quaker United Nations Office and the Refugee 
Policy Group (RPG) lobbied to get states to take action on issues of internal 
displacement (Newland, Patrick, Zard and OCHA 2003, 19). These NGOs 
can be considered a coalition of norm entrepreneurs, together with countries 
such as Austria and Norway who later nudged the NGO lobbying efforts 
further within the UN.  
 
The efforts of the RPG need particular mention here, as one of the primary 
drivers of the NGO lobbying campaign in the analysis of this present 
research. The work of the RPG in collaboration with other NGOs also sheds 
more light on the framing of the IDP issue. Established in 1982 by Dennis 
Gallagher, RPG focused on resettlement assistance and protection of 
refugees and asylum seekers in the United States. Gallagher and his team 
almost naturally expanded their work towards the plight of the displaced 
within the international boundaries of their own countries. Titled ‘Internal 
Refugees: The Hidden Half,’ a 1988 RPG article by Lance Clark said, “We 
cannot, and must not, continue to ignore the existence of these people and 
our responsibility to find ways to help them.”102  
 
By the 1980s, the crisis of mass exoduses due to the increasing number of 
internal armed conflicts had become overwhelming. And experts, observers 
and others from various fields of work were not coordinated in their efforts to 
initially, even conceptualize the problem. Everything from ‘internal refugees,’ 
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‘internally displaced persons,’ to ‘de facto refugees,’ ‘displaced people,’ and 
more was used to describe and define the situation being addressed.  
 
In many ways, the RPG continued to take conceptual lead on the IDP idea. 
In 1989, Lance Clark from the RPG who first used the term internal refugees 
shifted to internally displaced persons (IDP), which in his 1988 article he had 
already classified as the broader category of those caught in refugee-like 
situations but remain within their own countries (Clark 1989). Clark (1988) 
did not offer much as a definition but focused on the structural causes of 
internal displacement, and why and how international assistance and 
protection did not reach IDPs.  
 
At this early stage of trying to frame the IDP issue, the focus was on the 
protection of IDPs with an emphasis on their human rights. To further 
strengthen the human rights arm of the RPG, Gallagher brought on board 
Roberta Cohen – an Executive Director of the New York-based International 
League of Human Rights and deputy assistance secretary in the State 
Department’s human rights bureau in the Carter administration. Cohen was 
an ardent advocate of the rights of the displaced perhaps drawing on her 
Jewish roots, and also because she had witnessed first hand the misery and 
plight of the Ethiopians displaced by famine and conflict in 1984-85 when 
she lived in Addis Ababa (Weiss and Korn 2006). With the arrival of Roberta 
Cohen, RPG’s advocacy and campaign for the rights of IDPs turned became 
more focused.  
 
Beginning in 1989, following Cohen’s move to RPG, she wrote on the crisis 
of internal displacement and pushed for action in the UN through her 
publications, statements and at meetings. In a RPG pamphlet published in 
January 1990 on introducing refugee issues into the UN human rights 
agenda also presented Cohen with the opportunity to bring the human rights 
issues of the internally displaced. In this document she noted:  
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“Recently two major international conferences drew attention to the 
plight of internally displaced persons, the 1988 meeting on 
Southern African Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons 
(SARRED) in Oslo, Norway, and the 1989 International Conference 
on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) held in Guatemala. 
General Assemble resolutions, in response, have called for the 
creation of a UN mechanism to coordinate relief programs for 
internally displaced. But no response to date has called for the 
protection of their human rights. It is time for the UN to consider the 
establishment of international standards and machinery to protect 
those internally displaced.”  
 
By October 1990 in a briefing published by the International League of 
Human Rights Cohen advanced three demands reiterating that:  
 
“The international community has been slow in recognizing and 
addressing the problem. In UN human rights bodies, there has 
been no debate or action on internally displaced persons. It is time 
now for the UN to turn its attention to this new and growing 
category of persons and consider ways to provide them with 
assistance and protection.”  
 
Her demands included, firstly, that the internally displaced need human 
rights protection. Cohen also suggested that a report be prepared to study 
the scope of the human rights violations faced by IDPs. Finally, she 
demanded that there was a need for an international rapporteur and the 
development of a body of standards to protect IDPs (Cohen 1990). Cohen 
and the RPG’s driving role in the pushing forward the NGO lobbying effort 
was evident, as noted by Elizabeth Ferris.  
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In a letter dated 1 January 1990 from the World Council of Churches to 
Dennis Gallagher, Elizabeth Ferris expressed deep gratitude to Roberta 
Cohen on guiding the way forward “strategically and practically.”103 It was 
Cohen’s practical demand for a special rapporteur that was then advanced 
by the World Council of Churches in the 1990 session of the UN 
Commission of Human Rights, as per a letter dated 23 November 1989 
circulated amongst the members of the WCC by Ferris.104 Together with 
Martin McPherson at the Quaker Office at the UN in Geneva, Ferris at the 
WCC focused on the first lobbying steps “to get the UN more actively 
involved with the internally displaced,” and the RPG focused on “the 
substance” (Weiss and Korn 2006: 19).  
 
By February 1990, Roberta Cohen made her case before the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in a meeting for its delegates organized by 
the Quaker UN Office and the WCC. In her statement to the Commission 
she reiterated that “the Commission on Human Rights in recent years has 
begun to recognize the problem, namely that there is no human rights 
protection for those internally displaced. Commission resolutions on El 
Salvador105, Guatemala106 and Afghanistan107, for example, have referred 
specifically to internally displaced persons as being without protection or 
assistance. But the Commission has not gone beyond pointing this out in 
select cases. Isn’t it time to go a step further? The World Council of 
Churches at this Commission session has introduced a statement calling for 
the appointment of a special rapporteur for internally displaced people. This 
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is a very modest step, given the magnitude of the problem, but it is an 
important beginning.”108 
 
McPherson from the Quaker Office decided to push a bit harder based on 
Cohen’s statement of demands with a draft resolution to be submitted to the 
1991 session of the Commission on Human Rights. He “harbored no great 
expectations that the issue would be taken up…rather the statement would 
be a tool for engaging states in a dialogue on the issue” (Bagshaw 2005: 
76). But it was this shot-in-the-dark move that led to the UN Secretary 
General’s 1992 Analytical Report on the human rights dimensions of IDPs 
because the Austrian government took up McPherson’s statement and 
sponsored the resolution that made the request of the Secretary General 
(Bagshaw 2005). 
 
Soon after the Analytical Report, the demand for a special rapporteur on the 
rights and needs of internally displaced persons quickly gained momentum 
through media articles, statements, reports and other collective lobbying 
efforts. And by 1992, RPG attended the session of the UN Commission of 
Human Rights for the first time as a NGO with consultative status with the 
ECOSOC. Cohen had done quite a bit of legwork, and she notes in her 24 
February 1992 memo to Dennis Gallagher, “Because of these efforts, RPG 
is known among NGOs, international organizations, and various 
governments as one of the main advocates, together with the Quaker UN 
Office, of Commission action on internally displaced persons.”109  
 
RPG was able to draw on more vocal support, than a year before, from 
Hungary, Austria, Norway, UNHCR and others who also supported RPG’s 
demand in their respective statements before the Commission. This was not 
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only the beginning of the legitimization of the RPG and broader NGO 
coalition on IDPs, but also the legitimization and recognition of the need for 
the international community and the UN to begin to consider the needs and 
rights of the internally displaced as an international concern, and no longer 
just a matter restricted to internal jurisdiction of states or just a domestic 
issue. The result was the adoption of an Austrian-sponsored resolution at 
the UN Commission on Human Rights without a vote at the end of its 48th 
session in 1992: 
 
“Requests the Secretary General to designate a representative to 
seek again views and information from all governments on the 
human rights issues related to internally displaced persons, 
including an examination of existing international human rights, 
humanitarian and refugee law and standards and their applicability 
to the protection of and relief assistance to internally displaced 
persons.  
 
Encourages the Secretary General to seek views and information 
from the specialized agencies, relevant United Nations organs, 
regional inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations 
and experts in all regions on these issues…and the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Early Warning regarding New Flows of 
Refugees on Displaced Persons established by the Administrative 
Committee on Coordination… 
 
Requests the Secretary General to present a comprehensive study 
to the Commission at its forty-ninth session identifying existing 
laws and mechanisms for the protection of the internally displaced, 
possible additional measures to strengthen the implementation of 
these laws and mechanisms and alternatives for addressing 
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protection needs not adequately covered by existing 
instruments.”110 
 
6.2.1.2. IDP Agenda Setters Get Their UN Ally 
Francis Deng, a Sudanese Diplomat, was appointed as the first 
Representative of the UN Secretary General on Internally Displaced 
Persons soon after the adoption of the 1992 Human Rights Commission 
resolution. Appointment of a thematic representative is one of the 
mechanisms at the disposal of the commission that it has used quite often to 
address concerns of human rights violations and human rights questions 
and matters that required further investigation. And as Martin McPherson of 
the Quaker UN Office stated in a fax to Roberta Cohen following the 1992 
Commission resolution to appoint a representative, “It was the best we could 
get without a vote.”111  
 
A consensual no-vote resolution is the best kind of UN resolution. It has 
present and future bearing – in the here-and-now, a no-vote resolution 
means legitimacy rooted on a sturdy normative foundation because any 
negative vote would weaken its standing. A no-vote resolution “also had the 
advantage of silencing later critics, who could be reminded that the 
commission already had endorsed without reservation the very ideas to 
which they objected” (Weiss and Korn 2006: 23).  
 
Initial reactions from states following the appointment of the Special 
Representative were mixed, as some of the communiqués between heads 
of state or their UN representative or other delegates and representative and 
Deng show. These letters were in response to Deng’s letter to governments 
seeking views and opinion on how to address the protection of IDP rights 
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beginning with the definition of IDPs. The responses he received were also 
indications about the desired international response and approach states 
foresaw; a few states opposed the very idea of any international 
engagement on internal displacement: 
 
“We believe that your mandate is extremely important and we wish 
to support you in fulfilling your objectives…We are enclosing copies 
of U.S. Government reports and statements on human rights, 
refugees and the internally displaced and will do our best to provide 
you with additional country-specific information…We would urge 
you to focus on identifying and furthering the implementation of 
existing mechanisms…At this time, we are not prepared to suggest 
that mew mechanism or laws are, a priori, necessary to address the 
needs of the internally displaced.”112 
 
There were similar welcoming and supporting responses from countries 
such as Norway, Austria. But some others made their oppositional stance 
clear from the start. China and Pakistan,113 for instance, responded with the 
lack of necessity to offer any views or opinions, as they did not have IDPs in 
their countries. Meanwhile, the NGO lobbying coalition continued its support 
by putting forward some of the most practical opinions. For instance, the 
International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), in their response to 
Deng, advocated for “the creation of an international instrument on the right 
of humanitarian intervention.” But recognizing the urgency of the IDP crisis 
against the length of time that a creation of a legal international instrument 
would take, also proposed “in the interim that the United Nations 
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Commission on Human Rights elaborate Guidelines on Displaced Persons 
for adoption at the meeting scheduled for February and March 1993.”114  
 
The Quakers were more positive about provisions in existing international 
standards that could be applied to IDPs. Once existing standards are 
compiled into a single document, they recommended that the Special 
Representative identify gaps and then draft guidelines to fill these lacunae 
and complement the existing standards. And like other organizations, such 
as Caritas, the Quakers too proposed mechanisms that could help 
ameliorate the situation of displacement, such as early warning systems to 
identify potential internal displacement or refugee flows.115  
 
Still others, like the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization 
(UNPO), highlighted that the categorization of IDPs still excluded those in 
“the de facto situation” that does not correspond to the “de jure recognition 
by the international community.” Here UNPO highlighted the precarious 
nature of the territorial dimension of internal displacement, for instance in 
the case of Iraqi Kurdistan.116 RPG’s missive to Deng was a more studied 
response with reports and statistics about the IDP situation in Africa. The 
comments, views, opinions poured in as was wanted and expected.  
 
The UN Secretariat decided that the Secretary General and his 
Representative could not have been intended to operate separately, as 
could have been inferred from the resolution, and handed over the entire job 
to Deng (Weiss and Korn 2006). He prepared a single study that contained 
the compilation of views and comments from governments, NGOs, and a 
review of the existing humanitarian, human rights and refugee laws and 
                                                        
114
 Letter from the International Catholic Migration Commission dated 29 October 1992, 
from the unarchived collection of the Brookings Institute 
115
 Letter from the Quaker United Nations Office, dated 2 November 1992; Letter from 
Caritas Internationalis, dated 5 November 1992 (Prot. No. DP 120/92), from the unarchived 
collection of the Brookings Institute 
116
 Letter from UNPO dated 2 November 1992, from the unarchived collection of the 
Brookings Institute 
 191 
standards that could be applied to the protection and relief assistance of 
IDPs.  
 
6.2.2. Road to the Guiding Principles 1993-1998 
The road to the Principles was a bumpy ride. The bumps and hurdles were 
highlighted from the very first Comprehensive Study submitted to the 
Commission on Human Rights in 1993. Identification of IDPs for practical 
and functional purposes was a primary concern. “A balance needs to be 
struck,”117 states Deng’s comprehensive study, regarding defining IDPs. The 
only available global definition at the time was the one stated in the 1992 
Analytical Report of the Secretary General. It stated that IDPs were “persons 
who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large 
numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of 
human rights or natural or man-made disasters; and who are within the 
territory of their own country"118 
 
This was unnecessarily restrictive noted a few organizations like the IOM 
and WFP, and “could be interpreted to exclude persons who are internally 
displaced in small numbers,” observed the US. Meanwhile the ICRC was 
against a definition altogether as Deng thought for the ICRC the underlying 
concern appears to be that it “would be undesirable to distinguish between 
civilian populations displaced by armed conflict and those who have not 
been displaced, but whose needs are similar.” There were a few supporters 
like Jordan who agreed with the working definition, UNHCR who thought it 
was “a good starting point,” and UNESCO who thought it could use “slight 
modifications.”119  
 
The other major bone of contention was regarding achieving a negotiable 
balance between the need for new standards relating to protection and 
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assistance of IDPs and better implementation of existing principles, laws 
and norms.120 Deng suggested that those who were in favor and those who 
were against developing new norms were in fact sitting on two sides of the 
same policy fence: “Both are motivated by the same policy considerations. 
Those who consider the present law adequate want to strengthen its 
protection by reaffirming it and focusing attention on implementation and 
enforcement mechanisms. Those who advocate a new regime are 
particularly concerned that the internally displaced often suffer unusual 
hardships, deprivations and gross violations of human rights which require 
special attention and remedial measures.”121 
 
Therefore in the concluding remarks of the report, Deng proposed not only a 
compilation of existing international standards that would be useful and 
relevant to the protection of rights of IDPs together with concurrent work on 
a more legally binding declaration or even convention, but also boldly 
proposed that UNHCR be designated to uphold the rights of IDPs by 
redefining its mandate, that the Commission on Human Rights set up an 
early warning mechanism, and that the Representative (i.e. Deng) be 
granted authority to study the various UN agencies to understand the 
protection gaps within them.122  
 
Treading with caution (Weiss and Korn 2006), the Commission on Human 
Rights resolved in 1993123 to give Deng and his mission another two years. 
Appreciating his work, they also noted that Deng had “identified…the 
compilation of existing rules and norms and the question of general guiding 
principles to govern the treatment of internally displaced persons.” It was 
Austria’s word-craftsmanship, among other things, by removing the word 
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“legal” from the phrase “existing legal rules and norms” that perhaps made 
this resolution more palatable for many states (Weiss and Korn 2006).  
 
The resolution requested that the Representative “continue his work aimed 
at a better understanding of the general problems faced by internally 
displaced persons and their possible long-term solutions, with a view to 
identify, where required, ways and means for improved protection for and 
assistance to internally displaced persons.” Deng’s mandate and work was 
also provided a larger audience in this resolution, as the Commission on 
Human Rights requested annual reports to be submitted not only to the 
Commission, but also to the UN General Assembly. Though Weiss and Korn 
(2006) consider this was an amber light, Deng and team revved forward with 
his mission to formulate a compilation of existing rules and norms that led to 
the development of a normative framework (Bagshaw 2005) on protecting 
and assisting IDPs.  
 
6.2.3. Relevant Parallel Developments within the UN 
Meanwhile, since the early 1990s, the UN also initiated a couple of 
measures in an effort to address the humanitarian concerns of the complex 
emergencies that mushroomed since the end of the Cold War. This included 
the creation of the role of the Emergency Relief Coordinators (ERC) in 1991, 
the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), and the brief stint of the 
Inter-Agency Task Force on IDPs the following year.  
 
It was a General Assembly resolution of 1991 that gave birth to the ERC in 
its 34th paragraph of the annexed 42 guiding principles that aimed, as the 
title of the resolution states, to strengthen the coordination of humanitarian 
emergency assistance of the United Nations.124 The DHA was created from 
the UN Disaster Relief Office created by the UNGA in 1972 (Forsythe 2009), 
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which became the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) in 1997. Both the mandate of the ERC and DHA were limited to 
assistance with no elbowroom on issues of IDP protection (Weis and Korn 
2006). There may have been a broader mandate for the DHA, as one of the 
suggestions at the time of its creation was to set it up as a Department for 
Humanitarian Affairs and Human Rights. It was considered too radical for 
the time (Duffield 2001). 
 
It was the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) chaired by the ERC that 
designated the ERC as the “focal point” for IDPs in 1994, however with little 
effectiveness (Deng and Cohen 1998). The IASC also set up in 1992 a task 
force on IDPs that helped shape some policy issues around internal 
displacement in the mid-1990s. This was enabled by the recommendation of 
the Task Force itself to broaden its mandate to include not only analysis of 
specific situations of internal displacement, but also assistance and 
protection issues of IDPs and national and international capacity to deal with 
them. The Task Force was deactivated in 1997, and quietly transferred its 
mandate to the IASC Working Group (IASC-WG). This was also a time 
when the UN was undergoing reform especially following the humanitarian 
debacle in Bosnia. “Internal displacement became a permanent agenda item 
for the IASC” (Orchard 2015: 305). So, unlike in the Task Force when the 
Special Representative was invited only when IDP matters were discussed, 
Deng was a “standing invitee” to all meetings of the IASC Working Group 
(Deng and Cohen 1998). This was an advantage for Deng, his associates 
and allies who were not only nearing the end of the development of the 
Guiding Principles125, but also hoped that internal displacement may be 
mainstreamed into UN discourse.   
  
6.2.4. Moving Closer to Formulating the Guiding Principles 
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In addition to institutional mainstreaming of issues pertaining to IDPs, the 
main aim of most of those who advocated for strong international 
engagement on internal displacement was a normative framework that 
addressed the assistance and protection of those internally displaced. The 
task of compiling relevant existing norms was the basis for developing a new 
normative framework on internal displacement. The compilation that did not 
receive explicit mention – except for a perambulatory reference – in the 
1993 Commission on Human Rights resolution, got the green light in the 
1994 and 1995 resolutions in which Deng was encouraged to continue his 
work, “including his compilation and analysis of existing rules and norms.”126 
 
Austria took the lead in supporting Deng and his team in drafting the 
compilation of existing rules and norms. The Austrian draft, which was rights 
based, was completed by the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights 
in Vienna, under the leadership of Prof. Manfred Nowak. In America, 
Roberta Cohen turned to the Washington-based International Human Rights 
Law Group, and together with the American Society of International Law 
(ASIL), a second study was produced that was needs based. The two 
studies were tabled at the 1994 Austrian-hosted Legal Roundtable in Vienna 
(Weiss and Korn 2006).  
 
In the final statement of experts, it was recommended that the two studies 
be merged based on the need-based study, which would then allow the 
corresponding body of principles to follow a rights approach.127 This was a 
Herculean task that needed the panache of both a scholar and diplomat. 
Prof. Walter Kälin – who later took Deng’s place as the second Special 
Representative – was selected for the job. He chaired a meeting of the 
                                                        
126
 Commission on Human Rights Resolution on Internally Displaced Persons, adopted on 9 
March 1994, E/CN.4/RES/1994/68; Commission on Human Rights resolution on Internally 
Displaced Persons, adopted on 3 March 1995, E/CN.4/RES/1995/57. The 1995 resolution 
also extended the Representative’s mandate for another three years.  
127
 Final Statement of Experts from the Legal Round Table on Internally Displaced Persons, 
on 1-2 October 1994 in Vienna, Austria 
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Austrian and American legal experts in May 1995 in Geneva, and then 
merged the two studies into one compilation of over 100 pages, which was 
submitted to the Commission on Human Rights in the spring of 1996 (Weiss 
and Korn 2006).  
 
Of special interest to note here is that though the word “legal” was cautiously 
dropped out of the resolutions that made Deng and his team’s work to 
compile existing rules and norms relevant to IDPs possible, it found its way 
back into the final submission before the Commission. It was titled the 
Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms. 128  The Compilation that was 
presented in 1996 ran over 100 pages but excluded provisions on protection 
from displacement. As this was considered a pertinent issue, a second part 
to the Compilation 129  that dealt exclusively and comprehensively with 
various nuances of the protection from displacement was presented in 1998 
almost simultaneously with the Principles.  
 
One development that has been left out of much of the writing on the 
Guiding Principles is the work of the International Law Association (ILA), and 
the setting up of their committee on internal displacement in 1992. ILA’s 
work ran parallel to that of Deng and his team. Their primary aim was a bit 
more ambitious than that set out by Deng. According to the co-rapporteur of 
the ILA Committee, Prof. Rainer Hofmann, “Its primary aim is to develop 
draft principles of international law governing the legal status of internally 
displaced persons.”130 This independent group of international legal experts 
developed a body of international law that was first different from the scope 
and nature of the Principles. But as the ILA Committee began producing 
                                                        
128
 Report of the Representative of the Secretary General, Mr Francis M. Deng, submitted 
pursuant to the Commission of Human Rights resolution 1995/57, Compilation and Analysis 
of Legal Norms, E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2 
129
 Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms, Part II: Legal Aspects Relating to the 
Protection against Arbitrary Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.1 
130
 Preliminary Report of the ILA Committee on Internally Displaced Persons submitted by 
Rainer Hofmann at the 66
th
 Conference of the International Law Association, 14-20 August 
1994, Buenos Aires, Argentina (emphasis added) 
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drafts, they followed closely with Deng’s work submitted to the UN. In fact, 
Bagshaw (2005) claims that the 1996 Compilation and Analysis draws on 
drafts prepared by expert bodies, such as the ILA.  
 
Though Deng and ILA’s teams were drawing on each other, they were also 
working on their Principles and Declaration respectively simultaneously, at 
least till Deng requested that the ILA defer its work in 1997 till the finalization 
of the Principles. In a May 1997 letter to the Chairman of the ILA Committee, 
Dr. Luke T. Lee, Prof. Hofmann understands Deng’s request as an “effort to 
avoid any uncoordinated and possibly conflicting approaches” in the task to 
improve to legal status of IDPs. But he failed to see why the ILA Committee 
should defer their work. 131  The ILA Committee continued their work 
producing draft Declarations in 1998, and even one at their London 
Conference in 2000.132 In the meantime, members of the ILA Committee 
including Prof. Hofmann actively participated, upon invitation by Deng, in the 
drafting of the Principles.  
 
In a recent email correspondence with Roberta Cohen, she explained why a 
body of principles was preferred to a Declaration: “two reasons really -- 1) 
there was great political sensitivity at the time about a legal framework for 
IDPs, and while a declaration was discussed among the legal team, we 
decided that Guiding Principles were more likely to gain acceptance; 2) 
Guiding Principles also made sense because no new law needed to be 
created.”133  
 
But even with the possibility of framing a body of Guiding Principles, Cohen 
and her colleagues were cautious as stated in a memo she drafted soon 
                                                        
131
 Letter from Prof. Rainer Hofmann to Dr. Luke T. Lee dated 27 May 1997, from the 
unarchived collection of the Brookings Institute 
132
 Report and Draft Declaration for consideration at the 2000 Conference of the 
International Law Association Committee on Internally Displaced Persons, from the 
unarchived collection of the Brookings Institute  
133
 Email from Roberta Cohen to this researcher dated 10 March 2015, from the unarchived 
collection of the Brookings Institute 
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after the 1996 Commission resolution: “The debate in the Commission, 
however, suggests that it will not be easy to mobilize support quickly for the 
adoption of a body of principles.” Her fears were based on the 
developments, or lack thereof, in the adoption of the Declaration on 
Minimum Humanitarian Standards.134 Nevertheless, work on the Principles 
was made possible through the 1996 resolution of the Commission on 
Human Rights that called upon “the representative of the Secretary-General 
to continue, on the basis of his compilation and analysis of legal norms, to 
develop an appropriate framework in this regard for the protection of 
internally displaced persons.”135  
 
From mid-1996 until early 1998, several rounds of meetings between groups 
of experts continued alongside efforts to gather comments on various drafts 
of the Principles, and garnering support for the process and the Principles 
themselves. This culminated in the experts’ meeting in Vienna on 17-18 
January 1998 (Weiss and Korn 2006). The next months saw intense 
lobbying in the run up to the 1998 Commission on Human Rights session 
that would not only receive the Principles, but would also take up the 
extension of the Representative’s mandate.  
 
As Weiss and Korn (2006) elaborate, Robert Goldman lobbied with the Latin 
American states backed by his appointment to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. Adama Dieng, the Norwegian Refugee 
Council and other NGOs together with Deng worked on the African nations 
from Geneva. Roberta Cohen was presented with the perfect lobbying 
opportunity as she was requested to join the US delegation to that year’s 
Commission as a public member. She agreed with the guarantee that she 
would address the Commission on the issue of IDPs. Cohen was also given 
                                                        
134
 Memorandum (confidential) from Roberta Cohen to Francis Deng, Robert Goldman, 
Daniel Helle, Walter Kälin, Manfred Nowak, and Maria Stavropoulou dated 20 June 1996, 
from the unarchived collection of the Brookings Institute 
135
 Commission on Human Rights resolution on Internally Displaced Persons, adopted on 
19 April 1996, E/CN.4/RES/1996/52 
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responsibility to deal with the Commission’s annual resolution on migrants, 
which was her carrot-and-stick to deal with the Mexican delegation that led 
the team that raised objections to the Principles (Weiss and Korn 2006: 66). 
 
In the end, the Austrian-led resolution was still worded cautiously. The draft 
resolution that contained the words, “Takes note with appreciation,” was 
diluted to “Takes note.” However, the resolution136 did include the IASC’s 
welcoming of the Guiding Principles and their decision to share them 
amongst executive members. A fuller acknowledgement of the Guiding 
Principles did not come until the following year’s resolution in the 
Commission, and in the General Assembly in February 2000.137 
 
6.2.5. Analyzing the 1996, 1997 and 1998 Drafts of the Principles 
Before delving into the nature, scope and content of the Principles, here is a 
brief comparative analysis of the several drafts of the Principles. This 
researcher has found four drafts – one from 1996, two from 1997 and one 
from 1998.138 A brief comparative analysis is provided here to understand 
the shifts and changes the drafts went through to arrive at a final version.  
 
The biggest shift in the drafts was the drastic change in the definition of 
IDPs. It was broadened to be as inclusive as possible, without unnecessary 
restrictions. This was one of the major achievements through the drafting 
process.  
 
                                                        
136
 Commission on Human Rights resolution on Internally Displaced Persons, adopted on 
17 April 1998, E/CN.4/RES/1998/50 
137
 Commission on Human Rights resolution on Internally Displaced Persons, adopted on 
27 April 1999, E/CN.4/RES/1999/47; UN General Assembly resolution on the Protection of 
and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, adopted on 25 February 2000, 
A/RES/54/167 
138
 All drafts of the Guiding Principles were retrieved from the unarchived collection of the 
Brookings Institute. 
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Table 4: Analysis of the Drafts of Guiding Principles 
Analysis 1996 1997 (I) 1997 (II) 1998 
Principles 27 29 28 30 
Division In three sections:  P1-
7 as general 
provisions. P8-23 as 
basic rights and 
fundamental 
freedoms. P24-27 as 
humanitarian 
assistance 
Divided into five 
sections. P1-4 as 
general provisions. 
P5-9 related to 
protection from 
displacement. P10-
23 related to 
protection of human 
rights during 
displacement. P24-




P1-4 as general 
provisions. Section 
II (up to principle 8) 
related to protection 
from displacement 
P9-22 as protection 
of human rights 
during 
displacement. P23-
25 related to 
humanitarian 
operations. P26-28 
related to return 
and reintegration of 
IDPs 
Divided into five 
sections. P1-4 as 
general principles. 














Definition Used the very first 
definition that focused 




reference to “large 
numbers” 
New definition 








Omission Protection from 
arbitrary displacement 
not included; 








Right to Employment 
was listed separately 
(principle 23) 
Additional protection 
for vulnerable groups 
such as pregnant 
women, children, 





























Another major achievement was the special focus on vulnerable groups 
such as women and children, whose rights and special needs were at the 
forefront of international deliberations through the 1990s as demonstrated in 
the preliminary case study of UNSCR 1325 in the previous chapter. The 
involvement of the Women’s Commission in the drafting process had a great 
deal to play in the nuances of language and relevant focus on the matter of 
women and children.  
 
But as one comprehensive statement on internal displacement, what are the 
meaning, power and legitimacy of the Guiding Principles?  These issues are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
6.3. Meaning, Power and Legitimacy by Replication and 
Particularization 
 Though it is a compilation of existing international “legal” standards, laws 
and norms, the Guiding Principles are still considered what many term as 
soft law, or soft law through restatement, or what others may call non-legal 
norms.139 Its main characteristics are that they are non-binding, at times a 
precursor to making of hard laws, and also an easy way out in the event 
there is no international agreement on hard law.  
 
So it is with the Guiding Principles. It is a non-binding instrument that 
restates in one set of statements the assistance and protection needs of the 
internally displaced – potential or real – before, during and after 
                                                        
139
Abbott, K.W. and Snidal, D. (2000) Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 
International Organization, Vol.54 No.3, pp.421-456; Goldstein, J., Kahler, M., Keohane, 
R.O., Slaughter, A-M. (2000) Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, International 
Organization, Vol.54 No.3, pp.385-399; Shelton, D. (2000) Commitment and Compliance: 
The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, London and New York: 
Oxford University Press; Bagshaw, S. (2005) Developing a Normative Framework for the 
Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, New York: Transnational Publishers Inc.; Bothe, 
M. (1980) Legal and Non-Legal Norms – a meaningful distinction in international relations? 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol.11, pp.65-95; Finnemore, M. (2000) Are 
Legal Norms Distinctive? New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 
Vol.32, pp.669-705 
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displacement. As the ERC, Jan Egeland, mentions in the forward of the 
second edition of the Guiding Principles, it is “a critical tool” that enables a 
holistic response to the crises of internal displacement. It is also an 
“advocacy and monitoring” framework. 140  The primary scope of the 
Principles lies in the definition that not only identifies IDPs, but also defines 
the applicability of the instrument. The definition was no longer in the 
Guiding Principles as in the drafts, but was moved to an introductory section 
titled, scope and purpose. 141  In these senses, the Guiding Principles 
establishes new norms because there is no other single instrument that 
provides one statement of international legal standards that apply to internal 
displacement.  
 
What is not new is that it is a compilation of existing international laws and 
norms that already guarantees its existing power and legitimacy by 
extension on the issue of internal displacement. States, such as Mexico, 
India and others have questioned the legitimacy of the process of drafting 
the Principles that was not as inclusive of states as usual norm-creation 
processes are in the international sphere. However it was states, such as 
Austria and other co-sponsoring states that led to the drafting of the 
resolutions adopted in the Commission of Human Rights and in the General 
Assembly. Therefore, lack of legitimacy is not a claim that has standing.  
 
Here is a closer look at the Principles that have been in use since 1998. The 
relevant sources of the laws and norms that each Principle draws on is 
referenced from the two Compilations and Analysis of Legal Norms: 
 
                                                        
140
 Forward to the second edition of the Guiding Principles by Under-Secretary General for 
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland 
141
 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 
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Table 5: Analysis of the Guiding Principles142 
 
Section Principle Provisions Cascading Mechanism Drawn from 
I: General 




Without prejudice to 
criminal responsibility 







UN Charter, UDHR, 
International Civil and 
Political Rights Covenant 
(ICCPR) 
2 Obligates all authorities 
to observe the Principles 
 
Put IHL and human 
rights laws, and right to 
seek asylum above 
Principles 
As most soft laws do, 
Principles speaks to the 





Situates IDPs as eligible and 
equal before for IHL and 
human rights laws. 
Replicates right of asylum 
from UDHR, American 
Declaration, African Charter 
3 Responsibility to protect Replication San Remo Principles 
                                                        
142
 Each principle draws on multiple existing international norms; not all are mentioned against each principle. 
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IDPs rests with national 
authorities, which IDPs 






Special attention to 
vulnerable groups 
 
Replication ICCPR (article 26), UDHR 
(articles 2 and 7), other 
conventions 
 






5 Upholding IHL and 
Human Rights laws to 
avoid displacement 
Establishing primary of 
IHL and Human Rights 
laws 
 




freedom of movement 
UDHR (article 13(1)), ICCPR 
(article 12(1)), Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, etc. 
7 Provisions for proper 
displacement procedure 
Replication of the 
derogation clauses set 
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into the laws mentioned 
in principle 6 above 
8 Upholds the rights to life, 
dignity, liberty and 
security of those 






UDHR (article 3), ICCPR 
(article 6(1)) 
9 Responsibility of states 
to protect specific 
groups from 
displacement 







10 Right of life of those 




IDPs should be 
protected as civilians 
would be during war 
Replication of right to life UDHR (article 3), ICCPR 





Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol II 
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Added protection against 




Foundational to human 
dignity is basic human rights 
as espoused by the UN 




(common article 3) and 
Additional Protocol II (article 
4) 
12 Protection from arbitrary 
arrests 
Replication UDHR (article 9), ICCPR 
(article 9(1)) 
13 Safe from inhuman 
recruitment, especially of 
children 
Replication and 
particularization in cases 
of IDP children 
Convention on the Rights of 
a Child 
14 Freedom of movement Replication UDHR (article 13(1)), ICCPR 
(article 12(1)), 
15 Right to seek asylum Replication and 
particularization 
UDHR (article 14(1)), 
American Declaration (article 
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XXVII), Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action  
16 Re-establish contact 
with missing/sick/dead 
family members 
Replication Fourth Geneva Convention 
(articles 25 and 26) 




UDHR (article 16(3)), ICCPR 
(article 23(1), 24 (1)), 
ICESCR (article 10(1)), 
African Charter (article 
18(1)), Refugee standards 
18 Basics of life Replication UDHR (article 25(1)), 
ICESCR (article 11(1)), CRC 
(article 27) 
19 Right to medical care Replication Geneva Conventions 




UDHR (article 6), CEDAW 
(article 16), CRC 




UDHR (article 17) 




(article 6),  
23 Right to education Replication and 
particularization 
UDHR (article 26(1)), 
ICESCR (article 13(1)), 










Replication ICRC standards 
25 Shall in the first instance 
be provided by national 
authorities 
Extension of the right to 
life responsibility 
 
ICESCR (article 11) 
26 Protection of 
humanitarian workers 
Replication Additional protocol I and II 
(articles 9(1) and 11(1)), 
Convention on the Safety of 
United Nations and 
Associated Personnel 
27 Humanitarian workers 
must consider the 
In special reference to 
ICRC and UNHCR 
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28 Primary duty to enable 
return in safety and 
dignity lie with 
competent authorities 
Particularized from right 
to freedom of movement 
 
29 Competent authorities 
should help returned 
IDPs to resettle, and 
compensate for 




American convention, and 
precedent in the aftermath of 
the Iraq invasion of Kuwait 
where a UN compensation 
fund was set up (UNSCR 
687 (1991)) 
30 Give humanitarian 
actors access to help 
IDP return and resettle 
Replication and 
particularization 





The Guiding Principles is unmistakably and admittedly a replicated and 
particularized compilation of existing humanitarian and human rights laws, 
norms and standard practices as the table above demonstrates. Yet it 
strengthens and advances norms on IDPs in its emergence as one relatively 
comprehensive statement of international norms that apply to internal 
displacement, having also set the scope, nature and parameters of what 
internal displacement means.  
 
In the preliminary test cases in chapter 5, the mechanisms of replication and 
particularization of existing norms and intersubjective understandings had to 
be drawn out, while also revealing the genealogical underpinnings of the 
norm clusters. But in the case of the Guiding Principles, the approach used 
to develop the set of norms involved relying heavily on existing structures. 
This approach itself implies replication and particularization. However it still 
does not reveal what normative structures – meaning, power and legitimacy 
– are replication, particularized, or are cascaded before state adherence.  
 
Three norm clusters are extracted here to continue with the next stage of the 
revised model in the following chapter: 
 
Humanitarian cluster: One of the main concerns in situations of internal 
displacement is the inability to meet the humanitarian needs of IDPs. This 
primary concern demands that this cluster be further studied. Do norms of 
international humanitarianism differ in the case of internal displacement? 
 
Sovereignty cluster: The foundation of the Principles is rooted in 
sovereignty as responsibility where the duties and responsibilities of the 
states are of paramount importance in order to assist and protect IDPs. 
What normative understandings underpin this cluster? 
 213 
 
Citizenship cluster: This leads to the third cluster, which delves into the 
normative understandings of the legal status of IDPs now that the Principles 
have placed them on the fence between domestic and international 
jurisdiction. Where do they belong? 
 
 A genealogical exploration of these clusters will enable a deeper 























DYNAMIC NORM CASCADING OF  
GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 
 
 
“Internal displacement has emerged as one of the great human tragedies of 
our time. It has also created an unprecedented challenge for the 
international community: to find ways to respond to what is essentially an 
internal crisis.”  
– Kofi Annan(as cited in the preface to Cohen and Deng 1998)  
 
“It is hard to imagine an idea that is better than IDPs to illustrate the 
importance of crucial changes in discourse and reframing of possible 
solution to international challenges.”  
– Thomas Weiss and David Korn (2006: 9) 
 
 
The former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan is right in labeling internal 
displacement as an unprecedented challenge for the international 
community as was illustrated in the previous chapter. It is dynamic, complex 
and embedded in a web of normative understandings that, more often than 
not, the international community has felt easier to avoid than address. And 
even at times when such crises have been addressed, it was not because it 
was any less complicated in nature or scope. Meanwhile, scholars such as 
Weiss and Korn are equally right in asserting that the crises of internal 
displacement, and the people that have been affected by it or been victim to 
it – the IDPs – has challenged international normative understandings 
creating a space for discourses to shift.  
 
The previous chapter examined the first stage of the norm life cycle, the 
development and emergence of the UN Guiding Principles as an 
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international normative instrument. Chapter 6 examined this development 
much as the classical norm life cycle would, within the limited time frame of 
the 1980s up until 1998 when the Principles were noted in the Commission 
of Human Rights. This provided the basis for the second part of stage 1 of 
revised model, which not only includes the emergence of a norm, but also 
an evaluation of what the norm means and stands for. This chapter 7 
continues the revised model from stage 2 that reveals the dynamic nature 
and processes of cascading of the clusters of norms the make up the 
Principles. This genealogical stage will enhance understanding of the 
normative underpinnings of the Guiding Principles, what it means, and how 
it constructs internal displacement and IDPs.  
 
The clusters used in the genealogical examination, as extracted at the end 
of stage 1 in chapter 6 are: right vs. responsibility of states situated within 
the normative framework of sovereignty (sovereignty cluster), the question 
of the legal status of IDPs (citizenship cluster) and international 
humanitarian protection (humanitarian cluster). The choice of these clusters 
were motivated by the international debates that surrounded internal 
displacement and the development of the Guiding Principles. The stage 1 
analysis of the early Guiding Principles drafts and its final version also 
substantiated the extraction of these three clusters. Sovereignty as 
responsibility was the ethos on which the Guiding Principles were framed, 
and thus this was an important cluster to examine. Studying the role and 
responsibility of the state in the context of internal displacement within the 
broader norm ecosystem of sovereignty, in turn meant a need for an 
enhanced understanding of the legal standing of a person in this regard. The 
citizenship cluster provides the space for this analysis. The choice of the 
final humanitarian cluster is based on the premise that humanitarian 
protection is at the root of international protection of civilians. Examination if 
this third cluster aims to situate the Guiding Principles in this well-
established normative structure and to understand better its normative 
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underpinnings of humanitarianism. The interactions between these clusters 
are also analyzed.  
 
7.1. STAGE 2 – Unpacking the Guiding Principles: A Normative 
Genealogy 
 
“The Principles are intended to provide guidance to the Representative in 
carrying out his mandate; to States when faced with the phenomenon of 
displacement; to all other authorities, groups and persons in their relations 
with internally displaced persons; and to intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations when addressing internal displacement.”143  
 
This passage from the introduction to the Guiding Principles reveals the 
nature and scope of its normative foundations. As a normative structure or 
framework, it is not put forward as soft law, or an instrument will law-like 
character, or an instrument that restates existing international hard laws, as 
many have characterized it. Instead the UN presents it as a tool to provide 
guidance targeted at various agents, including the office and mandate of the 
Special Representative.  
 
Though humble in its presentation, its normative foundations have deep 
roots. As has been claimed many times by its own drafters, the Guiding 
Principles are a compilation of existing international humanitarian and 
human rights norms, and draws on this robustness, sometimes in part, or in 
whole depending on the law that a principle was borrowed from.  
 
But what normative understandings do the borrowed principles mirror? What 
intersubjective understandings have been extended, particularized, or 
replicated in the drafting of the Principles? The genealogical exploration of 
the clusters below aims to provide answers to these questions. For 
                                                        
143
 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, para.10 
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purposes of the genealogy, internal displacement will be situated in broader 
parameters of displacement, as it cannot be studied in isolation. In this 
regard, displacement is defined, to use Stavropoulou’s definition, broadly as 
the forced movement of people (Stavropoulou 1998). 
 
7.1.1. Cluster 1: Sovereignty – Polity vs. People  
Timeframe: 1945-1995 
 
The rights and protection of people – in times of war and peace – as a 
responsibility of the state are well established as international laws and 
norms. Yet it is the rights and responsibilities of states established as norms 
of sovereignty that have often conflicted with these international laws, 
sometimes to the point of gross violations. Nevertheless, sovereignty is the 
very basis of the protection of people because protecting one’s people and 
upholding their rights is an internal matter for a state – a responsibility of the 
sovereign. The Guiding Principles is rooted on the normative understanding 
of sovereignty as responsibility, and not just a right, as Deng (2001) 
explains: “I approach sovereignty not as a negative concept by which states 
barricade themselves against international scrutiny and involvement, but 
rather as a positive concept entailing responsibility for the protection and 
general welfare of the citizens and of those falling under state jurisdiction.” 
Yet, webs of international norms intrude into this sovereign space reminding 
states of this responsibility, and, since the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court, punishing persons persecuting their people instead of 
protecting them. There is a norm cascading tension, and sometimes, even, 
collision.  
 
This normative tension did not always exist. In the centuries before the 
Westphalia Treaty, sovereignty was vested in the king, emperor legitimated 
through the divine or the voice of god represented by the priest (Holmes, 
1982). With the dawn of the Westphalian peace, some scholars – 
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international lawyers and international relations academics – mark the dawn 
of sovereignty, as it is known today (Gross 1948). But others contest the 
attribution of the birth of modern sovereignty to the Westphalian peace. 
Osiander (2001: 266) states that the Westphalian treaty was nowhere close 
to a conception of sovereignty. “The Peace of Westphalia proper was an 
agreement between only three parties. It consists of two treaties signed on 
24 October 1648, one – the Treaty of Munster between the Holy Roman 
Empire and the King of France, and the other – the Treaty of Osnabriick 
between the Holy Roman Empire and the Queen of Sweden.”  
 
This was not about sovereignty but about the continued survival, in an 
improved way, of the Empire through “territorial jurisdiction” which is often 
mistaken for territorial sovereignty. Territorial jurisdiction is more in line with 
the meaning of state sovereignty, which is “defined in terms of the territories 
over which institutional authorities exercise legitimate control,” while national 
sovereignty or nations is “defined in terms of communities of sentiment that 
form the political basis on which state authority rests” (Barkin and Cronin 
1994: 110-111). This means that people and their voices did not have 
primacy of place; the principle of the legitimate state came through pacts 
and associations between states and not the people governed within 
respective territories. Sovereignty as territorial jurisdiction lasted up until the 
First World War. 
 
The shift in the meaning of sovereignty from state sovereignty of the pre-
WWI period to national sovereignty in the post-WWI phase was driven by 
US President Woodrow Wilson – the norm entrepreneur/(re)maker at this 
time – in his Fourteen Point proposal for world peace (Fraser, 1999). He 
elevates the importance of the sovereignty of peoples to that of states and 
governments thus, in point 5: “A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial 
adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the 
principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of 
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the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims 
of the government whose title is to be determined.”  
 
The shifting primacy of the polity over people is what led to the conflict in 
norms. Interestingly, as the genealogical exploration in this cluster will 
reveal, though people, their needs and rights, gained in importance as 
revealed in the first cluster above, the significance of the state and its norms 
of sovereignty did not shift or cascade accordingly, or loosen up as many 
claim. However, the norms of sovereignty did cascade, and how, will be 
explored in this cluster.  
 
The examination in this cluster will focus on those norms related to 
sovereignty in relation to forced displacement, and as relevant to this 
research. The fundamental norm in this regard is the freedom of movement 
and its corollaries, such as protection from displacement, protection against 
arbitrary displacement, right to seek and enjoy asylum and the like. These 
are not explicit legal provisions in international humanitarian or human rights 
laws, but the forced movement of populations or displacement increasingly 
emerged as a “distinct violation of customary international law” and “gross 
violation of fundamental freedoms including freedom of movement” (Simons 
2002).  
 
Interestingly, the mass and forced flight of people, especially across 
territorial borders also gradually became associated with the violation of 
sovereignty and threat to international peace and security, as stated in the 
UNSC Resolution 688 on Iraq144. This conflict of normative understandings 
is critically explored in this cluster.  
 
                                                        
144
 “Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of 
Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, which led to a massive flow of 
refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions, which 
threaten international peace and security in the region” UN Security Council Resolution 
adopted on 5 April 1991 at the 2982
nd
 meeting, S/RES/688 (1991) 
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7.1.1.1. Free to Move: Three-way Friction between Person, Nation and State 
The basic fundamental existential necessity not to be bound by space and 
time is the true essence of the universal right of the freedom of 
movement 145 . Satvinder Juss’ (2004: 289-290) explanation on the 
fundamentality of this freedom is apt here: “Without it, other rights are 
precarious. Universally recognized values, such as mutual aid, humanity, 
hospitality, comity, mutual intercourse, and good faith, all depend on the 
right to free movement for their efficacy. The world order depends on 
freedom of movement. Whether one is looking at the encouragement of 
peace by the easing of demographic pressures, or the enrichment of 
national cultures, or the redistribution of economic resources, or the pursuit 
of humanitarian objectives, freedom of movement has a central role to play 
in the modern global order. All are fundamentally interconnected and 
indivisible from one another.”  
 
This essential nature of this right has also been recognized in a 1988 report 
of the Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities:  
 
“Freedom of movement is a constituent element of personal liberty… The 
prohibition against arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, and the right to seek 
and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution reinforce the 
implementation of the right to leave. The rights to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion and freedom of expression, in particular the 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, require freedom of movement for their full 
realization.”146 
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 Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on 10 December 1948, 
217 A (III) 
146
 Final Report on The Right of Everyone to Leave Any Country, Including His Own, And to 
Return to His Country, submitted by the Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, at the 40
th
 Session of the Commission on Human Rights, 20 
June 1988, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/35 
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As much as it is relevant the modern global order, the freedom of movement 
is derived from the much longer and older tradition of the “concept of liberty,” 
according to McAdam (2011)147 who links it to classical philosophical and 
legal traditions. This research is however concerned with its twentieth 
century constructions of (1) right to move freely within a state’s borders, 
which includes choice of residence that will be addressed in the next cluster 
on citizenship (2) right to leave one’s country and return, and (3) right o seek 
and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. All these are directly 
relevant to the displacement discourse.  
 
However, this construct of the freedom of movement causes normative 
friction with the construct of sovereignty. The former is a right of a human, 
whereas the latter is a right of a state. As McAdam (2011: 47) points out: 
“…the right to leave a country is not paralleled by a concomitant right to 
enter any country other than one’s own.” So though the right is granted, an 
equal obligation is not required of states to exercise or actualize this right. 
Such an explicit obligation would infringe on the very foundation of 
sovereignty. States have their own policies – immigration, extradition, 
refugee status determination, and others – that prevail over, and are 
sometimes contradictory to the rights enshrined in the fundamental freedom 
of movement.  
 
7.1.1.1.1. An Analysis 
This confrontation between the norms of freedom of movement as a human 
right and the norms of sovereignty as a prerogative of the state, an 
especially binding force at the level of the international community of states, 
is at the core of the displacement discourse and the cascading of norms 
within it. The territorial dimension – the right to cross international borders at 
                                                        
147
 However McAdam separates the right to return from the right to leave, and combines it 
with the right to seek and enjoy asylum. This present research does not adopt McAdam’s 
approach. 
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will vs. a state’s right to protect its borders – is only one part of the 
normative friction. National sovereignty, which goes beyond defined borders 
and identifies with a defined population, is another part. According to Barkin 
and Cronin (1994), though national sovereignty was given international 
precedence after the First World War, a normative reconstruction – a 
reconfiguration that could always cause normative friction – was embedded 
into the international institutionalization of the global order with the 
establishment of the UN Charter.  
 
Here Barkin and Cronin’s (1994: 123) analysis is apt. “The charter affirms as 
the first purpose of the UN the maintenance of international peace and 
security. It defines this as the prevention of the violation of established state 
borders by the forces of other states. This clearly establishes the priority of 
the integrity of established state borders over the integrity of national or 
nationalist groups. The charter also affirms the principle of the self-
determination of peoples, but not of nations…As long as a state adequately 
represents its people as individuals, other states cannot legitimately claim to 
represent some of these people as members of its nation.” 
 
State Acceptance of Norms in Numbers 
Norms of Rights of Man vs. Norms of Rights of State 
Freedom of Movement St. Parties Sovereignty St. Parties 
1945 Charter of the United Nations 





Declaration of Human 
48 in favour + 8 
abstentions149 
  
                                                        
148
 UN Treaty Collection 
149
 OHCHR, Factsheet No.2 (Rev.1) on the International Bill Human Rights, available 
online: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf   
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Rights adopted by 
UNGA resolution (also 
makes reference to 
primacy of sovereignty) 
International Covenant 
of Civil and Political 
Rights 1966 (also 
makes reference to 
primacy of sovereignty) 
168150   
 
So by reducing the construct of a nation to that of individuals, the state as a 
territorial construct is replicated as a priority. Examination of state 
acceptance of the UN Charter by numbers alone might make the UN 
Charter seem more powerful and legitimate than the Declaration of Rights or 
the ICCPR. However, the UN Charter also affirms respect for human rights 
not only in its preamble, but also as its main purpose stated in paragraph 2 
of article 1, and encourages the realization of human rights for all in more 
articles in the Charter than it mentions sovereign equality. 151  But the 
Declaration and its reflection in the UN Charter have diminished moral force, 
according to Lauterpacht, because of the “absence of any sacrifice of 
sovereignty ‘on the altar of the inalienable rights of man’” (Bernstorff 2008: 
908). Though human rights have gained international ground, the inviolable 
norm of sovereignty remains fundamental to the international community. 
What has changed is that these two spheres of norms constantly interact 
and clash since 1945, which is very much part of the norm cascading 
process.  
 
Within the parameters of this research, and the case study of the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement, this normative tension between 
                                                        
150
 Numbers accessed from UN Treaty Collection Database 
151
 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, articles 13, 55, 68, and 76 
promote or encourage the respect for, or realization of human rights for all. 
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sovereignty and the right to freedom of movement has caused the 
provisions of the right to be in a state of flux. This relates to the constituent 
points 2 and 3 above – leaving one’s country and seeking and enjoying 
asylum in another country respectively, which is most obvious in the 
cascading of refugee norms particularly in the right of asylum. The right to 
move freely in one’s country will be discussed later. Though, functionally 
and legally, the two forced displacement groups – IDPs and refugees – have 
been separated and kept apart, their normative evolution and cascading are 
intertwined.   
 
7.1.1.2. Asylum: From A Right to Diminished Responsibility  
The fundamentality of sovereignty – state and nation – has come under 
intense normative pressure from the international institution of asylum that is 
practiced and realized at a state level. Asylum – a practice that has ancient 
roots152 – embodies not only the right of freedom of movement, but it is also 
a response in the event of its violation and thereby can seek the protection 
of one’s rights in another country. The roots of the practice of asylum in the 
twentieth century lie in the UDHR: “Everyone has the right to seek and to 
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”153 
 
This construction of the right to seek asylum does two things. First, it 
identifies that individuals have this right and in turn lays the foundation of the 
categorization of such individuals. In so granting this right, it also separates 
the individual from the state indicating that the state does not have a claim 
over the individual (Boed 1994). Second, though asylum is framed as a 
right, it is very much rooted in the norms of sovereignty as well. The right to 
seek asylum can only be realized in a country that is not one’s own, 
                                                        
152
 Price, M.E. (2005) Politics and Humanitarianism? Recovering the Political Roots of 
Asylum, Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, Vol.19 No.2, pp.277-311; Arbodela, E. and 
Hoy, I. (1993) The Convention Refugee Definition in the West: Disharmony of Interpretation 
and Application, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol.5 No.1, pp.66-90 
153
 Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on 10 December 
1948, 217 A (III) 
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meaning that international borders have to be crossed. The nature of the 
crossing – voluntary or forced – is not emphasized but the right of asylum is 
sought from persecution, a term that legally also remains vague (Price 2005, 
and Arbodela and Hoy 1993). 
 
The realization of the construct of the norms of asylum, however, does not 
lie in seeking it, but in enjoying it. This can be made possible only by actions 
on the part of the state granting asylum, which is not obligatory on the part 
of the state. The obligation was removed in the drafting of the UDHR by an 
amendment154 proposed by the British delegate. This was how the right to 
seek and “to be granted” asylum was amended to to seek and “to enjoy” 
asylum (Nayar 1972). At the third committee of the UNGA in 1948 that 
considered the draft UDHR, the British amendment was voted 30 to 1 with 
12 abstentions (Weiss 1969). Granting asylum is the prerogative of the 
state, not the right of an individual, as stated by Morgenstern (1949: 327): “A 
competence to grant asylum thus derives directly from the territorial 
sovereignty of states.” The norms of sovereignty were so strong in the post 
World War II and Cold Warn periods that in the drafting of the international 
covenant of rights, the right of asylum was excluded, as it was deemed not a 
human right (Nayar 1972).  
 
7.1.1.2.1. Asylum in the Context of Forced Displacement 
The drafting of the international human rights covenants and the refugee 
convention were underway in the same years, though the covenant took 
much longer to be completed and adopted. With the increasing number of 
refugees in the aftermath of the Second World War and the absence of a 
right of asylum in the covenant and convention drafts, the Director General 
of the then International Refugee Organization expressed his concern in a 
communication to the Commission on Human Rights: 
                                                        
154
 Amendment by the United Kingdom to the Preamble and Article 12 of the Draft 
Declaration E/800, submitted on 11 October 1948, A/C.3/253 
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“…there is an urgent need to attempt to secure international recognition for 
measures designed to, implement "the provisions of Article 14 of the 
Declaration on Human Rights, paragraph 1, in which it is stated that 
everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution. If the general right of the individual to seek and enjoy asylum is 
recognized it is necessary to attempt to define whose responsibility it is to 
give effect to this right. Although it is the sovereign right of States to regulate 
the admission of aliens, nevertheless their policy of admission should he 
implemented by the Members of the United Nations in such a way that 
consideration is given to the right of the individual to seek asylum.”155 
 
The closest the international community came to legalizing some form of 
right of asylum is in the provisions against punitive measures for illegal 
entry, expulsion and refoulement in the Refugee Convention. 156  In fact, 
asylum itself is only mentioned once in the preamble to the convention, as 
recognition of the need for international cooperation in easing the “heavy 
burdens on certain countries” in granting of asylum.157 And to ensure that 
the roots of sovereignty vis-à-vis asylum were intact, the UNGA adopted a 
Declaration on Territorial Asylum on 14 December 1967158 that emphasized 
that the granting of asylum was in exercise of a state’s sovereignty, and that 
the decision to grant asylum rested with the state. 159  The issue of 
                                                        
155
 Communication from the Director General of the International Refugee Organization to 
the Sixth Session of the Commission on Human Rights, 30 March 1950, E/CN.4/392 
156
 Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted on 
28 July 1951, UNTS, Vol. 189, p. 137 
157
 Preamble to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted on 28 July 
1951, UNTS, Vol. 189, p. 137 
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 A decade later an international effort to draft a convention on territorial asylum ended 
disastrously 
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 Article 1(1) and 1(3) of the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, adopted on 14 December 
1967, A/RES/2312(XXII) 
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sovereignty was reiterated again in the Declaration in that the situation of 
the asylum seeker has no bearing on the sovereignty of states.160  
 
7.1.1.2.2. An Analysis 
The cascading of norms of sovereignty overpowered the cascading of 
human rights, especially with regard to the freedom of movement and right 
of asylum. In the moments of norm conflict, the norms of sovereignty 
prevailed. It would seem that norms of sovereignty was accepted by states 
to have a higher norm status, especially because respect for, and the 
realization of human rights for all at the national level depended on respect 
for, and realization of sovereign equality at the international level.  
 
State Acceptance of Norms in Numbers 
The Normative Instrument State Parties 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 
by UNGA resolution 
48 in favour + 8 
abstentions 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 145161 
1967 Protocol to the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees 
146162 
1967 UNGA Declaration on Territorial Asylum Unanimous163 
 
Though the right to seek and enjoy asylum is rooted in the UDHR, it is not 
normatively accepted as a right in practice. One reason could be that it is 
not an international right legalized through the covenants. Another reason 
could be that it is institutionalized in the Refugee Convention, and thus 
realized in practice as a humanitarian response to those forced to leave their 
homes and countries and are in need of immediate protection. In this regard 
                                                        
160
 Article 2(1) of the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, adopted on 14 December 1967, 
A/RES/2312(XXII) 
161
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the sovereignty cluster is intertwined with the humanitarian cluster that is 
elaborated later in the chapter. And a refugee by definition is temporary 
state of being, a state that ceases to be when the persecution, or fear of it 
ends. Therefore the normative understandings of asylum as a right were 
torn asunder.  
 
7.1.1.3. Containing Displacement. Deterring Asylum 
The burden of granting asylum grew with the increasing number of refugees 
from the early 1970s, and growing mass flight by the end of the Cold War. 
The international community of sovereign states was coming together to 
cooperate on bearing the burden of granting asylum, but it was a growing 
international cooperation towards lesser asylum, not more. This shift in the 
practice of granting asylum also had implications for internal displacement.  
 
Many have decried this global shift in refugee norms. Some, like Keely 
(2011) have suggested the existence of parallel frameworks of refugee 
norms – one in the Western countries setup to admit and resettle those 
fleeing communist oppression; there was nothing temporary in this 
arrangement. The other system was the one managed and operated by the 
UNHCR, which provided temporary protection and humanitarian assistance 
as its mandate allowed from its inception. By the end of the Cold War, even 
this palliative role of the UNHCR was being distorted with a growing role for 
the refugee agency (Hathaway 1995). For this UNHCR, the changes 
included “the extension in UNHCR practice of the categories of people it 
assists; the increased focus of many agencies on preventive action, even 
within countries at war, to reduce the likelihood of massive refugee flows 
across borders” (Roberts 1998: 375). This extension of the UNHCR’s role 
also extended to IDPs. As early as 1972, UNHCR assisted the repatriation 
and resettlement of displaced Sudanese inside and abroad.164 
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 UN General Assembly Resolution on Assistance to Sudanese Refugees Returning from 
Abroad, adopted on 12 December 1972, 2958 (XXVII)  
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This shift is evident in the acceptance numbers of asylum applications 
through the 1980s up until 1991. Though the asylum applications rose, the 
recognition rates fell, notes Rosemarie Rogers (1992: 1122): “According to 
Widgren (1991: 4), on average 70 percent of asylum applications in Europe 
are not recognized after thorough scrutiny in the first and second instance, 
and that percentage is growing.” Policies at national and international levels 
were aiding the shift in normative practice, went from reduced asylum and 
temporary protection, to outright policies of containment of displaced 
persons.   
 
7.1.1.3.1. Humane Deterrence: Keeping a Lid on It 
Shifts in political attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers translated 
into concrete policies and strategies of ‘humane deterrence’. Misleading in 
its terminology, ‘humane deterrence’ policies were first implemented in the 
early 1980s in response to the Indo-Chinese influx into South-east Asia 
(McNamara 1990). Known as the boatpeople, these were the hundreds and 
thousands that fled the violence of the fall of Phnom Penh and Saigon in 
April 1975. By 1977, the exoduses into the many South-east Asian nations 
reached critical mass and became a problem these governments no longer 
wanted to address, but wanted to get rid of. By June 1979, the foreign 
ministers of the South East Asian countries did exactly this at the ASEAN 
meeting: 
 
“The Foreign Ministers stressed that ASEAN countries which had become a 
heavy burden of providing temporary shelter to the illegal 
immigrants/displaced persons (refugees) have reached the limit of their 
endurance and have decided they would not accept any new arrivals. They 
reiterated the decision of ASEAN countries to take firm and effective 
measures to prevent further inflow of illegal immigrants/displaced persons 
(refugees). The Foreign Ministers gave notice that the ASEAN countries 
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would send out the illegal immigrants/displaced persons (refugees) in their 
existing camps should they not be accepted by resettlement countries, or by 
the respective Indochinese countries within a reasonable time-frame, and in 
the absence of any arrangements to the contrary. To ensure the 
effectiveness of these measures, the Foreign Ministers agreed to coordinate 
the effort, of their respective governments.”165 
 
This decision was endorsed at an UN-sponsored meeting of governments 
in Geneva in July 1979. Following, the implementation of this decision, boat 
arrivals reduced within a few months together with dramatic two-third 
decrease in Vietnamese camps in South-east Asia owing to a massive 
third-country resettlement operation. The ASEAN move gave Thailand the 
support it needed to deal with the increasing numbers of Laotian refugees 
pouring in. Thai authorities claimed “the newcomers were...common 
economic adventurers rather than people fleeing danger, attracted by 
camps in Thailand...clearly visible from the Laotian side and which provided 
relatively secure and comfortable conditions in which to await selection by 
third countries” (McNamara 1990: 126).  
 
Thai authorities tried stricter apprehension measures to return Laotians to 
their country, but it did not have any impact on the arrival numbers. Then 
together with the UNHCR, the Thai authorities pieced together a ‘humane 
deterrence’ proposal suggested by the UNHCR officials in Bangkok. The 
proposal involved a two-pronged approach. Firstly the Nong Khai camp on 
the border with Laos would remain closed to all new arrivals. This meant 
the opening of another camp away from the border. Secondly, activities of 
international voluntary organization in the camps aimed at resettlement 
operations would be largely restricted. This ‘humane deterrence’ strategy’ 
was officially implemented by the Thai government in 1981 with “austere 
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camp conditions; the denial of resettlement processing to new arrivals and, 
at least implicitly, renewed efforts to apprehend and expel arrivals at the 
border” (McNamara 1990: 127). Several resettlement countries implicitly or 
explicitly gave their blessings to this Thai strategy.  
 
7.1.1.3.2. From Deterring to Averting Refugee Flows 
The 1980s also saw an international move through the UN spearheaded 
with West Germany playing a leading role that put more pressure on source 
countries to reduce and avert refugee flows. The core of the UNGA 
resolution that solidified this international move was in its emphasis on 
“considering, in addition to humanitarian and social relief, suitable means to 
avert new flows of refugees,” which the UN believed was caused by the 
“policies and practices of oppressive and racist regimes as well as 
aggression, alien domination and foreign occupation.” 166  This led to the 
establishment of a Group of Governmental Experts on International 
Cooperation to Avert New Flows of Refugees a year later.167 The Group 
submitted their report to the UNGA through the Secretary General with 
seven very modest recommendations. They were nothing new but reiterated 
adherence to existing norms, practices, laws, and urged member states to 
exercise their sovereignties to avert all new flows of refugees by 
ameliorating or eliminating the root causes of refugee flows.168  
 
Instances of humanitarian interventions, some of them military in character 
such as the intervention in Iraq, were also seen in the latter part of the Cold 
War and after. These interventions, unlike those discussed in the 
humanitarian cluster later, are clearly seen as refugee averting strategies: 
“The United Nations’ safe havens that were established in the territorial 
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boundaries of Iraq to protect the Kurds from the Iraqi military and in the 
former Yugoslavia to shield Bosnian Muslims from Serbian and Croatian 
attack are…examples of the shifting trend toward containment 
policy…Evidence suggests that early implementation of these programs 
may be an effective preventive mechanism” (Tiso 1994: 575). 
 
Some observers and scholars, including Tiso quoted in the paragraph 
above, believed that containment strategies were working by reducing 
refugee numbers in the years immediately after the Cold War. But others 
believed that the shifted focus on root causes was not delivering in terms of 
concrete results (Martin 1982). It did not reduce the number of people 
displaced and international cooperation to address it as a human rights and 
humanitarian concern was not getting any better. There were a few more 
strategies created by refugee receiving states through the 1980s and 1990s 
that pushed norms of sovereignty further than human rights or 
humanitarianism.  
 
One of the first among these was an Australian initiative to push a wedge 
between refugees and long-term protection by emphasizing what they 
considered an existing practice of temporary refuge. The Executive 
Committee of UNHCR reaffirmed this practice with a caution to explore it 
deeper in 1980.169 Its deeper exploration through a group of experts again 
cautiously concluded that asylum seekers should be provided with a solution 
on a durable basis in the country that they first seek refuge, and that only “if 
that State is unable to accord them asylum on a durable basis, it should at 
least grant them asylum on a temporary basis.”170 The burden of granting 
asylum still remained with countries of first instance, and these states – 
especially in South East Asia – were feeling overburdened. Many 
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 UNHCR, Conclusions Adopted by the Executive Committee on International Refugee 
Protection, No. 19 (XXXI) Temporary Refuge (1980) 
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resettlement countries were also developing their own temporary refuge or 
temporary protection policies, such as Norway171, the US (Bertrand 1993), 
Australia (Phillips and Spinks 2013) and others.   
 
Growing pressure from countries of first instance paved the way for the 
Comprehensive Plan of Action at a May 1988 meeting in Thailand that 
brought together first asylum governments, resettlement countries, and 
others involved with the refugee crisis, especially with the Vietnamese 
boatpeople (Bronée 1993). The Plan sought to stem clandestine departures, 
regulate orderly departure, guarantee temporary refuge for all asylum 
seekers, establish region-wide refugee status determination procedures, 
continue resettlement programmes, coordinate repatriation of failed asylum 
seekers. 172  Though some considered the Comprehensive Plan as 
successful (Bronée 1993), others saw it as hostility towards asylum seekers 
(Helton 1989). Meanwhile the European states adopted the Dublin 
Convention in 1990 that came into effect in 1997, followed by the Directive 
on International Protection and the Dublin Regulation by the turn of the 
century. These were meant to regulate the movement of asylum seeks 
between European states that no longer had border control (Hurwitz 1999 
and Battjes 2002), and close their doors on refugees (Kjaerum 1994). 
 
Some policies even undermined accepted international understandings and 
normative practices. For instance, the practice of assigning ‘safe country’ 
tags meant that those granted asylum can return to a country that is no 
longer a threat, or return to the country of first asylum, or is not granted 
asylum because the country of origin has been pre-assessed as safe. This 
is legally aberrant to the very foundation of the Refugee Convention “that is 
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the individual definition of the refugee, which is the standard by which to 
judge the applicant’s claim (Hailbronner 1993).  
 
7.1.1.4. Cluster Conclusion: Rethinking Sovereignty As Responsibility in the 
Guiding Principles 
Norms of sovereignty have remained steadfast in the face of emerging 
norms of protection and rights of the displaced. There has been a growing 
intensity to, and continued cascading of the norms of sovereignty in that the 
exercise of sovereignty is a state’s prerogative. This can be seen especially 
in the practice of granting territorial admission to people. The strength of the 
norms of sovereignty is also evident in the rejection to formulating 
international laws on the right of asylum – fundamental to upholding the 
freedom of movement and thus other rights as discussed above. It is also 
manifest in the establishment of international policies, programmes and 
strategies that deterred even a humanitarian response to asylum seekers. 
 
In fact, containment policies such as safe havens go against the 
fundamental right to freedom of movement. However, there was a normative 
double standard in the practice of sovereignty as well. While humane 
deterrence policies were in order to protect the sovereignty of receiving 
states, strategies that sought to avert refugee flows was interference in the 
sovereignty of countries of origin. For instance, the US-led operation in Iraq 
in 1991 to protect the fleeing Kurdish people was an incursion, however 
humanitarian, on Iraq’s sovereignty. Of the long list of UN Security Council 
resolutions on Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait, only a handful did not 
fall under chapter VII of the UN Charter, and it was one of these resolutions 
that the intervening states claimed gave them legitimate grounds to interfere 
in an internal conflict.173 But it did not explicitly do so, except on the grounds 
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that this resolution recalled previous resolutions adopted under Chapter VII 
though did not include any call to assist and protect the Kurdish people. 
 
Containment policies were given an institutionational allure with the 
possibility of calling upon UNHCR to respond in a humanitarian capacity on 
an ad-hoc basis. But not without a caveat as stated in the 1998 UNGA 
resolution that took note of the Principles: “Reaffirms its support for the role 
of the Office of the High Commissioner in providing humanitarian assistance 
and protection to internally displaced persons, on the basis of specific 
requests from the Secretary-General or the competent organs of the United 
Nations and with the consent of the State concerned, taking into account the 
complementarities of the mandates and expertise of other relevant 
organizations, and emphasizes that activities on behalf of internally 
displaced persons must not undermine the institution of asylum.”174 So there 
may have been some institutional resistance to the undermining of the 
norms of asylum. 
 
However, the various national policies are what lent structure and meaning 
to the norms of asylum, especially to those who were displaced and did not 
fit the Refugee Convention definition because of the lack of clear 
international normative practice on the matter, such as in the case of 
internally displaced or stateless persons. For instance, people displaced 
during the violent creation of the state of Bangladesh in 1971 did not fit the 
definition of a refugee. International norms of refuge and asylum were not 
available in this case leaving them to turn to Indian, Pakistani, and then 
emerging Bangladeshi governments (Ferris 1993: 8). Chinese refugees in 
Hong Kong faced a similar fate in 1959 when the UNHCR could do very little 
for them. In theory, they could avail of the protection of the Republic of 
China, seeing as they were still within Chinese territory (Plender 1994). 
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Therefore, though seldom to the benefit of asylum seekers and often to the 
strengthening of territorial integrity and state sovereignty, it was national 
policies that cascaded international norms on the freedom of movement and 
its related rights, within and beyond the Refugee Convention.175  
 
The push to draw out existing international norms applicable to situations of 
internal displacement, and highlight the rights of IDPs came amidst the 
developments discussed above. Shifting international focus from arriving 
asylum seekers to averting them also meant increasing attention to those 
displaced within borders. The resulting Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement was founded on the principle of sovereignty as responsibility, 
which is not a deviation from existing normative practice or understanding 
though it has been considered a norm-altering formulation176.  
 
Sovereignty – whether through protection of a state’s own or interference in 
another’s – has always been at the core of the displacement discourse, as 
has been revealed in the genealogy of this cluster. It would seem that the 
efforts to reframe sovereignty as “sovereignty as responsibility” was not 
entirely successful. This guiding philosophy of the norms on internal 
displacement only embedded and framed the issue deeper into the 
normative web of sovereignty.  
 
Interestingly, an explicit responsibility of the state is only mentioned once in 
the Principles, with a mention of the state itself only five times two of which 
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 From a regional perspective, adoption of the 1928 Havana Convention on the Right of 
Asylum, which was followed by the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Political Asylum, 
seems to have caused more confusion with regards to the granting of refuge and granting 
of political asylum in the Latin American region. Meanwhile in Africa, the 1969 Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa seems to complement the 
1951 Refugee Convention. And a unified strategy by the EU seemed to have limited the 
options for asylum seekers. 
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 The authoritative book on internal displacement by Korn and Weiss claims that the 
concept of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ “was a new way of thinking about an issue that 
was central to the problem of assistance and protection for the internally displaced.” Weiss, 
T.G. and Korn, D.A. (2006), Internal Displacement: Conceptualization and its 
Consequences, London and New York: Routledge, p.24 
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are made in the introduction and scope of the Principles, specifically the 
definition of an IDP. The explicit mention of state obligation is made in 
principle 9 in reference to the international “obligation to protect against the 
displacement of indigenous peoples, minorities, peasants, pastoralists and 
other groups with a special dependency on and attachment to their lands.” 
Other obligations or references to normative practice are linked to national, 
state or competent authorities, which is unclear in formulation and vague in 
indicating whose responsibility IDPs are. Based on “sovereignty as 
responsibility,” the Guiding Principles are non-interfering at best, but this 
may have left the question of the belonging and protection during and after 
displacement of IDPs unanswered. 
 
7.1.2. Cluster 2: Humanitarianism – Walking the Human Rights Tight 
Rope  
Cluster Timeframe: Late 19th century – Early 1990s 
 
Internal displacement has been described as one of the most complex 
humanitarian crises. Examination of the Guiding Principles shows that it is 
not the short-term humanitarian concerns that pre-occupied the drafters. 
Only four principles in the fourth section – principles 24 to 27 – of the 
instrument relates to humanitarian assistance. They relate to customary 
international values – humanity, impartiality, neutrality – attached to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, vesting the national authorities with 
the responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance in the first instance, 
protection of humanitarian workers, and giving due regard to the protection 
needs of IDPs when providing said assistance.177  
 
The core of the humanitarian dimension of the Guiding Principles lies in its 
provisions for humanitarian protection, though the scope and nature of 
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 Section IV – Principles Relating to Humanitarian Assistance (principles 24 to 27) of the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2,  
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internal displacement as defined in the Principles extends beyond situations 
of armed conflict. It was the growing number of non-international armed 
conflicts and complex political emergencies that made the development of 
the Guiding Principles seem urgent. Humanitarian protection is the 
framework of international norms that consist of provisions for the protection 
and safety of combatants and civilians during times of war. Provisions of 
international humanitarian protection are more rights focused in that they 
aim to preserve the rights of those under its protection during times of war. 
The core of international humanitarian protection during times of war is 
deeply, but not exclusively, rooted in the Four Geneva Conventions and two 
Protocols appended to them. Furthermore, humanitarian protection extends 
to include situations that cannot definitively be categorized as war, nor 
qualify as peacetime either. These are humanitarian crises in which wartime 
provisions cannot and, may not suffice.  
 
To explore and understand the nuances of humanitarianism embedded in 
the Guiding Principles genealogically, this cluster is analyzed, in the first 
instance, within the framework of wartime provisions protecting civilians in 
non-international armed conflict, and then to humanitarian protection norms 
that fall outside wartime provisions. At the end of the cluster we return to the 
Principles to re-assess its normative foundations in relation to humanitarian 
protection. 
 
7.1.2.1. Protecting Civilians from Excesses of Violence 
International humanitarian and human rights laws have protected civilians in 
armed conflicts in a systematic way at least since the institutionalization of 
the Laws of War governed by the 1907 Hague Regulations178 that were 
                                                        
178
 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its 
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, adopted on 18 
October 1907 
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elaborated from the second Hague Convention of 1899179. The Laws of War 
has been consistently developed on the premise that excessive violence 
and needless destruction are superfluous to actual military necessity, and 
are not only immoral but also counterproductive to the attainment of the 
objectives of the use of military force (Graham 1975).  
 
The Laws of War may not have an explicit rights approach in its provisions 
to protect civilians, but by aiming to reduce unnecessary suffering, which 
was and continues to be understood as “excessive” or “needless,” citizens 
would be treated as humanely as would prisoners of war by the occupying 
forces (jus in bello). Article 3 of the Hague regulations makes this provision 
for both combatants and non-combatants that can be expected to constitute 
a belligerent army in an occupied territory. This provision not withstanding, 
the preamble to the 1907 Hague Convention states that, “Until a more 
complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting 
Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the 
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain 
under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as 
they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the 
laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.”180 A direct 
human rights-centered protection becomes part of the international 
normative framework of protection in the mid-twentieth century, which will be 
discussed in the latter part of this cluster.  
 
7.1.2.1.1. An Analysis  
                                                        
179
 Hague Convention (II) on the Laws and Customs on the War on Land, adopted on 29 
July 1899 
180
 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its 
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, adopted on 18 
October 1907 (emphasis added). There is no definition of inhabitants in the Hague 
Regulations, except by qualification in the definition of belligerents. However the preamble 
to the Hague Convention is more clear in its provision of protection of both belligerents and 
inhabitants.  
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A quick view of actual practices suggests that the dictates of public 
conscience were not entirely in line with the normative discourse of the time. 
From 1899 to the 1907 version of the Laws of War on Land, state parties 
reduced by 13 members. At the time of publishing their book, Schindler and 
Toman (1988: 63) state that 17 members that “ratified the 1899 Convention 
did not ratify the 1907 version.” This however did not relieve them of their 
obligations under the 1899 Convention as stated in Article 4 of the 1907 
Convention181, while those party to the 1907 version were bound by the 
updated Laws of War on Land. 
 
State Acceptance of Norms in Numbers 
The Normative Instrument State Parties182 
Hague Convention (II) on the Laws and Customs on 
the War on Land 1899 
51 
Hague Convention (IV) and annexed Regulations 1907 38 (+15 signed)  
 
The 1907 Convention only makes a handful of clarificatory additions to the 
1899 version (Schindler and Toman 1988), yet there were a few members 
who preferred the earlier one. And since both versions held respective state 
parties obliged to adhere, the reduction in numbers is not significant, in 
theory, to the cascading of norms regarding the protection of civilians from 
the excesses of war. However, these earlier international obligations do not 
extend to non-international armed conflicts or conflicts not of an international 
character, which means that civilians affected by internal armed conflicts, 
including IDPs though undefined at that time, were not explicitly protected in 
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 Article 4 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) states that “The Convention of 1899 
remains in force as between the Powers that signed it, and which did not also ratify the 
present Convention.” 
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 State party numbers are being cited from ICRC’s official data as available on their online 
archive: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByDate.xsp  
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any way by the Laws of War. Interestingly, this was a normative break from 
what prevailed before183. 
 
7.1.2.2. Non-international Armed Conflict Provisions: Normative Break 
There was an earlier codification that established the rules for the protection 
of civilians in non-international conflicts. Interestingly, a year before the first 
Geneva Convention of 1864, the Lieber Code established the rules of war 
for the armies of the United States, which also included their treatment of 
wounded enemy combatants, prisoners of war, hostages, and rebels, 
insurgents and their governments, and most importantly armed and 
unarmed, and loyal and disloyal civilians both in the U.S. and in other 
countries where the war was being fought.  
 
The Lieber Code contains a separate section – Section X containing articles 
149 to 157 – that elaborated the rules of engagement in situations of 
insurrections, civil war and rebellion. The last but one article of the Code is 
significant here; it states: 
 
“Common justice and plain expediency require that the military 
commander protect the manifestly loyal citizens, in revolted 
territories, against the hardships of the war as much as the 
common misfortune of all war admits. 
 
The commander will throw the burden of the war, as much as lies 
within his power, on the disloyal citizens, of the revolted portion or 
province, subjecting them to a stricter police than the noncombatant 
enemies have to suffer in regular war; and if he deems it 
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 For studies on earliest conceptions of internal conflicts, see Laura, P. (2006) Formation 
of the Treaty Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Boston and Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publisher. Though not part of the timeframe of the humanitarian cluster, it is interesting to 
note that internal conflicts were considered almost sinful in the Christian traditions. Even the 
Arthashatra – the ancient Indian text on statecraft – considers “internal troubles” more 
damaging to the King and sovereign than external ones. For more, see Kautilya’s 
Arthashastra, translated into English by R. Shamasastry 
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appropriate, or if his government demands of him that every citizen 
shall, by an oath of allegiance, or by some other manifest act, 
declare his fidelity to the legitimate government, he may expel, 
transfer, imprison, or fine the revolted citizens who refuse to pledge 
themselves anew as citizens obedient to the law and loyal to the 
government.”184 
 
Though extremely limited and characterized by loyalty, the Lieber Code 
clearly protects citizens in a non-international armed conflict, which in the 
Code were characterized by the definitions of an insurrection, civil war and 
rebellion. All of these categories of combat had one commonality – territorial 
restriction as that reflected by a legitimate government.185 In a reductionist 
sense, this is similar to the present understanding of an armed conflict of a 
non-international character that has since the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
been defined by conflicts that are limited to within a member state’s 
sovereign borders.186  
 
7.1.2.2.1. An Analysis 
Though the Lieber Code was an American military policy, scholars such as 
Schindler and Toman (1988) see the Code as the foundation to modern 
international laws of war. It is also said to have “influenced the further 
codification of the laws of war and the adoption of similar regulations by 
other states” (Schindler and Toman 1988: 3). The normative understanding 
that prevailed in an influential instrument such as the Lieber Code, however 
narrow and nascent, seemed anathema to the evolving international system 
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 Article 156 of the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field promulgated as General Orders No.100 by President Lincoln (Lieber Code), on 24 
April 1863 (emphasis added). Available online at the Yale Avalon Project: 
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 Articles 149 to 152 of the Lieber Code define insurrection, civil war and rebellion 
respectively 
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 Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions describes armed conflict not of an 
international character as only defined by its “occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties.” (emphasis added) 
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over the next several decades. This is despite the fact that there was an 
increasing recognition through the nineteenth century of the applicability of 
emerging international laws of war to internal strife such as insurgency, 
belligerency and civil war. One of the earliest such recognitions was in 1822 
when “the Supreme Court of the United States referred to recognition by its 
government of a state of civil war between Spain and its colonies” (Cullen 
2010: 14).  
 
But until the mid-twentieth century, the protection of non-combatant civilians 
or loyal citizens that would also include those who may have been internally 
displaced became more problematic, and less clear than what was stated in 
the Code. Though the Lieber Code inspired much of the early international 
humanitarian framework, especially the Laws of War, its provisions on the 
treatment of civilians during civil war was not carried forward, and did not 
cascade.  
 
7.1.2.3. 1949 Common Article 3: Patching Up the Normative Break 
Efforts were made to patch up this normative break of the late nineteenth 
early twentieth centuries. In the drafting an entire convention on the 
protection of civilians, one article specifies their protection in armed conflicts 
not of an international character. This protection is specified in Article 3 
common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in a limited form. 
 
The limited nature and scope of Common Article 3, though “significant and 
innovative,” was the result of the reluctance of the member states of the 
international community to recognize, and thereby grant, equal status to 
armed forces rebelling against recognized governments (Elder 1979). The 
Diplomatic Conference of 1949 that finalized the Four Geneva Conventions 
at the end of the Second World War and in the dawn of decolonization 
echoed with deliberations on what started out as the fourth paragraph of 
Article 2 of the draft conventions. Article 2 common to the Geneva 
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Conventions dealt with the treatment of civilians in international conflict. 
After being rejected several times since the Diplomatic Conferences of 1912 
on the matter of protection of civilians in non-international armed conflicts, 
the ICRC finally restricted the matter to the last paragraph of Article 2. This 
draft was presented at the 17th Red Cross Conference in Stockholm (Elder 
1979). 
 
However, the objections continued. “No other issue has given rise to such a 
long discussion and to such a detailed and exhaustive study as the question 
of the extension of the Convention to war victims of conflicts not of an 
international character.” Mr. Morosov part of the delegation of the former 
USSR was right in making this remark at the eighteenth plenary session of 
the 1949 Diplomatic Conference. 187  Member states dilly-dallied on the 
question of nature of armed conflicts not of an international character – 
should it be defined on formal or factual criteria, as The Chairman of the 
Special Committee appointed to decide on these difficulties asked at its third 
meeting.188  
 
But even before identifying the defining criteria of non-international armed 
conflicts, the debate seesawed on the very need for such a provision. Mr. 
Morosov of USSR at the same session argued that since the very reason for 
the establishment of the UN is upholding of international peace and 
repressing all acts of aggression to the contrary, and since the Conventions 
were based on principles of international law and amplified provisions of 
international law relative to the laws and customs of war, shouldn't “the 
special provisions of international law relative to periods of war should be 
extended to all cases of armed conflict, including those of a non-
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 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Volume II Section B, 
p.325 
188
 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Volume II Section B, p.44 
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international character.”189 Others, including the ICRC held a diametrically 
opposing view, as stated the following day at the nineteenth plenary 
meeting: “I appeal to you most urgently to provide at least minimum 
protection for war victims even in conflicts not of an international nature,” 
said Mr. Carry of the ICRC.190 
 
The deliberations also reached a point of separating the fourth paragraph of 
Article 2 to form another Article – Article 2A and then Article 3. With a “timid 
breach” (Junod 1984: 30) in the normative understanding of sovereignty, the 
adoption of Common Article 3 in the Geneva Conventions was a victory in 
many ways, especially for the ICRC to whom all war victims should be 
eligible for equal international protection. 
 
7.1.2.3.1. An Analysis 
Part of the reason for this “timid breach” (Junod 1984: 30) can be revealed 
when situating the drafting of the Geneva Conventions, especially Common 
Article 3, within the post-World War II international context. Soon after the 
end of WWII, there was a wave of conflicts – inter and intra-state – that 
dotted the history of the longest superpower ideological standoff of the time 
– the Cold War191. Even as conflicts took place around the globe, those 
internally displaced were not the ones who posed a daunting challenge for 
the international community; it was those who fled across international 
borders. This issue and its impact on the normative development of internal 
displacement will be discussed at some length in the next cluster on 
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sovereignty. In many ways, the normative strands of international 
humanitarianism overlaps and interlinks with the other clusters and vice 
versa, which will be elaborated in the final overall analysis of all three 
clusters before moving to stage 3 of this case study.  
 
Therefore in 1949, though small, a consensus to include Common Article 3 
into the Geneva Conventions was a big leap in international norm cascading 
and shifting that brought all civilians under the purview of international 
humanitarian laws. The four Geneva Conventions have been ratified by all 
196 states, which in numeric terms means that it has thoroughly cascaded.  
 
State Acceptance of Norms in Numbers 
The Normative Instrument State Parties192 
Geneva Conventions (I, II, III, IV) 1949 196 
 
But the quantitative lens of norm cascading does not always reflect a similar 
view in the application of a norm, as has been the case with the application 
of Common Article 3. There are often legal questions to the point at which 
an internal armed conflict begins to be recognized; but most often “its 
application has been discarded by certain governments that consider 
“events” occurring in their territories do not constitute real armed conflicts” 
(Junod 1984: 30) Or as in the Algerian or 1973 Chilean conflicts, Article 3 
conditions were belatedly recognized. These legal and political challenges 
that were deliberated into a compromised Article 3 was what led to the need 
for the Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions towards the 
1960s and 1970s. Though the normative gap seemed to have been patched 
by Common Article 3, it seemed insufficient in reality to protecting civilians 
impacted by non-international armed conflicts. 
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7.1.2.4. 1977 Additional Protocol II: Re-cascading or Regression? 
Though the application of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions proved problematic, it was nevertheless foundational to the 
drafting of the 1977 Additional Protocol II. The preamble of Protocol II sets 
the tone for this:  
 
“The High Contracting Parties, 
Recalling that the humanitarian principles enshrined in Article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, constitute 
the foundation of respect for the human person in cases of armed 
conflict not of an international character, 
Recalling furthermore that international instruments relating to 
human rights offer a basic protection to the human person, 
Emphasizing the need to ensure a better protection for the victims 
of those armed conflicts, 
Recalling that, in cases not covered by the law in force, the human 
person remains under the protection of the principles of humanity 
and the dictates of the public conscience…”193 
 
In many ways, the second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions 
was a re-cascading of existing normative understanding regarding the 
protection of civilians in non-international armed conflict. Try as it did, the 
ICRC could not expand the parameters of Common Article 3 in its many 
drafts and deliberations of Additional Protocol II in the decades ahead of the 
Four Diplomatic Conferences of 1974-1977. After many hours and years of 
deliberation on the nature and characteristics of non-international armed 
conflict and even a coalition of states that rejected the idea entirely, as in the 
1949 Diplomatic Conference, Protocol II finally came to fruition. So, though 
Protocol II rests on the normative foundations of Common Article 3, it is its 
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 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted on 8 June 
1977, 1125 UNTS 609 
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own instrument additional to all four Geneva Conventions and not additional 
to Common Article 3. Junod’s (1984: 32) account on this deserves 
elaboration here:  
 
“A final goal was to safeguard what article 3 has already attained. To 
avoid a legal regression if a restrictive definition was 
adopted…Safeguarding the conditions of application of common 
article 3…demonstrates that Protocol II was conceived as an entity 
additional to the four Conventions, applicable to all armed conflicts 
other than those subjected to common article 2. This separation of 
the Protocol from article 3 was aimed at avoiding a reduction in the 
scope of article 3, which might result from establishing precise rules. 
Common article 3 thus kept its autonomous existence.” 
 
The drafting and adoption of Additional Protocol II was an exercise in 
restating the importance of existing international humanitarian norms, 
replicating them to a large extent within provisions of Protocol II, and 
particularizing them by extending the existing understanding to include 
situations of non-international armed conflicts. Though it is primarily a re-
cascading period, it was not without compromises and regressions.  
 
One of the first compromises was that Protocol II has only 168 parties, and 
the rest are still legally bound by the Geneva Conventions including those 
who are party to Protocol II. It projects diminished power and legitimacy in 
its own right, though they replicate existing normative understandings. 
 
A second compromise was clarity and specificity, which are the core 
elements of the component of meaning in norm cascading. From the draft 
47 provisions that were detailed and comprehensive, the Protocol II adopted 
was a reduced 28 provisions that were generic. Thirdly, it also provided for 
limited agency compared to Common Article 3 that referred to “parties to the 
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conflict” ensuring conformity to the Geneva Conventions through some form 
of a special agreement in the last paragraph of the article. Protocol II makes 
no such reference.  
 
The limited nature and scope of Protocol II was the negotiated success of 
the Pakistan delegation at the 1977 Diplomatic Conference (Junod 1984). 
Mr. Hussain of the Pakistan delegation speaking at the 49th plenary meeting 
of the fourth and last session of the Diplomatic Conference presented the 
thinking behind the compromised and compressed Protocol II having 
produced a reduced draft:  
 
“Its provisions must be acceptable to all and, therefore, of obvious practical 
benefit; the provisions must be within the perceived capacity of those 
involved to apply them and, therefore, precise and simple; they should not 
appear to affect the sovereignty of any State Party or the responsibility of its 
Government to maintain law and order and defend national unity, nor be 
able to be invoked to justify any outside intervention; nothing in the Protocol 
should suggest that dissidents must be treated legally other than as rebels; 
and. lastly, there should be no automatic repetition of the more 
comprehensive provisions, such as those on civil defence, found in Protocol 
I. To include such provisions would risk changing the material field of 
application to such an extent that States would either fail to ratify Protocol II 
or tend to argue for its non-application in situations falling within its scope, 
thereby leaving the victims of those conflicts without adequate protection.”194 
 
7.1.2.4.1. An Analysis 
From a holistic point of view, the development of Protocol II seemed to be 
marked by a cascading stasis, almost a step back, because of its limited 
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scope and nature though it replicated and particularized the normative 
essence of then existing international humanitarian laws. Though the 
international community of states accepted the replication and 
particularization of normative essence of the existed intersubjective 
framework, they were reluctant to frame the elements or nuances of the 
replicated norms any further.  
 
State Acceptance of Norms in Numbers 
The Normative Instrument State Parties195 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) 
168 (+3 signed) 
 
Nevertheless, Protocol II together with Common Article 3 provided far better 
international legal provisions for the protection of civilians, including IDPs, in 
non-international armed conflicts. 
 
However, the realities of international humanitarianism on the ground 
through the 1960s and 1970s were a testament to this norm cascading 
stasis and regression. States were taking a step back, and letting non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), including the ICRC, to take their place, 
giving rise to a new humanitarianism. Chandler notes that in the bipolar 
world, relief charities stepped in where states could not because their 
humanitarianism seemed universal and politically neutral (Chandler 2001). 
Between 1945 and 1949 alone nearly 200 NGOs were created, most of 
them based in the US (Davey, Borton and Foley 2013). In situations such as 
in Biafra in 1968 and in the 1970s in Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Cambodia, 
NGOs closed the gap of humanitarian need that states left wide open, or 
simply refused to get involved in. At times, the NGOs themselves became 
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part of the casualties despite their political neutrality and universalism, such 
as the ICRC in the Biafran conflict.  
 
Biafra was a civil conflict made more complex with the UN deciding non-
involvement, the Nigerian government blocking Biafra’s secession, and a 
famine. Though the Nigerian government denied permission to the ICRC to 
provide relief services196, the ICRC started airlifting relief in late 1968. This 
bold move made the ICRC a prime target when the Nigerian government 
shot down the Red Cross plane in the summer of 1969 (Desgrandchamps 
2012). In Biafra the old humanitarianism was also shot down, and a new 
humanitarianism emerged according to many.197 The new humanitarianism 
was further catalyzed by the crises of East Pakistan and, later, Ethiopia. The 
mass displacement and fatalities in East Pakistan in the early 1970s, later 
renamed Bangladesh, caused by political violence, armed uprisings and 
natural disaster challenged the humanitarian system. The Ethiopian famine 
of 1984-85 also revealed areas in the international humanitarian structure 
that needed improvement (Davey, Borton and Foley 2013). 
 
By the 1970s and 1980s, governments became part of the new 
humanitarianism by becoming direct funders – the donors – “as well as the 
integration of international humanitarian NGOs in international institutions 
and their growth in numbers and influence” (Chandler 2001: 686). Therefore 
the bipolar Cold War world was fertile not only for humanitarian action 
(Davey, Borton and Foley 2013), but also for a deeper, indirectly 
interventionist, political humanitarianism with strong human rights 
undercurrents.  
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7.1.2.5. In the Crosshairs of Humanitarianism and Human Rights  
The normative roots of the international human rights undercurrents is 
deeply embedded in one of the most fundamental global body of norms – 
the UN Charter. This is not to say that international human rights did not 
exist before 1945, but that the Charter initiated their internationalization and 
institutionalization at a collective level like nothing before it (Buergenthal 
1997). The Charter also underpins the norms of sovereignty and non-
intervention in domestic affairs – almost pitted directly against human rights 
norms, which has been discussed in the sovereignty cluster above. 
 
The tension between the emerging norms of human rights and the deeply 
rooted norms of sovereignty also led to shifts in the perspective of 
humanitarianism as well, drawing the two normative strands of human rights 
and humanitarianism closer. This came about at the UN’s first International 
Conference on Human Rights in Tehran in 1968 that marked 20 years of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A resolution at the conference 
stated that the UN Secretary General could take steps to uphold human 
rights in armed conflicts. These steps included promoting the better 
application of international humanitarian laws, carrying out an assessment of 
a need for additional humanitarian instruments, and encouraging the 
continued observance of the laws of civilized nations drawn from the laws of 
humanity and dictates of public conscience, pending the adoption of new 
laws.198 This was further endorsed by a UN General Assembly resolution on 
the same issue in the same year.199 
 
The growing focus on human rights was also reflected in the increasing 
need for development and growth. Some of these demands were being met 
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through humanitarian NGOs. For instance, by the end of the 1960s Oxfam 
was spending “less than 10% of its budget on disaster response: more than 
50% was used on medical and welfare projects in areas unaffected by any 
emergency, and 40% went on agricultural development and technical 
training” (Whitaker 1983: 22). Even agencies within the UN underwent 
transformations. UNICEF that rose from the demise of the UNRRA decided 
to extend its work during the period of the Cold War and the growing 
development debate to the general health of children who were not in any 
kind of emergency (UNICEF 1996 and others).200   
 
This leads to a further shift in humanitarianism, which was not only marked 
by a deepening practice as described above, and in the previous section, 
but also by establishing a link between relief and development, and its 
subsequent securitization following the end of the Cold War. There are two 
arguments that enabled the linking of relief to development: first is that 
short-term assistance was insufficient and forward-looking strategies were 
needed, which led to the second strand that assistance should be rights 
based (Chandler 2001). Not only did NGOs play a bigger role in human 
rights-based humanitarianism that often spilled into development, but the 
international community also stepped up, at times, in the 1980s and 1990s 
taking bolder steps – humanitarian intervention – under chapter VII of the 
UN Charter to deal with human rights violations, such as in Iraq, Somalia, 
former Yugoslavia, Haiti and others (Buergenthal 1997).  
 
7.1.2.5.1. An Analysis 
The coming together of humanitarianism and human rights has 
strengthened the protection of civilians, including IDPs, in various internal 
crises. A rights-based focus is also evident in the provisions of Protocol II 
that has replicated much of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the 
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ICCPR. The benefits of the meshing of humanitarianism and human rights 
exceed the complexities that arise from it. As Junod (1984: 34) notes, “the 
existence of an “overlapping zone” of situations in which international 
humanitarian law and human rights are applicable simultaneously 
contributes to the reinforcement of protection because the means of 
implementation of the Protocol and Covenant are different.”  
 
State Acceptance of Norms in Numbers 
The Normative Instrument State Parties 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 
by UNGA resolution 
48 in favour + 8 
abstentions201 
Proclamation of Tehran 1968 adopted at the 
International Conference on Human Rights 
84 states present 





International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
1966 
168203 
International Covenant of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 1966 
164204 
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Therefore the humanitarian protection provided through Protocol II, though 
limited in scope, was better because of the threads of human rights woven 
into it. One of the most important protections that not only replicates one 
provision of the Civilian Convention of 1949, but also extends it further is 
that which is provided in Article 17 – prohibition of forced movement of 
civilians. This was limited to protected persons or aliens206 as described in 
the first part of the 1949 Civilian Convention. In Protocol II this extends to all 
civilians and draws strength from the right to freedom of movement 
stipulated in the ICCPR207. Some of these and other aspects of rights have 
been discussed in the sovereignty cluster, and will be come up in the cluster 
on citizenship, as reinforcing and, at times, conflicting, yet coexisting norms.  
 
However, there were some, including Theodore Meron (1983), who felt that 
protection gaps persisted in domestic situations of conflict and violence. This 
led to the drafting of the Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian 
Standards for any situation that fell outside the purview of Protocol II or the 
within the derogation clauses of the human rights covenants (Petrasek 
1998). Though not binding in any way, the Turku Declaration sets out 18 
human rights provisions, including a right not to be displaced arbitrarily, to all 
situations including internal violence, disturbances, tensions, and public 
emergency, without any conditions for derogation.208  
 
Fundamental standards of humanitarianism and humanity have been 
deliberated at the UN for decades without much progress. But by the end of 
the 1990s, several international legal milestones were achieved through 
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case law of the many ad hoc international tribunals and the Rome Statute of 
the ICC that criminalized humanitarian and human rights violations, 
specifically war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, thereby 
strengthening international humanitarian and human rights laws (Schüller 
2010). 
 
7.1.2.6. Cluster Conclusion: Rethinking Humanitarian Protection in the 
Guiding Principles 
It is clear from the genealogical exploration presented above that the 
humanitarian protection of civilians in internal armed conflicts has shifted, 
regressed and progressed since the late 1800s. Even the concept and idea 
of humanitarian protection has collided, conflicted and, at times, co-opted 
into normative frameworks on sovereignty, citizenship and human rights. 
From the Leiber Code to the laws of international humanitarianism, it is no 
longer just the protection of a person from the excesses of war, but also an 
extended embodiment of a person’s rights.  
 
Yet, deliberations on the human rights of the internally displaced – 1980s 
and 1990s – still concluded that IDPs were not sufficiently, and specifically, 
protected (Cohen 1991).209 Though a compilation of existing international 
laws and standards, as the Principles are often described, the Principles still 
expand international humanitarian normative foundations in two ways: 
identifying the issue, and framing acceptable behaviour.   
 
The issue was identified in the definition of IDPs, which is a normative leap, 
as nothing before the Guiding Principles had done this. This is an accepted 
fact (Weiss and Korn 2006), but the emergence of a definition is not a 
normative breakthrough in itself; it is how the definition breaks normative 
                                                        
209
 Also see Refugee Policy Group (1992) Human Rights and Humanitarian Emergencies: 
New Role for U.N. Human Rights Bodies: Washington DC: RPG; Cohen, R. and Cuénod, J. 
(1995) Improving Institutional Arrangements for the Internally Displaced: Washington DC: 
Brookings Institute and RPG 
 257 
boundaries and created important precedents. The challenge – conflict-
induced internal displacement – that plagued the international community 
was not the only focus of the definition. It included “armed conflict, situations 
of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-
made disasters.”210 Thus unlike Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, the Guiding Principles could be applied to situations of internal 
violence or war-like conditions that could be characteristic of any of the 
situations listed in the definition. It creates an explicit normative continuum 
between humanitarianism and human rights. It lays out a more malleable 
and flexible normative parameter than the international humanitarian 
framework with regard to scope and field of application. 
 
Interestingly, through the identification of the issue was humanitarian in 
nature, the framing of the solution was not. The Guiding Principles do not 
draw from the protection granted through the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol II. The tabular analysis of the Guiding Principles in 
chapter 6 shows that out of 30 principles, only a handful are directly drawn 
or indirectly borrowed from the Geneva Conventions or Protocol II. Most 
principles are drawn from international human rights covenants and the 
Turku humanitarian standards, as indicated in Deng’s Compilation and 
Analysis and many of the draft Principles.  
 
Two factors can explain this. Firstly the Guiding Principles were meant to 
address the gaps in the protection of the rights of IDPs. Secondly the 
restricted scope of application of the Geneva framework and its watered 
down provisions applicable in non-international armed conflicts, as 
discussed above, do not make it an appealing or natural choice.   
 
However, this creates two problems: Firstly, as the framing of the 
humanitarian response to internal displacement is human rights centric, a 
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humanitarian response is still limited. Moreover, having extracted the IDP 
category from the broad category of citizens who come under international 
humanitarian protection in non-international conflicts – Common Article 3 
and Protocol II additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions – the internally 
displaced may be put in a more complex crisis than before because of their 
special normative status. This was one of the concerns raised in 
consultations with Francis Deng and state government soon after his 
appointment, as stated in a post-consultations memorandum: “Those 
consulted expressed…fear that creating a new category of persons entitled 
to certain rights and/or treatment may give rise to undesirable distinctions 
among victims.”211 These fears were not unwarranted as was realized when 
states began internalizing some of the principles. In so doing, some states 
started processes of status determination in addition to registering IDPs, as 
stated in a 2008 Brookings Manual on protecting IDPs, thereby making the 
situation more complex (Williams 2008: 14). 
 
The human rights approach has also been questioned by the ICRC because 
of the fact “that human rights law, even though formally applicable in 
wartime, is essentially designed for times of peace. In practice, the exercise 
of these rights in very often reduced in the event of conflict...” (ICRC 1988: 
4) This is especially true in cases of internal violence that does not 
necessarily amount to a conflict, for which reason the Turku Standards were 
drafted. But as a non-legal, thus legally non-obligatory, set of norms, its 
provisions may or may not be observed. However, the ICRC’s statute gives 
it more legal force in the actions it can take in such instances (ICRC 1988).  
 
Another problem goes back to ICRC and Switzerland’s initial concern that a 
new set of norms on IDPs would undermine the power and authority of 
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Additional Protocol II.212 Though a general hierarchy is created in the scope 
and introduction of the Principles, it does so without specifically calling on 
the Geneva Conventions or other existing humanitarian standards and 
practices. Not borrowing from Additional Protocol II or Common Article 3 
more concretely in the Principles has, perhaps, eroded some of the power 
and legitimacy of those norms, in the case of IDPs at least, and highlighted 
its limitations and inadequacies once more. This is due to the identification 
of IDPs that are not limited to situations of armed conflicts, thus falling 
outside the purview of humanitarian laws. This is also due to the strategic 
approach of the drafters of the Principles that circumnavigated the thorny 
normative issue of sovereignty by reconstructing it as a responsibility of the 
state, but with no success as the sovereignty cluster revealed.  
 
7.1.3. Cluster 3 – Citizenship: Flattened and Renationalized 
Timeframe: 1900 to 1995 
 
This leads to the third cluster – citizenship – of this study, which not only 
focuses on the post-displacement phase as is addressed in the last section 
of the Principles, but also on displacement itself as it relates to belonging. It 
is a question of belonging and re-belonging or emplacement. The question 
of belonging is also one layer in the clusters of sovereignty and 
humanitarianism, in that territorial borders demarcate the lines of 
responsibility also on the basis that those displaced belong, or ideally 
choose to belong to a particularly defined and internationally recognized 
space. This belonging, normatively and characteristically rich and complex, 
is derived formally through nationality and citizenship.  
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Nationality and citizenship, often used synonymously and 
interchangeably, 213  according to Paul Weis, a authority on issues of 
nationality, “emphasize two different aspects of the same notion: state 
membership. “Nationality” stresses the international, “citizenship” the 
national, municipal aspect” (Weis 1956: 4-5).  
 
Some, like Rubenstein and Adler (2000), try to highlight the distinction 
between the two. Others, like Chatterjee clarify the link between these 
deeply contested constructs: “The modern form of the nation is both 
universal and particular. The universal dimension is represented, first, by the 
idea of the people as the original locus of sovereignty in the modern state, 
and second, by the idea of all humans as bearers of rights…By enshrining 
the specific rights of citizens in a state constituted by a particular people, 
namely a nation. Thus, the nation-state became the particular, and normal, 
form of the modern state” (Chatterjee  2004: 29). Separating them, as far as 
possible, the following sub-sections explore these normative constructs of 
belonging that essentialize forced displacement.  
 
7.1.3.1. Nationality: Situating Peoples 
Nationality continues as a bastion of sovereignty, especially from an 
international perspective, in that it is the discretion of the state to decide who 
it allows in its territory, at least to the extent that was decreed in 1923 on 
nationality issues of Tunis and Morocco by the Permanent Court of Justice 
on the extent of domestic jurisdiction of states, in this case of Britain and 
France: “it might well be said that the jurisdiction of a State is exclusive 
within the limits fixed by international law – using this expression in its wider 
sense, that is to say, embracing both customary law and general as well as 
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particular treaty law…The question whether a certain matter is or is not 
solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it 
depends upon the development of international relations. Thus, in the 
present state of international law, questions of nationality are, in the opinion 
of the Court, in principle within this reserved domain.”214 
 
This reserved domain was emphasized seven years later in the first attempt 
to codifiy international laws. In fact international laws on nationality were one 
of three items listed for international codification, the other two being 
territorial waters and state sovereignty (Reeves 1930). Though a highly 
political issue, the reason for nationality making the list of the first attempts 
to codify international law has often been attributed to the increased mobility 
of people by a US delegate on the nationality committee of the Hague 
Conference: “A century ago international law was regarded as having little or 
nothing to do with nationality, but as movements of populations from country 
to country and acquisition of new nationalities through naturalization have 
greatly increased in modern times, problems concerning the nationality of 
persons, involving conflicting claims between states, have correspondingly 
increased” (Flournoy 1930: 467).215 
 
Though the movement of people between territorial borders became, and 
continues as, an established way of existence, the right of people to belong 
– naitonality – was not entirely a matter of individual choice as article 1 of 
the 1930 Hague Convention states, which also touches upon the tension 
between sovereignty and international law: “It is for each State to determine 
under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by 
other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, 
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international custom, and the principles of law generally recognised with 
regard to nationality.”216 
 
By the end of the Second World War, nationality was no longer only a 
prerogative of a state, but also an individual human right, as provided by 
article 15 of the UDHR. But, the legislation of rights through the drafting of 
the international covenants did not see the right to nationality translate in its 
totality to a legal right. Article 24 of the ICCPR only provides for a child’s 
right to nationality.  
 
Other specific legal provisions include prohibition of discrimination based on 
nationality as laid out in the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination.217 This fear of persecution based on nationality is 
also laid out in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Progressive steps included 
granting married woman the right to choose her nationality, and also giving 
women an equal right to decide her nationality in the Convention on the 
Eliminationf of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)218.  
 
7.1.3.1.1. An Analysis 
Stemming from the recognition of the increased movement of people, the 
initial codification of international laws on the difficult topic of nationality 
primarily focuses on issues that caused complications between states such 
as questions of nationality of married women, children and so on. The 
objective was to simplify any points of law that would make relations 
between states easier. From the aspect of an individual’s rights, it came 
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down to which state would be responsible for them even in the case of 
expatriation and multiple nationalities.  
 
State Acceptance of Norms in Numbers 
The Normative Instrument State Parties 
1930 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to 
the Conflict of Nationality Laws (adopted by the 
League of Nations) 
24 (11 of which 
signed and ratified 
the treaty after the 
establishment of 
the UN)219 
1930 Protocol relating to Military Obligations in 
Certain Cases of Double Nationality (adopted by the 
League of Nations) 
27 (14 of which 
signed and ratified 




In the post-Second World War period, norms of lesser interference in 
domestic affairs prevailed as is evident in the crystallization of human rights 
laws in the ICCPR, which limits the right to nationality only to children. 
Deliberations above on the tension between limiting and extending 
international interference in domestic affairs are also relevant in this cluster.  
 
However, spurred by the events in apartheid South Africa the community of 
states were able to come to a consensus about elimination of racial 
discrimination based on a list of criteria, including nationality, which also 
extended to the rights of women. This is more a reflection of the then 
growing need for individual equality rooted in the post-World War II 
emerging significance of human rights than a reflection of any diminishing 
importance of interference in internal state affairs or sovereignty. These 
were particularizations of the international norms of nationality within the 
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borader normative framework of equality. Nationality matters remain within 
the domestic realm until they conflict with international law (Batchelor 1995), 
which meant that matters relating to internal displacement were left out of 
the questions on nationality. 
 
7.1.3.2. Situating the  Stateless 
The realm in which tensions sparked and conflicted in the international 
domain was with regards to statelessness. Deliberations on statelessness 
shadowed international debates on nationality even in 1930 at the 
international community’s first attempt to codify international laws. But the 
matter was not accorded sufficient significance, until the end of the Second 
World War and especially in relation to the granting of refugee status and 
asylum. Even then, it was a subject that was still secondary to that of 
determing the status of, and protecting refugees. As discussed for the 
previous clusters, though concerns and legal provisions for the protection of 
refugees was ontologically centered in the international, it evolved and 
cascaded in state practice at the domestic level. So too it was in the case of 
the normative project of statelessness. 
 
In theory, mechanisms, thus far explored, that lead to statelessness are 
limited, but go beyond just the remit of the law. De jure (by law) 
statelessness are “those who are not considered as nationals by any state 
under its law” (Goris, Harrington and Köhn 2009: 4)220. But statelessness 
cannot only be characterised within law. De facto statelessness should also 
be taken into consideration. These are people who are “stateless in practice, 
if not in law – or cannot rely on the state of which they are citizens for 
protection” (Goris, Harrington and Köhn 2009: 4), such as the aboriginals of 
Australia, or Tamils of Sri Lanka, bedouins of Kuwait and so on. Though the 
first is an emphasis on citizenship itself, the latter is a shift to the protection 
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of the citizen. This is directly linked to the conceptualization of citizenship 
itself, which is a political, social, economic and above all national normative 
project (Rubenstein and Adler 2000). Some have tried to “denationalize” 
(Bosniak 2000) citizenship, only to conclude that it is aspirational and a 
working possibility at best.  
 
Citizenship is a concept and practice that has been around since the ancient 
city-states of Greece and Rome (Heater 2004) that was revived with the 
French Revolution (Tilly 1995), 221  the emergence and growing of the 
international human rights regime and much scholarly verbiage222 since. But 
a couple of the more accepted thoeretical and practical paths to citizenship 
are jus soli (right of birth) and jus sanguinis (right of blood), though these do 
not sufficiently cover claims to citizenship. Jus domicili (right by residence) 
should also be taken into consideration (Gibney 2009).  
 
The debate on what constitutes right by residence is ongoing. However the 
debate offers some points to consider. One way to understand or assess 
right by residence is when a person chooses to exercise this right; i.e. a 
person makes a “choice” (Gibney 2009) to live or not in a particular state. 
Another way to look at jus domicili would be from the point of view of the 
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state. “All people living under – or subject to – the laws of a particular state 
should be members of that state” (Gibney 2009: 51). A third way would be 
that of “societal membership” (Bauböck 2005). The test of membership is the 
depth of one’s social and economic roots into a particular political 
community, tying an individual’s well-being to the common good (Bauböck 
2005).  
 
7.1.3.3. The Question of Habitual Residence 
However conceptualizations, characterizations and legal provisions on 
nationality, citizenship and statelessness do not always address, or provide 
responses to situations of forced displacement, especially internal 
displacement. Though territoriality stands out in this cluster, it comes down 
to one important question – that of habitual residence which can be seen in 
most of the international instruments pertaining to displacement, such as in 
the definition of refugees in the 1951 Refugee Convention,223 in the defintion 
of IDPs in the Guiding Principles,224 and so too in one of the provisions in 
the 1954 Statelessness Convention.225  
 
Scholars such as Cavers place the emergence of the use of ‘habitual 
residence’ in international legal discourse in the post-World War II Hague 
Conference that discredited the use of the connecting nationality factor at 
the individual level because of the denunciation of the pre-war Hague 
conventions that employed it (Cavers 1972).226 In fact, the emergence and 
employment of the term habitual residence began in international private 
                                                        
223
 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted on 28 
July 1951, UNTS, Vol. 189 p. 137. Article 1 a(2) of the Convention uses the term habitual 
residence to identify those without nationality and may qualify as refugees. 
224
 Paragraph 2 of the introduction to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, identifies IDPs territorially as those “persons or groups of persons 
who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual 
residence…” 
225
 Article 14 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, adopted on 28 
September 1954, UNTS, Vol. 360 p. 117 
226
 Carvers also cites Ernst Rabel’s (1958) work from the Conflicts of Laws: A Comparative 
Study in which Rabel states that the then Secretary General reported the need for a more 
satisfactory concept than nationality.  
 267 
law, and very specifically in conventions relating to that of children – relating 
to their guardianship, adoption, abduction and so on (Cavers 1972 and 
Bozin-Odhiambo 2012). Thus, it may seem odd that in 1966 the covenant of 
rights and many more international conventions on the rights and protection 
of a child returned to the use of nationality – a concept with discredited 
claims since the end of the Second World War – as a connecting factor. 
However, habitual residence remains a determining criterion in establishing 
the nationality factor between individual and polity (Costamagna 2013).  
 
This draws from the principle practice set forth by the judgment of the 
International Court of Justice in the contentious Nottebohm case in which 
the 11 out of 14 judges “have given their preference to the real and effective 
nationality, that which accorded with the facts that based on stronger factual 
ties between the person and one of these States whose nationality is 
involved. Different factors are taken into consideration, and their importance 
will vary from one case to the next: there is the habitual residence of the 
individual concerned but also the centre of his interests, his family ties, his 
participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a given country and 
inculcated in his children, etc.”227 Though this was a principle approach in 
the case of dual nationalities, the ICJ was creating precedent by imposing 
this principle in the case of Friedrich Nottenbohm who had only one 
nationality – that of Liechtenstein. As Jones (1956: 288) explains, the court 
was extending the effective nationality principle “to the sphere of protection 
the principle of connection.” 
 
Though habitual residence has legal precedence and significance, the 
concept is not legally defined. It has been argued that it be kept simple and 
out of the realm of spurious legal propositions leaving it open to 
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determinations on the facts of a case. 228  This allows conceptual and 
practical flexibility, and also frees this international and domestic term to be 
free from being bound by varying interpretations of national laws. However, 
this also means makes the application of habitual residence not as simple 
as not defining it, simply because facts – used to determine habitual 
residence – are not simple or uncomplicated (Stone 2000).  
 
7.1.3.4. An Analysis 
The post-Second World War period saw a dramatic rise in people who were 
left stateless and the response of the international community was the 1951 
UN Refugee Convention. While drafting the Refugee Convention, the Ad 
Hoc Committee vested with this responsibility, had also drafted a Protocol 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. However, this Protocol did not 
see the light of day. At the Conference of Plenipotentiaries in 1951, it was 
decided that the Refugee Convention would be adopted without the Protocol 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (Batchelor 2005).  
 
This not only led to the conceptual and practical separation of refugee and 
stateless vis-à-vis defintion and effective protection (Batchelor 1995), but 
also created a deeper problematic – that of the exclusion of those displaced, 
especially internally displaced. A footnote in the 1949 Study of 
Statelessness is clarifying in this regard: “those refugees who have fled from 
one to another part of the country of which they are citizens are not stateless 
persons.”229  Though it would seem logical to categorize IDPs under the 
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conceptual understanding of de facto statelessness, in practice they were 
not. 
State Acceptance of Norms in Numbers 
The Normative Instrument State Parties 
1930 Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness 
(adopted by the League of Nations) 
11230 
1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons 
87231 
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 66232 
 
As Barutciski (1998: 12) explains, “Being a victim of displacement is not the 
quality that has historically justified additional human rights protection for 
refugees. It is rather the quality of being a foreigner who has escaped 
persecution that is addressed by international refugee law...the kinds of 
rights granted to refugees would not make sense for displaced persons who 
are still in their country of origin. These rights would be redundant if granted 
to citizens in their own states. If a government is responsible for having 
internally displaced its own people in the first place, is it useful to insist that it 
gives partial rights to employment or access to certain types of welfare 
benefits?” 
 
The structural, functional and conceptual clarity of the refugee framework 
and convention stemmed from knowing who should be included and who 
should be left out. So in 1951 it was decided that those who were forced out 
of their homes but not out of their countries fell between the cracks of 
international debates on sovereignty and human rights. They were not 
stateless and therefore did not require the support of the international actors 
and other states. Displacement was seen purely from within the perspective 
of internationally-recognised sovereign borders and in turn the denial of a 
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nationality or citizenship that ended the moment a person was forced to 
cross her home country’s international borders and seek refuge in another 
country.  
 
Though the conventions relating to status of stateless persons and the 
reduction of statelessness233 was a step towards addressing the needs and 
issues of those who were not covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
these conventions on statelessness did not move away from the “seeking to 
ensure everyone has their right to a nationality in practice” and thereby 
providing a “legal framework...on securing national protection for persons 
who might otherwise be in need of international protection” (Batchelor 2005: 
35). The normative framework of statelessness is the replication of 
nationality norms and particularization of refugee norms by exclusion, that 
specifically, and ironically, left out the displaced.  
 
However, the incorporation of habitual residence into the definition, 
characterization and practical understanding of internal displacement may 
have given the IDP normative framework more flexibility, especially in the 
post-displacement phase,234 by not limiting it only to questions of nationality, 
citizenship or statelessness. This normative break may be beneficial in one 
way, but from a rights perspective, the principles only refer to no 
discrimination against IDPs who have returned, resettled or reintegrated and 
repossession of property to the extent possible with possibility for 
compensation.  
 
The Guiding Principles make no mention of any guarantee of rights that 
should be accorded to nationals or citizens, which may not be possible from 
the point of view of only habitual residence, but it was a step in the right 
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direction. The characterization of internal displacement based on habitual 
residence is also limiting in that it further excludes those who may have  
been displaced from a temporary residence or location.  
 
7.1.3.5. Cluster-Analysis Summary 
A genealogical exploration of the three clusters above has demonstrated 
that the international community still considers internal displacement to be a 
domestic matter though it has gained increasing global attention and 
discursive space for reasons not entirely to the benefit of IDPs themselves. 
Nevertheless the international normative project on internal displacement 
has only reiterated the stronghold of fundamental norms such as 
sovereignty. The unrelenting hold of sovereignty on international affairs has 
arguably weakened, but it has not altogether disappeared. It has weakened 
through regular normative clashes with the human rights or humanitarian 
frameworks that consistently push put pressure on, and push the 
“boundaries” of sovereignty.  
 
One of the most foundational normative instruments at the global level, the 
UN Charter is itself a representation of this normative tension. As an 
instrument that stands for both the respect for state sovereignty and human 
rights for all, it is also one that has a high critical mass of states acceptance. 
However, the numbers are only a demonstration of a state’s willingness to 
accept an intersubjective understanding and the many dilemmas that come 
with it. Fluid meanings and understandings also give states normative 
maneuverability that often is a contributing factor to changing practices and 
actual state adherence to norms.  
 
The tensions and normative interlinkages between and within the clusters is 
also revealed in the analyses (see diagram below). For instance, though 
norms of sovereignty dictate non-interference in the domestic affairs of 
another state, the practice was flouted to maintain one’s own sovereignty  
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Figure 3: Norm Ecosystem of UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement:  
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and internal peace in certain situations, such as when states did not want to 
grant asylum, and implemented containment or deterrence policies by creating 
safe havens in the country of origin in the name of humanitarianism. The 
primacy of the state is also reflected in the status of individuals – their belonging 
– before international law by the merit of determining nationality as discussed in 
the citizenship cluster.  
 
Without effective nationality, or even basic nationality, a person does have 
access to rights and entitlements. This leads to an interesting legal conundrum 
with the regard to the claimed primacy of human rights, especially the 
fundamentality of the right to freedom of movement and its significance to the 
realization of other rights including right to a nationality. But if one needs a 
nationality to exercise or even have access to other rights, then there is a legal 
lacuna in the understanding of human rights. Though in practice, the status of 
the individual can guaratee some access to rights. 
 
However, some of this complexity may have been overcome in the case of IDPs 
who are characterized by being forced out of their habitual residence, even in 
the event that people have the opportunity to end displacement by returning or 
resettling in a place of habitual residence. Research has shown that IDPs and 
other displaced persons, especially in protracted situations, prefer to hold on to 
their displaced identity than claim nationality or citizenship in order to have 
access to certain rights, such as right to food in the case of Sri Lankan IDPs, or 
displaced Palestinians who would rather remain displaced than claim 
citizenship in another country because “the right to return is the highest priority” 
for them (Mehta and Napier-Moore 2010: 21). Though a favorable 
characterization, a need to re-examine the concept of habitual residence itself 
arises when IDPs themselves understand their situations differently. This also 
leads to the need for a better understanding of internalization and 
implemenation of the Guiding Principles at the domestic level, which may not be 
as effective as hoped. Analysis in stage 3 discussed in the following section will 
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also demonstrate how domestic laws on internal displacement, some of which 
may have come before the establishment of the Guiding Principles have also 
helped the strengthening of the international norms.   
 
7.2. STAGE 3: Re-examining Internalization – Case Study in Colombia 
 
Habitual residence is also prominent in the domestication of norms on internal 
displacement. Many countries efforts to legalize internal displacement norms 
focus on the right to return and property restitution, or registering temporary 
residences and undergoing further procedures to take up a new permanent 
habitual residence. Even before the development of the Guiding Principles, the 
signing of the Dayton Peace Accord of 1995 for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 
included a provision that entrusted the UNHCR with assisting the government to 
implement the Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons. The agreement 
stressed that the “early return of refugees and displaced persons is an 
important objective of the settlement of the conflict.” 235  In 2001, the BiH 
government enacted an additional law to regulate “the permanent and 
temporary residence of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the 
temporary residence of displaced persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”  
 
Quite similarly, Georgia enacted an IDP law in 1996, which was amended in 
2000 in line with the Guiding Principles. “In 2003 a ruling from the Constitutional 
Court of Georgia established the rights of IDPs to purchase property without 
losing their IDP status and entitlement to return and property restitution. IDPs 
were given the right to vote in local and parliamentary elections” (Kharashvili, 
Kharashvili and Subeliani 2008: 16). Georgia was one of the three countries, 
others being Azerbaijan and Turkey, that “made significant progress in bringing 
their IDP legislation into line with the provisions of the Guiding Principles,” 
though most European states adopted some form of domestic normative 
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framework on internal displacement since 1998 (Jonker 2008: 15). Meanwhile 
in countries like Burma, there was no progress in issues relating to internal 
displacement.  
 
On the internal displacement map, Colombia has a special place with its 
protracted armed conflict, unrelenting complex political violence, and endemic 
nature of displacement and disappearances. It was not until the 1990s that the 
Colombian government took cognizance of the internal displacement crisis 
driven by national and international pressure and, more importantly, a strong 
legal culture. In fact, the Colombian case demonstrates that the state began 
supporting IDPs before the international recognition of the Guiding Principles 
based on a reemphasis of the state’s other international humanitarian and 
human rights obligations. Nevertheless, even after amendments, the situation of 
internal displacement remains dire, as it is an issue that falls solely within the 
realm of internal affairs and Colombia’s internal affairs also remain in a dire 
state. 
  
7.2.1. A Brief Historical Background of Internal Displacement in Colombia 
One of the largest countries in South America, Colombia is rich in resources 
and culture with an unfortunate history of armed violence, socio-economic 
conflicts and a war against drugs that has spanned several decades. This 
longstanding socio-economic, and political violent turmoil has put Colombia in 
the number two spot in 2014, second only to Syria, of the top five countries that 
make up the 63% of IDPs in the world, the others being Nigeria, Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Sudan. Colombia accounts for a massive 5.7 million 
IDPs in the world.236  
 
Caught between partisan political parties – Conservatives and Liberals – since 
the mid-19th century, guerrilla groups since the 1960s and drug lords since the 
1970s, people had no other choice but to flee or be forced out of their homes, 
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the latter being more common.237In this web of conflict and violence, a large 
number of people were uprooted for their land, which further complicated the 
displacement discourse in Colombia. This complexity is also recorded in Deng’s 
first report on the country as the UN Special Representative. It was one of the 
first countries he visited following his appointment. The 1994 report stated: “At 
the end of the Second World War, 3% of the population monopolized more than 
half of Colombia’s arable land. This gave rise to a protracted period of violence. 
Known as "La Violencia," this amounted to an "undeclared" civil war between 
the Liberal and the Conservative Parties, the main political parties of the 
country, following the assassination of a popular political leader, Jorge Eliecer 
Gaitán, in 1948. Two million peasants fled to the towns and lost their lands or 
settled in other areas.” Even in the latter half of the 21st century, over half of the 
cultivable land in this South American country remains in the hands of a little 
over 1% of the population.238  
 
The UN High Commission on Human Rights on Colombia highlighted this 
method of enforced displacement as a major cause of internal displacement, 
and “the most serious consequence of the armed conflict” in the 1998 report. 
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The report highlighted that all parties in the conflict – armed forced, police and 
paramilitary groups – employed the tactic. “In many cases it is the population 
suspected of providing a basis of support for the insurgents who are forced to 
leave their homes and workplaces. Once the inhabitants have been evicted, 
any land of strategic value in economic or military terms is repopulated with 
supporters of the military or paramilitary forces thus creating security zones 
needed to control the land.” And there are also instances when the people are 
dispossessed at “the interests of certain economic sectors which support 
paramilitary groups with the aim of increasing their hold over natural resources 
and productive land.”239  
 
Enforced displacement is a clear violation of international human rights and 
humanitarian laws, as stipulated by the provisions of the right to movement and 
its corollaries, right to life, liberty and property and more in the ICCPR and a 
whole host of provisions in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol II to the 
Geneva Conventions.  
 
Apart from enforced displacement, there are three other forms of displacement 
recognized in Colombia: Non-deliberate, which is closer to the Guiding 
Principles definition of IDPs, as being forced to flee, but not as a deliberate 
policy or conflict strategy. Another category is the displacement caused by 
interest groups – land developers, corporations, and others – who may be 
acting through groups of people or individuals. This is quite similar to enforced 
displacement without the military dimension. The last one is voluntary 
displacement where people leave their habitual residences for economic 
reasons, such as cultivating illicit crops in the forest, which thickens the 
dynamic of conflict.240  Others just categorize displacement as massive and 
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individual in case of Colombia, where massive is characterized by “the 
displacement of ten or more households together, while individual displacement 
is the displacement of a person or family on its own” (Carrillo 2009).  
 
7.2.2. Internal Response to a Spiralling Crisis 
The complex nature of internal displacement, the protractedness of the crisis, 
the magnitude of the problem by sheer numbers alone, and increasing pressure 
from local religious bodies and NGOs finally got the Colombian government’s 
attention in the 1990s. According to Escobar, this lack of attention for IDPs was 
not because they had fallen off the radar, but because they were merged with 
other marginalized groups and the broad generic policies implemented on their 
behalf, such as policies for the urban poor in 1970s. In the 1980s, the 
government extended the efforts to include those affected by natural disasters. 
It was only in the 1990s that the term “displaced” entered the Colombian 
discourse and gained its own recognition as needing response from the state. 
But even then, there were discrepancies in numbers collated by various groups 
– state and non-state (Escobar 2000).  
 
As the state was beginning to respond to the plight of IDPs, the UN Human 
Rights Commissioner and the Commission made a move in 1994 to set up a 
permanent office in Colombia that was signed into agreement in late 1996.241 
And in 1994, UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on IDPs, Francis 
Deng visited Colombia, as one of the first countries he studied. Deng’s report 
also highlighted the discrepancies in the numbers of IDPs owing to reasons 
such as the vagueness of the definition used to identify them in Colombia, the 
silent way in which the displaced fled, the rejection by those fleeing from being 
identified as IDPs, and the lack of a systematic methodology in accounting for 
the number of people being displaced.242  
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In fact, the last of the four reasons may be more accurate than the others, as a 
more systematic approach of accounting for, and registering IDPs began in 
1995 under the auspices of the Catholic Church and several NGOs. An earlier 
attempt by a presidential body was considered a failure. “Thus, while the NGOs 
estimate that, between 1985 and 1998, violence led to the internal displacement 
of 1.5 million persons, in 1998, the Presidential Counsel for Displaced Persons 
estimated that, between 1996 and 1998, there were 340,000 people 
displaced…” (Escobar 2000: 111). Over 10 years later, in 2009 the discrepancy 
has not changed much – while government figures put the number of internally 
displaced at 1.9 million, NGO figures add up to two million more (Cepeda-
Espinosa 2009). A high proportion of those displaced were women and 
members of indigenous groups and those from economically-marginalized 
background (Carrillo 2009, Summers 2012, and Stirk 2013).  
 
7.2.3. Road to Law 387 
Though uncertainty prevailed with regards to identifying and assisting IDPs, the 
Colombian government became more responsive on the overall human rights 
front by 1990. And these measures also paved the way for more focused 
attention on the crisis of internal displacement in the Latin American country by 
the late 1990s. The Colombian government put a few measures – legally and 
institutionally – in place that sought to respond to the spiralling human rights 
situation.  
 
From vesting the municipal ombudsmen with more powers in 1990 to receive 
and investigate cases of human rights violations, creating an office of People’s 
Defender under the 1991 constitution that oversaw the promotion, exercise and 
dissemination of human rights, and a few police reform measures (Amnesty 
International 1994); to the adoption of a National Programme for 
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Comprehensive Attention to the Population Displaced by Violence in 1995, the 
Colombian government seemed to have been internalizing its international 
obligations. However, many have criticized the lack of substantial impact of 
these measures on the armed conflict or continuing violence, and in turn on 
forced internal displacement, including Deng who stated in his 2000 follow-up 
report on Colombia that the 1995 National Programme “suffered from a number 
of structural problems.”243  
 
However despite the shortcomings of these legislations and measures, 
Colombia is known for its strong legal culture that led to the 1997 law on 
internal displacement – Law 387. Though the 1991 Colombian constitution 
prioritizes human rights, it is Law 387 that is “largely responsible for inserting 
the subject of internal displacement into the Colombian regulatory framework” 
(Viana 2009). From defining IDPs, their rights and duties, emphasizing the 
state’s responsibility for IDPs, to establishing 33 articles against, during and 
after the end of displacement, this 1997 Colombian legislation244 is considered 
one of the most comprehensive on internal displacement and a legal 
breakthrough (Cepeda-Espinosa 2009: 6), not only in Colombia but also in the 
rest of the world. Most interestingly, when the Colombian parliament passed 
this bill, the Guiding Principles was still under consideration.  
 
In addition to the legal provisions that were a reiteration of existing international 
humanitarian and human rights laws and standards, Law 387 also enabled the 
setting up of mechanisms, such as the Central Registry of Displaced 
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Population. This made it mandatory on the government to maintain up-to-date 
information on the number of displaced at all times. The implementation of the 
IDP law was through a 3-tier system that included a national council, 15 
national institutions and local-level committees on internal displacement. A 
monitoring body was also established. However the problem remained a lack of 
understanding of the responsibilities at the local level, lack of coordination 
between the central and the regional administrations, and how best to utilize the 
resources mobilized.245  
 
There is much criticism about the Colombian experience of dealing with internal 
displacement, but the most judicious and direct of criticisms have come from 
within the country, from the country’s own Constitutional Courts. Law 387 may 
not have evolved had it not been for the courts that continuously pushed legal 
boundaries with regard to overall human rights, and then also assumed the role 
of monitor and evaluator of public policies, especially on the matter of internal 
displacement. Usually the court decision of 2004 is highlighted as exemplary in 
directly criticizing the government on poor and “unconstitutional” 246 
implementation of the policies for IDPs. But there were at least 17 decisions 
before 2004 that related to IDPs. And one of these decisions were as early as 
1997, which reiterated the rights of a farmer who was displaced, by upholding 
his right to freedom, resistance and freedom of movement. Another decision in 
2000 highlighted the poor coordination between institutions and the lack of 
policy development on forced displacement as required under Law 387. Three 
years later, the court highlighted the need for differential treatment of IDPs, 
which went on to pave the way for the invigorated ruling of 2004 (Rodriguez-
Garavito and Rodriguez-Franco 2015).  
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Some of this credit must also go to the judicial system put in place through the 
1991 constitutional reform and mechanism for quick decision on human rights 
violations through acción de tutela – a petition procedure. Once a petition is 
filed, a ruling must be made in 10 days. IDPs accessed this legal recourse since 
1997, which made the courts recognize the humanitarian magnitude of internal 
displacement. The 2004 Constitutional Court ruling was made on the review of 
108 such cases (Cepeda-Espinosa 2006). 
 
7.2.4. How the Guiding Principles Contributed 
Though the Guiding Principles were still under consideration internationally 
during much of Colombia progress on internal displacement, they still had much 
to contribute, especially because of “their incorporation into the decisions 
adopted by the Constitutional Court in exercise of constitutional judicial review 
has granted them additional legal strength, reinforcing their significance for the 
interpretation of the scope of IDPs’ rights” (Duque 2009: 178). The importance 
of the Guiding Principles was not only highlighted in the Constitutional Court 
decision of 2004, but also in 2000 when the court upheld the Principles as 
“parameters for legal creation and interpretation in the field of the regulation of 
forced displacement and State assistance to IDPs.” A similar ruling followed in 
2001 that sought recourse in several of the Principles.247  
 
The quiet adoption of the Guiding Principles internationally has helped countries 
like Colombia strengthen an already proactive legal system, 248  and more 
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importantly the case law that the Colombian Constitutional Court has 
accumulated post 1998 has, in turn, been enabling for the Principles. Firstly, it 
strengthens the normative basis of the Guiding Principles in that it does fill a 
humanitarian and human rights with regard to IDPs. And secondly, the court’s 
rulings and decisions are examples of not only how to internalize the Guiding 
Principles, but also domesticate them legally.  
 
7.3. Summative Case Conclusion: Change and Order through the Guiding 
Principles 
Colombia’s case is unique because of the complex nature of internal 
displacement and its embeddedness in the violent political conflict of the 
country. But it does not discount the fact that Colombia made substantial 
normative and legal progress with regard to the rights of IDPs even before the 
emergence of the Guiding Principles. The effective implementation of policies 
and laws have been analyzed249 and criticized often, even by the Constitutional 
Court itself. The structural and institutional weaknesses are at the core of the 
Colombian situation, but it is proof that progress can be made. The Guiding 
Principles have also contributed to the strengthening of Colombia’s response to 
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Table 6: Chronology of Dynamic Cascading of the Guiding Principles 
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international discourse – 
CATALYTIC.  
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On its own merit, the Guiding Principles are a big step in international normative 
progress in some ways, though not in others. Firstly, and most importantly, the 
international recognition of the definition of IDPs as stated in the Principles is a 
solid normative leap. Though it replicates elements of the refugee definition, 
before the adoption of the Principles, there was no agreed upon definition of 
IDPs that could be used to be able to justify assisting, supporting and protecting 
this category of people. However, this also means that creating a label could 
exclude those who not fit the definition, quite similar to the case of exclusionary 
categories of nationals, citizens, and refugees and stateless. 
 
Secondly, the Principles also set the tone of the international discourse on 
internal displacement as a crisis that is beyond just humanitarian. The 
replication and particularization of human rights in the Guiding Principles makes 
it particularly important. But this raises a particular concern in that as a 
instrument that protects IDPs, humanitarian protection is limited. And as a 
dedicated IDP instrument, it does not refer to the 1949 Geneva Conventions or 
the its Protocols except in a generic way to state in Principle 2 that, “These 
Principles shall not be interpreted as restricting, modifying or impairing the 
provisions of any international human rights or international humanitarian law 
instrument or rights granted to persons under domestic law.”250 Principle 25 
also vests responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance with national 
authorities, which once again limits the humanitarian cover for IDPs. However, 
as the case of Colombia shows, countries do not resort to a single instrument 
for answers. In the 2001 ruling of the Constitutional Court on a case where the 
state refused to register a person as an IDP due to lack of evidence, it held that: 
 
“…it must be very clear that the decree in which the article at hand is contained 
is the legal development of a Law that recognizes forced displacement as a 
factual situation; in turn, this Law is the development of a constitutional system 
to which international provisions have been incorporated, such as the Guiding 
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 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 
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Principles on Internal Displacements, issued by the UN, and Article 17 of the 
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, which 
purport to protect IDPs and do not require a certification of such a factual 
phenomenon... Finally, according to the interpretative criterion of the most 
favorable interpretation for the protection of human rights... the provision at 
hand must be taken to be a series of guidelines to facilitate an organized 
protection of IDPs’ fundamental rights.”251   
 
This is also indicative of the dynamic cascading of international norms, as 
argued in this thesis, and the dynamic nature of cascading in state adherence 
as well. Meanwhile, another concern that is raised by the Principles’ normative 
leap is that they are rooted in the ethos of sovereignty as responsibility, which is 
another way of continuing to relegate the issue of the protection of IDPs to the 
domestic realm. Though Deng, Cohen and their team were trying to expand the 
intersubjective understanding of sovereignty to include responsibility, in practice 
it still indicated the primacy of the state and non-interference in internal matters. 
But as seen in the cluster on sovereignty, non-interference can be sidestepped 
for the benefit of some states, such as when implementing humane deterrence 
policies.  
 
This brings into question the status of a person – normative or legal – at the 
international level. The genealogical analyses of the clusters show that 
internationally a person is subsidiary to a state. The status of a person has 
remain unchanged since the first international codification of laws on nationality, 
followed by the emergence and continuing expansion of the international 
human rights framework. Beyond territory though the individual is the focus of 
sovereignty, normative tension over the right of the state and those of people 
continue to clash with slow and incremental benefit to the individual, as the 
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 Colombia Constitutional Court decision T-327 of 2001, as cited in Duque, F.G. (2009) The 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Judicial Incorporation and Subsequent Application 
in Colombia in Rodolfo Arango Rivadeneira (ed.) Judicial Protection of Internally Displaced 
Persons: The Colombian Experience, Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, pp.175-203 
(emphases added)  
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human rights can only be realized through the state. Normative tension and 
clashes are not an undesirable phenomenon; they are needed to establish 
order and enable change, which can be incremental in some cases, and faster 
in others. In the case of IDPs and the Guiding Principles, change has been 
defiantly slow but evident and important, as the replication and particularization 
dynamics has demonstrated in the norm clusters of sovereignty, 





























The development of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement was a 
positive move by the international community in an effort to engage in an issue 
that is primarily considered a domestic matter. Scholars, including Weiss and 
Korn (2006) claim that the IDP norms were paradigmatic in its impact on 
existing discourse and international normative structures. This present research 
aims to examine whether the norms that underpin the Guiding Principles have 
been defining, as claimed, in its impact.  
 
In order to carry out an in depth study the Guiding Principles, Finnermore et al’s 
classic life cycle model of the constructivist theoretical framework on 
international norm development is used. This initial examination revealed 
inherent weaknesses in the constructivist model itself making it inadequate for a 
comprehensive study of the Guiding Principles, leading this thesis to propose 
that:  
 
Constructivist accounts of how norms spread and develop are deficient in terms 
of the mechanisms by which these processes occur. Norm cascading is more 
dynamic and multi-dimensional. Norms extend their reach and reinforce their 
power and legitimacy through replication and particularization before state 
acceptance and adherence, and do not merely cascade through state 
adherence. 
 
Two questions guide this present research. The first question is: How do 
international norms cascade before state acceptance and adherence? The 
second question relates directly to the case of the Guiding Principles: What are 
the normative underpinnings of the Guiding Principles, and how have they 
cascaded within existing international normative structures?   
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Thus this present research sets out to achieve two objectives. The first is the 
development of an enhanced life cycle model that would enable a deeper and 
examination of norm development and cascading as dynamic and complex 
processes. The feasibility and strength of the reformulated framework is 
thoroughly tested using two preliminary test cases – UNSCR 1325 (2000) and 
the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. The application of the enhanced 
model on the two preliminary cases not only substantiates this present 
research’s thesis on the complexity of norm development and cascading, but 
also strengthens and tightens the revised framework and its application. The 
fine-tuned revised framework is then ready to realize the second objective, 
which is a multi-dimensional study of the Guiding Principles to better 
comprehend it normative significance – both in terms of impacting change and 
maintaining order. The enhanced model is also tested on other international 
norms to substantiate its robustness, and that of the research proposition.  
 
This concluding chapter will start with a discussion on the formulations that 
enabled the development of the enhanced life cycle model. Then the research 
findings are set out in sections 8.2 to 8.4 in response to each of the research 
questions and objectives. The final section discusses future research 
implications.  
 
8.1. Formulations on the Enhanced Theoretical Framework  
There are a handful of constructivist theoretical frameworks that model 
international relations by laying out the development and diffusion of norms. 
Much of these draw on Finnemore et al’s life cycle framework. The theory lays 
out straightforward stages to the life of a norm. It starts with the origin of ideas 
in the international system – norm emergence. Then moves on to collective 
acceptance of common meaning, which may have come about cooperatively or 
competitively, thereby cascading the norm. This eventually leads to the 
normalization of practice – internalization.  
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Examination of the classic life cycle model in this present research’s effort to 
develop an enhanced version revealed a few weaknesses. Though a 
compelling framework, it is limited by operational design, and restricted in how it 
understands the constitution of its fundamental elements – agency and 
structure – how they influence each other, and how they remain stable or affect 
change or both. The classic life cycle view is limited in that though it delineates 
the stages of norm development, the norm itself is not at the core of the 
framework. This obfuscates the constructivist tenet of the centrality of norms, 
primarily because the framework is agent-centric and agent-driven. The 
quantifying and qualifying measure of the development and life of the norm is 
unduly reliant on state acceptance of a norm and adherence to it.  
 
The norm life cycle is also synchronic in its assessment situating the 
development of a norm in a spatial and temporal vacuum. By starting the life 
cycle with the emergence of an idea and the norm entrepreneur(s), the classic 
framework delinks the emerging (or new) norm from existing structures. From 
emergence to tipping point, cascading and internalization, the life cycle is a 
compressed and linear exposition of how an international norm is constructed, 
and does not adequately support understanding because it relatively disregards 
the significance of structure. Though Finnemore et al’s life cycle reveals the 
patterning of interaction; it overlooks the continuity of interaction over time 
(Giddens 1979).  
 
An enhanced framework would allow for the study of continuity of interaction 
within existing normative structures – norm ecosystems. It would also recognize 
and understand existing agency and structures, their existing relationship and 
dialectical dynamic, and the interaction created between them in the case of the 
emergence of a new norm or continued development of an existing norm. In the 
classic life cycle framework, patterns and continuity of interaction is also limited 
to state acceptance and adherence. These, and more limitations, discussed in 
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chapter 3 provide the basis for a reformulated theoretical approach for a deeper 
and dynamic study of a norm’s life, with specific focus on cascading.  
 
This thesis argues that norms cascade, i.e. develop and diffuse, in a more 
complex and dynamic way that is not limited to state adherence. It specifically 
explicates the processes of replication and particularization. Operationalizing 
this approach, a revised framework has been proposed with the insertion of 
mid-level theoretical building blocks. Starting with the emergence of a norm, as 
in the life cycle framework, the revised version then adopts a genealogical norm 
cluster analysis, and thereafter reconnecting with the original framework with a 
better grasp of the cascading process of state adherence, and finally 
internalization.    
 
8.2. Research Findings: Theoretical Contributions 
Addressing one of the research questions ‘how do norms cascade,’ this present 
research delivers answers theoretically and empirically. The empirical findings 
will be discussed in the sections 8.3 and 8.4 that focus on the preliminary case 
studies – UNSCR 1325 (2000) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention – 
and the in depth examination of the Guiding Principles respectively. The 
theoretical findings are two fold. The first is the reconceptualization of norm 
cascading, and the second is the development of the enhanced life cycle 
model.  
 
8.2.1. Reframing Norm Cascading 
In examining the life cycle framework, one of the drawbacks that were inferred 
was the constrained orientation of the concept of norm cascading. It was merely 
a quantitative variable, when in fact it is a rich theoretical percept. Having 
extracted its ontological bearings in the original framework, this research goes 
on to redefine norm cascading as an overarching concept in the life cycle that is 
not only limited to state adherence driven diffusion, but also the creation and 
development of a norm as well.  
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Though Finnemore and Sikkink lay out the groundwork for understanding norm 
cascading in their life cycle model, they do not go beyond a quantitative agent-
centric and agent-driven acceptance of norms. There is much in the 
constructivist and associated literature that helps this research extract and 
unpack norm cascading as: (i) Gain meaning and reach (ii) Create power (iii) 
Establish legitimacy. Examining and extracting the construct of norm cascading 
allows this thesis to begin to answer the research question ‘how do norms 
cascade,’ by reframing the concept to encapsulate a dynamic norm life. In its 
dynamic form, norm cascading includes: (i) Extending meaning and reach (ii) 
Reinforcing existing power and creating power by association (iii) Strengthening 
existing legitimacy and creating legitimacy by extension. In characterizing norm 
cascading as a continuous process, a dynamism is put in motion from the very 
stage of norm emergence – from the very initiation of the framing and affixing of 
meaning, defining and conceptualization, and (re)construction of social reality.   
 
This conceptual development and reframing not only situates norm emergence 
and evolution within existing ideational structures and agencies, but also 
enables a better comprehension of patterning and continuity of interaction. The 
reformulation of norm cascading also allows for a nuanced view of norm 
development in which meaning and reach is formed, reformed and reinforced, 
power is established and reestablished, and legitimacy is created, strengthened 
and refortified. This expanded theorization of norm cascading also reorients the 
gravitational center of the life cycle framework, which is the second theoretical 
contribution of this thesis.  
 
8.2.2. Developing the Framework 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) norm life cycle is the basis of our reformulated 
framework. Employing a genealogical cluster approach, the emergence, 
development and evolution of a norm is revealed not only in a dynamic way 
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before state adherence, but also in a new light from the process of state 
adherence as well.  
 
This enhanced new model is operationalized in three stages: Stage I – 
Synchronic Diagnostics, Stage II – Genealogical Exploration, and Stage III – 
Rethinking Internalization. Stage one starts where the original model begins – 
with the norm entrepreneur. Here the emphasis is on the narrative of creation 
as in the original, and in addition further explores the static meaning, power and 
legitimacy of the norm being studied. This first step lays the groundwork that 
enables the identification of the relevant norm clusters that could be further 
genealogically explored in stage two. The revised model recommends the 
identification of three clusters for reasons of feasibility.  
 
Each cluster provides a point of departure for a genealogical analysis of the 
respective norm cluster. Conceptualized by Nietzsche (1887) and popularized 
by Foucault, the genealogical method not only provides a historical perspective 
to the development of an international norm and its cascading, but also does so 
in a non-linear, non-causal manner.  In this way, the model is not looking for 
origins of norm clusters as much as it is seeking “to reestablish the various 
systems of subjection: not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the…play of 
dominations” (Foucault 1980: 83) whether in the normative structures itself or in 
the dialectical nature of agency, and most often both. This dynamism and 
complexity is revealed through a history that emphasizes “contestation,” (Klotz 
and Lynch 2007: 31) “chance occurrences, fortuitous connections and 
reinterpretations” (Price 1995: 86) that have sometimes led to change and at 
other times maintained order and as this research proposes, both.  
 
The stage is further validated by relinking to the original framework with its 
emphasis on state adherence by numbers. The quantitative indicator 
strengthens this stage by looking at the number of states that have ratified the 
instrument under study or those been borrowed from over time. This provides a 
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better understanding of what and how norms are internalized in the last stage, 
which is also a revision to the original model.  
 
8.2.3. Strengths and Challenges 
The enhanced analytical framework for examining and understanding norm life 
cycles presented in this thesis has proven to a number of strengths. One of the 
first indicators of its strength was demonstrated when the enhanced model was 
feasibly applied in the two preliminary test cases. This initial testing also 
showed how the enhanced model could be adjusted for better 
operationalization and application. The individual findings of the two test cases 
will be elaborated in the next section. Though the starting point of the revised 
life cycle model is similar to that of the original model, the overall framework is 
advanced with a temporally decompressed genealogical analysis that reveals 
normative synergies through the dimensions of meaning, power and legitimacy, 
interactions within norm ecosystems, and influence of structures on agency, as 
well as sway of agency on structure. Therefore not only has the significance of 
norms – a constructivist tenet – been upheld, but also it has reinforced the 
understanding of the role and dynamics of agency without an overemphasis on 
state acceptance and adherence.   
 
Its strength also lies in that the framework is able to capture the nature and 
interactions of change and order beyond just changes in state behavior 
determined by adherence. It reveals stability and evolutions in structures as well 
as agencies through interactions in, and over time. The nature of change is 
captured through the application of the revised model when the resulting 
analysis reveal increasing reach and reinforcement of social structures, 
elaboration and integration of focused practices into existing norms, and shifting 
parameters of legitimacy. These and more indicators of change also signify that 
this change is actually “rooted in existing social structures, maintained by the 
power of practice and quite impervious to change” because constructivist power 
is also the power “to reproduce, discipline and police” (Hopf 1998: 180).  
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Therefore change can be progressive and enabling as well as hegemonic and 
disciplining in the Foucaultian sense. This critical approach shows that Change 
and progress in international relations seldom means to “climb towards the top, 
but mainly away from the abyss,” to quote Emmanuel Adler (1991: 77). Change 
is not always a dramatic big bang; sometimes it is slow, gradual and an ongoing 
process, as this present research demonstrates. Findings from the case studies 
also reveal that change is incremental, and relies heavily of existing political, 
social, economic and normative frameworks, situations that may be at time 
historically continuous and at other times disjointed. 
 
Meanwhile, the application of the model demonstrates that a genealogical 
approach may be challenging. The overlapping and long time periods that could 
be involved in the analysis, and the dynamics of the interlinking norm clusters 
can lead to complicated inquiries. The process of choosing norm clusters for the 
genealogical phase of the enhanced model is also complex. The choice of norm 
cluster defines the extent, depth and feasibility of the genealogical analysis. For 
instance choosing the cluster of complete disarmament in the test of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention enabled an elaborate examination of some of 
the structures in this norm ecosystem. It may have been a concise inquiry had 
the choice been a cluster on sanctions. Instead the brief analysis on sanctions 
was part of the more comprehensive genealogical examination of the cluster on 
complete disarmament. Sometimes, the choice of cluster is evident. The 
sovereignty cluster in the in depth study of the Guiding Principles was an 
obvious choice. Though it is quite a complex norm extending over quite an 
expansive time period, the sovereignty cluster is integral to the study of IDP 
norms. The Guiding Principles were formulated on the ethos of ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility,’ and therefore an in-depth study without a sovereignty cluster 
would be an incomplete one.   
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The extent to which the enhanced framework is feasible has been examined 
and tested using the two preliminary test cases and the in depth study of the 
Guiding Principles. The robustly feasible framework that is based on addressing 
some of the weaknesses of the classic life cycle model and a 
reconceptualization of norm cascading, specifically through the mechanisms of 
replication and particularization, is a comprehensive response to one of the 
research questions, ‘how do norms cascade.’ The following section elaborates 
the findings inferred in the preliminary test cases. The application of the 
enhanced model on UNSCR 1325 and the Chemical Weapons Convention is a 
corroboration of the theoretical contributions of this present research, and an 
extension of the answer to one of the research questions, ‘how do norms 
cascade.’  
 
8.3. Research Findings: Contributions to Knowledge from Preliminary 
Case Studies 
The case studies were of two types – preliminary and in depth testing. UN 
Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, and the 
1993 Chemical Weapons Convention were used to test drive the revised 
framework, and fine-tune its elements and application. Although there is a 
wealth of research on cases like UNSCR 1325 and the CWC, the reformulated 
life cycle model enables a deeper examination of the normative underpinnings 
of these cases. The application of the enhanced model studies the emergence 
of the test cases in relation to the forming and reforming of meaning, reiteration 
of power and legitimacy. The findings also demonstrate how respective test 
cases fits into, extend, and conflict with existing constructs of structure and 
agency.  
 
8.3.1. Findings on UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000)  
Policy and development practitioners, human rights and women’s activists, 
national and international non-governmental organizations and countries across 
the world, and the UN itself have hailed UNSCR 1325 as a milestone, a historic 
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landmark (Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011), not only for women all over the 
world, but also for the progress of human rights, human development and 
peace and security. As a succinct 18-point landmark document, it gave 
practitioners, researchers and other professionals in the fields of peace, 
security, and gender issues the reinvigorating boost they needed in the post-
Beijing years to keep their overlapping agendas moving forward. It is also the 
only resolution of its kind to be adopted by the UN Security Council. This is also 
not to say that the resolution has not been criticized. Scholars (Ellerby 2013; 
Bjarnegard and Melander 2013) and practitioners have criticized the 
implementation and realization of the provisions of the historic resolution. 
However the critical analysis in existing literature on UNSCR 1325 is limited 
because it does not delve into the normative foundations of the resolution. The 
normative understanding of the women, peace and security resolution is also 
limited within the framework of the four pillars of prevention, protection, 
participation, and relief and recovery.  
 
However the enhanced examination of the development of UNSCR 1325 
demonstrates that it needs to be understood in terms of the way it brings 
together clusters of norms that has been developing and spreading for some 
time. In this sense, the analysis of the testing highlights that UNSCR 1325 is 
more limited and complex as a normative milestone than much of the literature 
presents. The analysis of the development and cascading of UNSCR 1325 in 
this present research does not argue that it is not historically important in 
several respects.  
 
Our analysis highlights that UNSCR 1325 is an important extension of the 
existing international normative structures. A synchronic analysis of UNSCR 
1325 demonstrates that the meaning, power and legitimacy of this international 
norm extend beyond just women, peace and security. It reveals that women, 
peace and security is being embedded into larger existing international 
normative frameworks, or parts thereof. Three such norm clusters were 
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extracted for a genealogical exploration – humanitarian protection of women, 
liberal peacebuilding, and gender balancing. The emphasis on protection of 
women is based in the replication of existing international humanitarian 
standards and practices. Meanwhile, much of the focus on participation in 
UNSCR 1325 emphasizes norms of liberal peacebuilding. The overall agenda 
of gender equality and gender balancing also has long and deep normative 
roots. UNSCR 1325 is not only embedded in these normative frameworks, but 
the construct and cascading of these respective clusters continue through the 
construct and cascading of UNSCR 1325 via the replication and 
particularization of abovementioned norms or normative principles in the 
resolution. 
 
The biological focus of the humanitarian protection of women remains intact to 
this day through the four 1949 Geneva Conventions adopted in the aftermath of 
World War II, and the ensuing two Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions. They contain a score and more provisions that relate specifically 
to the protection of women. Though scholars such as Krill (1986) and others 
describe it as a feature of equality, this research contends that there is a 
tension within international humanitarian law, specifically in the Geneva 
Conventions, in trying to balance the special protection needs of women and 
reiterating non-discrimination in general humanitarian protection. While there 
are provisions that emphasize that the execution of humanitarian treatment 
should be “without any adverse distinction founded on sex…”252 and treatment 
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 Article 12 of Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Article 12 of Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members 
of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; Article 16 of Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135; Article 27 of 
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1949, 75 UNTS 287; Article 75 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 
1125 UNTS 3; Article 4 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 
1125 UNTS 609 
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of women “as favorable as that granted to men,” 253  provisions in the 
Conventions also emphasize that “women shall be treated with all the regard 
due to their sex.”254 
 
The genealogical unpacking of the norm cluster of liberal peacebuilding 
revealed that the link between women and peace goes back decades, even 
before 1992 and the birth of liberal peacebuilding. It also became clear that 
links between women and peace were not first established in 2000 through 
UNSCR 1325. It has been deeply rooted and recognized since the 1970s, with 
emphasis on the increasing role of women in decision-making, democratic 
institutions, and better economic conditions for women. These are the 
fundamentals of liberal peacebuilding as well. UNSCR 1325 reiterates some of 
these normative links, its meaning, power and legitimacy between women and 
liberal peace, with a particularization in the specific context of peace and 
security in conflict and post-conflict phases.  
 
The biggest normative question when it comes to women and their status is 
equality. Though UNSCR 1325 includes provisions that promote gender 
sensitivity, and encourage special attention to gender-specific needs, like many 
of its predecessors the normative misconceptions of the term ‘gender,’ and its 
synonymy with women, often as the weaker sex, continue. Barrow (2010) and 
others, especially Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (2013: 613), claim that UNSCR 
1325 has responded to this issue with its central underlying theme of gender 
balancing, which “has to do with equal rights and the number of men and 
women engaged in international peace and security policies.” 
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Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 
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However the problematiqué and the response are not entirely unique to the 
peace and security context, or UNSCR 1325. The gender question has been an 
ontological and epistemological tug of war between eliminating discrimination 
and highlighting differences since women began fighting for their rights. The 
response has been a balancing act in one form or another through the 
centuries. The study of UNSCR 1325 shows that it brings together norms, 
normative principles and practices of at least 200 years together. Perhaps it is 
for this reason – cascading change and order simultaneously – that it is more 
historic than for its creation in 2000 alone.  
 
Though unrelated incremental changes in the protection of women, and their 
debatable implementation and realization has taken place, it has been within 
the prevailing larger normative framework of the primacy of sovereignty and 
international peace, human rights, peace and development, and/or human 
development. This indicates both catalytic movement towards the demands and 
agenda of women’s rights, and also cyclical movement of the broader normative 
and priority-wise more superior frameworks.  
 
8.3.2. Findings on 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)  
The study of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention was interestingly 
revealing too. With war and armed conflict, warfare technology grew. In a vast 
array of destructive technology, chemical weapons came under intense 
international scrutiny. In this sense, the Convention on the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction 
(CWC) is considered unique in the history of arms control. “There was no 
precedent for this global, comprehensive and verifiable multilateral 
disarmament agreement. The chemical weapons Convention provides for a 
cooperative, non-discriminatory legal instrument to eliminate the spectre of 
chemical warfare once and for all” (UN Yearbook on Disarmament 1992).  
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These words by the Chairman of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Chemical 
Weapons, Adolf Ritter von Wagner epitomize the significance of the treaty. The 
revised life cycle model reveals how understandings of norm development and 
cascading in this area are better comprehended within a wider framework of 
international norms. Three norm clusters were chosen to better understand the 
CWC norm development and cascading processes within agendas for: 
complete disarmament, non-use of poison, and the control and balance of dual 
use of prohibited substances.   
 
General and complete disarmament (GCD) is the core of the international arms 
control normative framework, and it is reflected in many of the treaties, 
resolutions, and other hard and soft international laws, including the CWC. 
Predecessors to the CWC also reiterate this international normative stand on 
GCD, such as in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, which 
mentions twice that states undertake the obligations in the NPT to work towards 
general and complete disarmament. But GCD is not unique to the modern-day 
arms control normative framework. Scholars such as Jonas (2012) claim that 
GCD has a history that dates back further than the NPT, while others like Rydell 
(2010) claim that it dates back centuries and millennia. 
 
And as history shows, GCD did not always begin as general and complete. It 
was simply disarmament, which in its strictest sense “means the physical 
destruction or elimination of certain types of weaponry” to a more fluid 
understanding that includes measure “various confidence-building measures, 
limitations of range or yield, reduction in numbers…more appropriately called 
arms control” (Rydell 2010: 227). So disarmament began with control, and grew 
to include a whole spectrum of measures that would eventually be general and 
complete.  
 
However the normative underpinnings – meaning, power and legitimacy – of 
control was linked to the normative and practical necessities of national security 
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as far back at Woodrow Wilson’s 1918 Fourteen Point Speech to Congress, 
which was also adapted in the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations. While 
Wilson’s Fourth Point suggested that, “national armaments will be reduced to 
the lowest point consistent with domestic safety,” Article 8 of the Covenant not 
only linked reduction in armaments to levels required for national safety but also 
to “…the enforcement by common action of international obligations.” 
 
In fact, even earlier instances of arms control can be seen in the 1800s. This 
had less to do with control, and more to do with outright prohibition – more in 
line with GCD. Earlier prohibitionary norms were rooted in the collective 
agreement on not national safety, but unnecessary human suffering. So in 
1868, the St. Petersburg Declaration renounced the use, in time of war, of 
explosive projectiles. In 1899 a Hague Declaration on Expanding Bullets was 
made in the effort to prohibit the use of these weapons that inflicted 
unnecessary cruel wounds.  
 
Therefore since the documenting of modern international laws of war, there has 
been a normative desire – in one form or another – for disarmament, which has 
grown to be understood as general and complete. But today – unlike from 
where its normative roots originate – GCD is not always general and complete 
disarmament. It allows for measures such as declaration, verification and even 
sanctions in an effort not only to maintain arms control, but also to allow for 
accepted use of prohibited materials.  
 
The norm cluster on dual use is an extension or sub-set of the norms on GCD. 
As Meier and Hunger (2014) contend, “Efforts to stop the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) increasingly focus on preventing the proliferation and 
misuse of dual-use technologies.” The belief and understanding that science 
can appease the laws of war with laws of humanity seems to have extended to 
the possibility that advancements in prohibited materials – as those used in 
WMDs for instance – can have positive benefits. This, as Price (1997: 17) 
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argues, is because of “the dominant interpretation of technology as a value-
neutral phenomenon.” 
 
Though this understanding of technology is reflected in today’s international 
framework of arms control, there have, nevertheless, been some shifts in its 
normative underpinnings, as this research revealed. Certain weapons are 
prohibited as a whole, including those that make the list of the WMDs. This 
means that the prohibition is also on the technology itself. And dual-use is now 
focused on the materials that are used in the prohibited weapons – a shift from 
the ends to the means. This shift came in the international debates of 1925, 
where with the inclusion of poison into the international arms control agenda 
came the realization “that nearly all materials used in chemical weapons were 
to be found in non-military industrial products and processes” (Bryden 2013: 
21). It can be inferred that dual-use norms have made arms control, especially 
GCD a shade greyer today.  
 
Similar normative shifts were seen in the third cluster on the prohibition on 
poison that underlies the two previous clusters. Norms on the prohibition of 
poison were set in writing as early as 1863.This research shows that though 
GCD is in line with repeated prohibitions on poison, allowances on dual-use 
seem to contravene it or at least make the prohibition of poison tricky. However, 
It is the combination of the prohibition on poison as a weapon and technological 
advancements that could be used as poisoned weapons that are the normative 
lineage of the CWC (Price 1997).  
 
The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention replicates the taboo on poison in its 
prohibition and extends it to include a taboo on its development, production, 
stockpiling and not only use. However, the immediate precedent for this was set 
in the 1991 UNSC resolution on Iraq made under Chapter VII that demanded 
Iraq do the same under a sanctions regime. The control processes that define 
the CWC, including allowances for dual-use advancements were also replicated 
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from its predecessors – the NPT and BWC. The most unique aspect of the 
CWC is that its adoption enables the international normative ambitions for 
general and complete disarmament by bringing it a little bit closer. 
 
8.4. Findings from In-depth Study on the Guiding Principles 
As stated in chapter 1 and at the beginning of this chapter, one of the research 
questions, and main objectives of this research was to develop the first in depth 
examination of the development and cascading of international norms on IDPs, 
and in particular the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Over two 
chapters, this thesis synchronically and genealogically examines the Guiding 
Principles contributing to a detailed understanding of their meaning, power and 
legitimacy, and their development, construct and cascading. Of the three case 
studies in this present research, the Guiding Principles are soft law, which 
unlike a treaty and resolution are theoretically and technically not legally 
binding. However, it has been understood that the legality of the instrument 
does not matter, and does not diminish its normative significance any more than 
any hard international laws. The model is applicable with any type of norm and 
is able to examine its construct and significance.  
 
8.4.1. The Emergence of the Principles: Findings 
Internal displacement is one the most difficult human tragedies on a number of 
fronts – politically, internationally, normatively, etc. It is one of the most complex 
issues – especially in relation to the protection of civilians – that the 
international community has flirted with for decades, and continues to do so 
with no signs of clear or full commitment. Kofi Annan called it a formidable 
humanitarian, human rights and development challenge for the international 
community (Cohen and Deng 1998); it still remains so, as this research has 
demonstrated.  
 
Though a challenging international issue, one of the primary normative 
milestones attributable to the Guiding Principles is that it, in no uncertain terms, 
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raised the crisis of internal displacement to the international level and put it 
under a global spotlight. A loose and informal coalition of NGOs and their 
representatives, and states like Norway, Hungary, Austria, can be considered 
the norm entrepreneurs. Their persistent lobbying made the appointment of a 
Special Representation possible in 1992. The first Special Representation, 
Francis Deng, turned out to be a strong ally for the informal coalition.  
 
Deng used all the support that he continued to receive from governmental and 
non-governmental allies to pave the way forward for the development of an 
international instrument on internal displacement. This new instrument would 
not be setting new standards but would be a compilation of existing 
international standards that would be useful and relevant to the protection of 
rights of IDPs. Though the proposed compilation was to be a legally binding 
declaration, it was eventually developed as normative guidelines. This research 
carries out a comparative assessment of four drafts of the Principles to 
understand its construct. 
 
The biggest shift in the drafts was the drastic change in the definition of IDPs. It 
was loosened up to be as inclusive as possible, without unnecessary 
restrictions. This was one of the major achievements through the drafting 
process. Another major achievement was the special focus on vulnerable 
groups such as women and children, whose rights and special needs were at 
the forefront of international deliberations through the 1990s as also 
demonstrated in the preliminary case study of UNSCR 1325. The involvement 
of the Women’s Commission in the drafting process can be credited with the 
nuances of language and relevant focus on the matter of women and children. 
The first part of this third case in chapter 6 also systematically identifies where 
each principle is drawn from, and what mechanism – replication, 
particularization or both – is being used.  
 
8.4.2. Genealogical Analysis: Findings 
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The first part led to the extraction of three clusters – sovereignty, 
humanitarianism and citizenship. The sovereignty cluster is significant because 
the Guiding Principles is rooted on the normative understanding of sovereignty 
as responsibility. The sovereignty cluster examined the normative tension 
between the rights and responsibilities of a state vis-à-vis the rights of its people 
that the former has to protect. To be able to carry out a valid, reliable and 
feasible analysis, the research focused on three aspects: freedom of 
movement, seeking and granting asylum and deterring displacement. The 
findings revealed that though people, their needs and rights, gained in 
importance as revealed in the first cluster above, the significance of the state 
and its norms of sovereignty did not shift or cascade accordingly, or loosen up 
as many claim.  
 
The fundamental norms of freedom of movement as a human right and the 
norms of sovereignty as a prerogative of the state, an especially binding force 
at the level of the international community of states, is at the core of the 
displacement discourse and the frictional cascading of norms within it. 
According to Barkin and Cronin (1994), though national sovereignty was given 
international precedence after the First World War, a normative reconstruction – 
a reconfiguration that could always cause normative friction – was embedded 
into the international institutionalization of the global order with the 
establishment of the UN Charter. 
 
“The charter affirms as the first purpose of the UN the maintenance of 
international peace and security. It defines this as the prevention of the violation 
of established state borders by the forces of other states. This clearly 
establishes the priority of the integrity of established state borders over the 
integrity of national or nationalist groups. The charter also affirms the principle 
of the self-determination of peoples, but not of nations…As long as a state 
adequately represents its people as individuals, other states cannot legitimately 
claim to represent some of these people as members of its nation.” So by 
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reducing the construct of a nation to that of individuals, the state as a territorial 
construct is replicated as a priority.  
 
The fundamentality of sovereignty – state and nation – has also come under 
intense normative pressure from the international institution of asylum that is 
practiced and realized at a state level. The construction of the right to seek 
asylum does two things: first, it identifies that individuals have this right and in 
turn lays the foundation of the categorization of such individuals. In so granting 
this right, it also separates the individual from the state indicating that the state 
does not have a claim over the individual (Boed 1994).  
 
Norms of sovereignty and their cascading remained strong in relation to the 
cascading of human rights, especially with regard to the freedom of movement 
and right of asylum. Though the former came up against emerging norms in the 
latter, the former prevailed over the latter in that the respect for, and realization 
of human rights for all at the domestic level depended on and were based on 
the respect for, and observation of sovereign equality at the international level. 
Though the right to seek and enjoy asylum is rooted in the UDHR, it is not 
normatively accepted as a right in practice.  
 
Even in the practice of granting asylum changed with bearing on the normative 
understanding of internal displacement. The burden of granting asylum grew 
with the increasing number of refugees from the early 1970s, and growing mass 
flight by the end of the Cold War. The international community of sovereign 
states was coming together to cooperate on bearing the burden of granting 
asylum, but it was a growing international cooperation towards lesser asylum, 
not more. Though the asylum applications rose, the recognition rates fell, notes 
Rogers (1992).  
 
Shifts in political attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers translated into 
concrete policies and strategies of ‘humane deterrence’. Misleading in its 
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terminology, ‘humane deterrence’ policies were first implemented in the early 
1980s in response to the Indo-Chinese influx into South-east Asia (McNamara 
1990). Other policies, such as the Comprehensive Action Plan of 1988, Dublin 
Convention of 1990 and ensuing regulations, and safe country tagging all 
mutilated the asylum and refugee normative understandings and practices. 
However, there was a normative double standard in the practice of sovereignty 
as well. While humane deterrence policies were in order to protect the 
sovereignty of receiving states, strategies that sought to avert refugee flows 
was interference in the sovereignty of countries of origin. 
 
This present research demonstrates that norms of sovereignty have remained 
steadfast in the face of emerging norms of protection and rights of the 
displaced. From a rejection, to formulating international laws on the right of 
asylum – fundamental to upholding the freedom of movement and thus other 
rights as discussed above – to establishing international policies, programmes 
and strategies that deterred even a humanitarian response to asylum seekers, 
there has been a growing intensity to, and continued cascading of the norms of 
sovereignty in that the exercise of sovereignty is a state’s prerogative, which 
especially includes granting territorial admission to people.  
 
This normative conflict leads to further complex understandings in the 
humanitarian cluster not only because of the sovereignty lies at the core of the 
displacement discourse, but also because though the Principles applies to 
those displaced beyond situations of armed conflict international humanitarian 
laws apply only to these said situations. However as this research has explored, 
humanitarian assistance and protection has also expanded its normative 
boundaries of meaning and practice and goes beyond violence and armed 
conflicts. But even within the cluster of humanitarian protection and assistance 
limited to armed conflict, there have been norm shifts and regresses, marking a 
cascading that moved forward at some times and retrograded at others.  
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We found that though the 1863 Lieber Code laid the foundation of international 
humanitarian law its provisions on the treatment of civilians during civil war was 
not carried forward, and did not cascade. A normative break came in 1949 with 
the inclusion of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions. Therefore in 
1949, though small, a consensus to include Common Article 3 into the Geneva 
Conventions was a big leap in international norm cascading and shifting that 
brought all civilians under the purview of international humanitarian laws.  
 
This laid the groundwork for the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva 
Conventions. The drafting and adoption of Additional Protocol II was an 
exercise in restating the importance of existing international humanitarian 
norms, replicating them to a large extent within provisions of Protocol II, and 
particularizing them by extending the existing understanding to include 
situations of non-international armed conflicts. Protocol II is limited in scope in 
design and operationalization. For instance, this research reveals that it for 
provides limited agency compared to Common Article 3 that referred to “parties 
to the conflict” ensuring conformity to the Geneva Conventions through some 
form of a special agreement in the last paragraph of the article. Protocol II 
makes no such reference. 
 
From a holistic point of view, the development of Protocol II seemed to be 
marked by a cascading stasis, almost a step back, because of its limited scope 
and nature though it replicated and particularized the normative essence of then 
existing international humanitarian laws. Though the international community of 
states accepted the replication and particularization of normative essence of the 
existed intersubjective framework, they were reluctant to frame the elements or 
nuances of the replicated norms any further. However, the realities of 
international humanitarianism on the ground through the 1960s and 1970s were 
a testament to this norm cascading stasis and regression. States were taking a 
step back, and letting non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including the 
ICRC, to take their place, giving rise to a new humanitarianism. Chandler 
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(2001) notes that in the bipolar world, relief charities stepped in where states 
could not because their humanitarianism seemed universal and politically 
neutral. 
 
The coming together of humanitarianism and human rights has strengthened 
the protection of civilians, including IDPs, in various internal crises. A rights-
based focus is also evident in the provisions of Protocol II that has replicated 
much of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the ICCPR. The benefits of the 
meshing of humanitarianism and human rights exceed the complexities that 
arise from it. As Junod (1984: 34) notes, “the existence of an “overlapping zone” 
of situations in which international humanitarian law and human rights are 
applicable simultaneously contributes to the reinforcement of protection 
because the means of implementation of the Protocol and Covenant are 
different. 
 
Therefore the humanitarian protection provided through Protocol II, though 
limited in scope, was better because of the threads of human rights woven into 
it. One of the most important protections that not only replicates one provision 
of the Civilian Convention of 1949, but also extends it further is that which is 
provided in Article 17 – prohibition of forced movement of civilians. This was 
limited to protected persons or aliens255 as described in the first part of the 1949 
Civilian Convention. In Protocol II this extends to all civilians and draws strength 
from the right to freedom of movement stipulated in the ICCPR.  
 
From the Leiber Code to the laws of international humanitarianism, it is no 
longer just the protection of a person from the excesses of war, but also an 
extended embodiment of a person’s rights. Yet, deliberations on the human 
rights of the internally displaced – 1980s and 1990s – still concluded that IDPs 
                                                        
255
 Article 4 of the General Provisions of the 1949 Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War states that “Persons protected by the Convention are those 
who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or 
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not 
nationals.” (emphasis in footnote added) 
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were not sufficiently, and specifically, protected (Cohen 1991). Interestingly, this 
case study also concluded from an analysis of the Principles itself that they do 
not draw from the protection granted through the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol II.  
 
Out of 30 principles, only a handful are directly drawn or indirectly borrowed 
from the Geneva Conventions or Protocol II. Most principles are drawn from 
international human rights covenants and the Turku humanitarian standards. 
Two reasons would explain this: firstly the Principles were meant to address the 
gaps in the protection of the rights of IDPs, and secondly the restricted scope of 
application of the Geneva framework and its watered down provisions 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts, as discussed above, do not 
make it an appealing or natural cascading choice.  
 
However, this creates two problems: Firstly, as the framing of the humanitarian 
response to internal displacement is human rights centric, a humanitarian 
response is still limited. And, having extracted the IDP category from the broad 
category of citizens who come under international humanitarian protection in 
non-international conflicts – Common Article 3 and Protocol II additional to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions – the internally displaced may be put in a more 
complex crisis than before because of their special normative status.  
 
The second problem goes back to ICRC and Switzerland’s initial concern that a 
new set of norms on IDPs would undermine the power and authority of 
Additional Protocol II.256 Though a general hierarchy is created in the scope and 
introduction of the Principles, it does so without specifically calling on the 
Geneva Conventions or other existing humanitarian standards and practices. 
Not borrowing from Additional Protocol II or Common Article 3 more concretely 
in the Principles has, perhaps, eroded some of the power and legitimacy of 
                                                        
256
 Confidential memo from Roberta Cohen to Francis Deng, Robert Goldman, Daniel Helle, 
Walter Kalin, Manfred Nowak and Maria Stavropoulou on Next Steps in the Legal Process, 
dated 20 June 1996, from the unarchived collection of the Brookings Institute. 
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those norms, in the case of IDPs at least, and highlighted its limitations and 
inadequacies once more. This is due to the identification of IDPs that are not 
limited to situations of armed conflicts, thus falling outside the purview of 
humanitarian laws. This is also due to the strategic approach of the drafters of 
the Principles that circumnavigated the thorny normative issue of sovereignty by 
reconstructing it as a responsibility of the state, but with no success, as the 
analysis in the sovereignty cluster revealed.  
 
These findings make those from the last cluster on citizenship even more 
pertinent. This cluster was examined, as relevant to internal displacement, from 
the perspectives of nationality, statelessness and habitual residence. This 
research finds that in the early stages of the construct of nationality, the initial 
codification of international laws on nationality in the 1930s primarily focused on 
issues that caused complications between states with the objective of 
simplifying inter-state relations. The rights of an individual were not the priority.  
 
This initial more brave intervention into internal matters of a state became more 
timid and less interfering in the years after the Second World War, where 
matters of nationality were limited to codification on that of identifying the state 
membership of a child. However, there was a more imposing tone in the 
international laws that addressed racial discrimination including based on 
nationality. This was less about the diminishing importance of interference in 
internal state affairs or sovereignty, and more about the then growing need for 
individual equality rooted in the fight against apartheid and the post-World War 
II emerging significance of human rights.  
 
Further examination of this cluster on belonging through the prism of 
statelessness and habitual residence illuminates the reasons behind IDPs being 
left unprotected under the international framework though their state 
membership and habitual residence comes under question. This research 
demonstrates that clarifications on the concept of a refugee and stateless 
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persons left IDPs outside the international protection net. The conceptual and 
practical separation of refugee and stateless vis-à-vis defintion and effective 
protection (Batchelor 1995) also excluded IDPs, letting them fall through the 
cracks of international protection.  
 
As Barutciski (1998: 12) explains, “Being a victim of displacement is not the 
quality that has historically justified additional human rights protection for 
refugees. It is rather the quality of being a foreigner who has escaped 
persecution that is addressed by international refugee law...” Therefore using 
habitual residence as a parameter of conceptualization of IDPs stems from the 
history of its very exclusion. The research also explores the dynamics between 
the norm clusters extracting a better understanding of the norm ecosystem. The 
genealogical exploration of the three clusters demonstrated that internal 
displacement has not gone beyond the realm of domestic affairs, though it has 
gained increasing international attention and discursive space. The high 
internlinkages between the norm clusters also suggest more normative tension.  
 
For instance, though norms of sovereignty dictate non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of another state, the practice was flouted to maintain one’s own 
sovereignty and internal peace in certain situations, such as when states did not 
want to grant asylum, and implemented containment or deterrence policies by 
creating safe havens in the country of origin in the name of humanitarianism. 
Tension is also evident between the structures that frame an individual and that 
of a state. For instance, without effective nationality, or even basic nationality, a 
person does have access to rights and entitlements. This leads to an interesting 
legal conundrum with the regard to the claimed primacy of human rights, 
especially the fundamentality of the right to freedom of movement and its 
significance to the realization of other rights including right to a nationality. But if 
one needs a nationality to exercise or even have access to other rights, then 
there is a legal lacuna in the understanding of human rights, which needs 
further examination and, perhaps, research.  
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8.5. Considerations for Future Research 
This present research demonstrates that a richer and enhanced understanding 
of norm development is possible – one in which the processes and dynamics 
that characterize the complexity of the construction of social knowledge and 
reality are identifiable and observable. The strength and feasibility of the revised 
life cycle model is demonstrated through its successful application in three 
different case studies. It has been shown that not only are norms cascaded in a 
more intricate way and that the processes of cascading are not limited to state 
adherence, but also that an enhanced understanding allows for a deeper 
comprehension of internalization and state adherence and normative practice 
means at the domestic level. This present thesis also reveals the dynamics of 
international change and order within a norm life cycle. The examination and 
analysis presented in this research based on the questions: how do 
international norms cascade, and what are the normative underpinnings of the 
Guiding Principles pave the way for possible future theoretical and empirical 
studies.  
 
From an empirical perspective, the critical unpacking of norm cascading before 
state acceptance and adherence opens the possibility for deeper inquiries into 
country case studies. For instance, as the case of Colombia in the Guiding 
Principles study demonstrates, the construction of the international IDP norms 
learned much from displacement dynamics in the South American country. 
Certain country cases studies may also shed more light on norm internalization 
and norm adherence, as demonstrated in the case of Somalia and its 
commitment to gender issues in the examination of UNSCR 1325. Meanwhile 
from a theoretical perspective, a deeper understanding of the process of norm 
development and cascading can be linked further to international policy 
development and the study of the mechanisms that enable the creation of 
policies and sustain them. This would complement the enhanced 




BOOKS & ARTICLES 
 
Abbott, K.W., Keohane, R.O., Moravcsik, A., Slaughter, A.M. and Snidal, D. 
(2000) The concept of legalization. International organization 54(3), 401-419. 
 
Adler, E. (1991) Cognitive evolution: a dynamic approach for the study of 
international relations and their progress, in Emanuel Adler and Beverly 
Crawford (eds.) Progress in postwar international relations. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
 
Adler, E. (1997) Seizing the middle ground: constructivism in world politics. 
European journal of international relations 3(3), 319–363. 
 
Alvarez, J.E. (1997) Why nations behave. Michigan journal of international law 
19, 303-317. 
 
Anon (1997) The UNHCR note on international protection you wont see. 
International journal of refugee law 9, 267-268. 
 
Arbodela, E. and Hoy, I. (1993) The convention refugee definition in the West: 
disharmony of interpretation and application. International journal of refugee law 
5(1), 66-90. 
 
Aronson, E. (2007) The social animal. 10th edition. New York: Worth. 
 
Azar, E.E. (1990) The management of protracted social conflict. Hampshire: 
Dartmouth. 
 
Baert, P. (2006) Philosophy of the social sciences: towards pragmatism. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Bagshaw, S. (2005) Developing a normative framework for the protection of 
internally displaced persons. New York: Transnational Publishers Inc. 
 
Bailey, J. (2008), Arrested development: the fight to end commercial whaling as 
a case of failed norm change. European journal of international relations 14(2), 
289-318. 
 
Ballentine, K. and Sherman J. (2003) The political economy of armed conflict: 
beyond greed and grievance. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
Barkin, S.J. and Cronin, B. (1994) The state and the nation: changing norms 




Barnes, J.A. (1977) The ethics of inquiry in social science: three lectures. Delhi 
and Oxford: OUP. 
 
Barnett, M. (1999) Culture, strategy and foreign policy: Israel’s road to Oslo. 
European journal of international relations 5(1), 5-36. 
 
Barnett, M. (2011) Empire of humanity: a history of humanitarianism. Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press. 
 
Bartelson, J. (1995) A genealogy of sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Barrow, A. (2010) UN Security Council resolutions 1325 and 1820: constructing 
gender in armed conflict and international humanitarian law. International 
review of the red cross 92(887), 221-234. 
 
Barutciski, M (1998) Tensions between the refugee concept and the IDP 
debate. Forced migration review 3, 11-14. 
 
Batchelor, C. (1995) Stateless persons: some gaps in international protection. 
International journal of refugee law 7(2), 232-259. 
 
Batchelor, C. (2005) The 1954 convention relating to the status of stateless 
persons: implementation within the European Union member states and 
recommendations for harmonization. Refuge 22(2), 31-58. 
 
Battjes, H. (2002) A balance between fairness and efficiency? the directive on 
international protection and the Dublin regulation. European journal of migration 
and law 4(2), 159-192. 
 
Bauböck, R. (2005) Changing meaning and practices of citizenship. PS: political 
science and politics 28(4), 667-669. 
 
Becker, S. and Bryman, A. (2004) Understanding research for social policy and 
practice: themes, methods and approaches. Bristol: Policy. 
 
Beetham, D. (1991) The legitimation of power. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
 
Berenskoetter, F. (2007) Thinking about power, in Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. 
Williams (eds.) Power in world politics. New York: Routledge. 1-22. 
 
Berger, P.L. and Luckmann, T. (1996) The social construction of reality: A 
treatise in the sociology of knowledge. London and New York: Penguin Books. 
 
 319 
Bernstorff, J. von (2008) The changing fortunes of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: genesis and symbolic dimensions of the turn to rights in 
international law. European journal of international law 19(5), 903-924. 
 
Bertrand, P. (1993) An operational approach to international refugee protection. 
Cornell international law journal 26(3), 495-504. 
 
Betts, A. and Loescher, G. (2010) Refugees in international relations. Oxford: 
OUP. 
 
Bhaskar, R. (1989) Reclaiming reality: a critical introduction to contemporary 
philosophy. London: Verso. 
 
Biersteker, T.J. and Weber, C. (1996) (eds.) State sovereignty as social 
construct. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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ANNEX: DEFINITIONS OF NORMS ACROSS DISCIPLINES 
 
 













- Not always legally 




Good and evil actions 
 
Thomas Hobbes (1962), 
Leviathan: Or the Matter, 
Form and Power of a 
Commonwealth 
Ecclesiastical and Civil 
 
 
No attempt at a definition but 
provides characteristics 
 
- Value judgments (but 
Hobbes made these 
arguments in enriching the 






Samuel von Pufendorf 
(1729), On the Law of 
Nature and Nations 
 
Certain modes superadded to natural 
things and motions by understanding 
beings; chiefly for the guiding and 
tempering the freedom of voluntary 
action, and for the procuring of 
decent regularity in the method of life. 
 
- “Modes” indicate means 
or ways of acting 
- Created by 
“understanding beings” – 
indicating a sense of 
already socialised persons 
who are able to create, 
recognise and apply the 
superadded modes 
- Creates regularity 
- Guidance for voluntary 
action – indicating a tension 
in the application of free will 
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and the self-imposition of 
accepting and complying 






Immanuel Kant (1964), 
The Metaphysical 
Principles of Virtue 
 
Also sourced from: H.J. 
Paton (1947), The 
Categorical Imperative: 
A Study in Kant’s Moral 
Philosophy 
 
These [categorical imperatives] are 
valid as laws only insofar as they can 
be seen to have a priori basis and to 
be necessary… They [doctrines of 
morality] command everyone without 
regard to his inclinations…But reason 
commands how one ought to act, 
even though no instance of such 
action might be found; moreover 
reasons pay no attention to the 
advantage which can accrue to us 
from such action, which admittedly 
only experience could teach. 
 
 
- Categorical imperatives 
are “a priori” and therefore 
pre-exist experience 
(distinction between is and 
ought) 
- They are applicable to 
everyone 
- They disregard or forego 
self-interest – indicating a 
tension in the exercising of 
free will (though not 
necessarily always) and 
the self-imposition of 
complying with categorical 
imperatives 
- There are no self-
accruing advantages to 






Hans Kelsen (1991), 




The Ought – the norm – is the 
meaning of a willing or act of will, and 
– if the norm is a prescription or 
command – it is the meaning of an 
act directed to the behaviour of 
another person, an act whose 
 
- A norm is a prescription 
- Guides the behaviour of 
another 
- The norm creates an 
obligation on part of the 
addressee’s behaviour – 
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meaning is that another person (0r 
persons) is to behave in a certain  
way… The judgement that some 
behaviour is ‘valuable’ or ‘has value’ 
(and in this sense, is ‘good’) means 
that this behaviour – as modally 
indifferent substrate – is decreed to 
be obligatory in a norm, is the content 
of an Ought. 
 
indicating a situation in 
which the addressee may 
or may comply with the 
norm by way of self-
imposition 
- Creates a value 
judgment 
 
Rules of Conduct 
 
 
Adam Smith (1976), The 
Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, edited by 
D.D. Raphael and A.L. 
Macfie 
 
Also sourced from: R.H. 
Coase (1976), Adam 
Smith’s View of Man, 
Selected Papers No.50, 
Graduate School of 
Business 
 
Our continual observations upon the 
conduct of others insensibly lead us 
to form to ourselves certain general 
rules concerning what is fit and 
proper either to be done or to be 
avoided. These general rules of 
conduct are of great importance. 
They represent the only principle by 
which the bulk of mankind are 




- Norms are created by 
observation and 
experience of the conduct 
of others – indicating a 
social and interactional 
context 
- Guidance for behaviour 
that is fit and proper 
- Value judgments are 
created in considering the 






E. Pattaro (2000a), 
Language and 
Behaviour: An 
Introduction to the 
Normative Dimension, in 
W. Krawietz et al. (eds.), 
The Reasonable as 
Rational? On Legal 
 
A norm is a pattern of behaviour, 
which is performed because it is 
conceived (felt, lived) as obligatory, 




- Pattern of behaviour – 
indicating regularity, 
common understanding 
and accepted values 
- Obligatory behaviour 
indicates that it may or 
may not be followed 











Anthony Giddens (1979), 
Central Problems in 
Social Theory: Action, 
Structure and 
Contradiction in Social 
Analysis 
 
(1984), The Constitution 
of Society: Outline of the 
Theory of Structuration 
 
Norms are identified as standards of 
behaviour or social practices in a 
society; or institutionalised 
approaches and responses in a 
society. 
 
Norms relate on the one hand to the 
constitution of meaning, and on the 




- Creates “standards of 
behaviour” in a society 
- Creates structures of 
“meaning” in society – 
indicating at some of the 
layers of social co-
existence and cohesion 
- “Sanctioning” of modes 
of social conduct indicates 
the creation of oughts that 
may or may not be 






Karl-Dieter Opp (2002), 
When Do Norms Emerge 
by Human Design and 
When by the Unintended 
Consequences of 
Human Action? : The 
Example of the No-
smoking Norm, 
Rationality and Society 
 
 
A norm is understood as a statement 
that something ought or ought not to 
be the case. 
 
 
- Expression or 
prescription of behaviour 
or expectation 
- Both regulative and 
enabling 
- Creates obligation that 






Jon Elster (1989), The 
Cement of Society: A 
Study of Social Order, 
Cambridge: CUP 
 
The propensity to feel shame and to 
anticipate sanctions by others at the 
thought of behaving in a certain, 
forbidden way. 
 
- A norm can create an 
obligation which when not 





- Guidance for behaviour 
that is allowed and 
forbidden – indicating its 
social nature through 
approval and/or 
disapproval by others 
- Sanctions can be 
expected; in effect there is 
no assured outcome to 
acting against a norm 
because sanctions are not 
always applied. They are 
non-consequentialist. And 
following a norm is also 








Elliot Aronson (2007), 




A change in a person’s behaviour or 
opinions as a result of real or 
imagined pressure from a person or 
group of people. 
 
 
- Real or imagined 
pressure as expressed by 
a person or group can 
guide or change a 
person’s behaviour 
- The pressure as 
expressed by a person or 
group can be normative 
- Given that pressure is 
expressed by a person or 
group it is indicative of a 
social context or in the 
words of Aronson, social 
influence 
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Normative order 
consisting of norms and 
values 
 




Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. 
Values – in the pattern sense – we 
regard as the primary connecting 
element between the social and 
cultural systems. Values take 
primacy in the pattern maintenance 
functioning of the social system. 
pp.18-19 
 
Norms, however, are primarily social. 
They have regulatory significance for 
social processes and relationships 
but do not embody “principles” which 
are applicable beyond social 
organization, or often even a 
particular social system. Norms are 
primarily integrative; they regulate the 
great variety of processes that 
contribute to the implementation of 
patterned value commitments. pp.18-
19 
 
- Values are higher in the 
social structural chain than 
norms 
- Norms guide behaviour 
whereas values only 
indicate the pattern (good, 
bad, right, wrong, etc.) 
without any expressed 
modes of allowed or 
forbidden behaviour 
- Conformity to a norm 
indicates compliance that 






Max Weber, The 
Interpretation of Social 
Reality, Edited by J.E.T. 
Eldridge (1971), London: 
Michael Joseph 
 
Includes both failure to act and 
passive acquiescence, may be 
oriented to the past, present, or 
expected future behaviour of others. 
Not every type of contact of human 
beings has a social character; this is 
rather confined to cases where the 
actor’s behaviour is meaningfully 
oriented to that of others. pp.76-77 
 
Social action that can be classified in 
 
- Guides human behaviour 
- The meaningful nature of 
the action indicates its 
social character as well as 
its intersubjective nature 
- Creates value-
judgements 
- Also indicates a need for 
the actor to believe that a 
substantial number of 
others also expects the 
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terms of rational orientation to an 
absolute value; involving a conscious 
belief in the absolute value of some 
ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other 
form of behaviour, entirely for its own 
sake and independently of any 
prospects of external success. It can 
at the same time be oriented towards 
discrete individual ends, affectual 
reactions and/or tradition. p.78 
 
action and will act in the 






George C. Homans 
(1951), The Human 
Group, London: 




A norm, then, is an idea in the minds 
of the members of a group, an idea 
that can be put in the form of a 
statement specifying what the 
members of other men should do, 
ought to do, are expected to so, 
under given circumstances…A 
statement of the kind described is a 
norm only if any departure of real 
behaviour from the norm is followed 
by some punishment. A norm in this 
sense is what some sociologists call 
a sanction pattern. p.123 
 
Our norms are ideas. They are not 
behaviour itself, but what people 
think behaviour ought to be. p.124 
 
It is clear that norms do not 
materialise out of nothing, but 
emerge from ongoing activities. p.125 
 
- Norm is an ought that 
guides the behaviour of 
members of a group. This 
indicates obligations that 
do not foreclose the 
possibility of non-
compliance 
- Sanctions follow in the 
event of non-compliance 





If we think of a norm as a goal that a 
group wishes to reach, we can see 
that the goal is not set up, like the 
finish line of a race, before race 
starts, but rather that the group 
decides, after it starts running, what 






Emmanuel Adler (1991), 
Cognitive Evolution: A 
Dynamic Approach for 
the Study of International 
Relations and their 
Progress, in Emanuel 
Adler and Beverly 
Crawford (eds.) Progress 




Values are mixed with varying 
amounts of knowledge, beliefs and 
expectations because our judgments 
of what should be are related to our 
judgements of what is 
 
- Involves standards of 
beliefs and expectations 
- “Expectations” involve an 
interactional or relational 
context; primarily social 
- Indicates an oughtness 
which creates a sense of 
obligation that may or may 






Martha Finnemore and  
Kathryn Sikkink (1998), 
International norm 





Standard of appropriate behaviour for 
actors with a given identity. 
 
- Common identity creates 
appropriate behaviour 
- Common identity also 
indicates the 
intersubjective nature of 
the standards of accepted 
or appropriate behaviour 
- These are accepted as 
standard – indicating an 
obligation on the part of 




- There is no mention of 








Janice E. Thompson 
(1993), Norms in 
International Relations: A 
Conceptual Analysis 
Analysis, International 
Journal of Group 
Tensions 
 
Norms should be viewed, in the first 
instance, as outcomes of individual 
beliefs which subsequently can exert 
influence over behaviour independent 
of the beliefs of individual actors. In 
other words, norms can assume the 
character of structures once they are 
embedded in social institutions. 
 
International norms should be used 
to refer to the normal, usual or 
customary practise of states. 
 
 
- Institutionalised guidance 
for behaviour 
- These guidance have 
been formed from 




Rule and Rules 
 
 
Nicholas Onuf (1998), 
“Constructivism: A 
User’s Manual” in 
Vendulka Kubálková, 
Nicholas Onuf and Paul 
Kowert (eds.) 
International Relations in 
a Constructed World 
 
Also sourced from: 
(1989), World of Our 
Making 
 
A rule is a statement that tells people 
what to do. The “what” in the 
question is a standard for people’s 
conduct in situation that we can 
identify as being alike, and can 
expect to encounter. The “should” 
tells us to match our conduct to that 
standard. If we fail to do what the rule 
tells us to, then we can expect 
consequences that some other rule 
will bring into effect when other 
people follow the rule calling for such 
 
- Guides behaviour in 
social situations 
- As a socialised actor, the 
person is able to match 
the situation to the 
behaviour required 
- Meeting the standard 
means that a value-
judgment is attached to 
the appropriate behaviour. 
It also indicates that an 




All the ways in which people deal 
with rules may be called practices. 
p.59 
 
Rules and related practices 
frequently form a stable (but never 
fixed) pattern suiting agents’ 
intentions. These are institutions. 
p.61 
 
Any stable pattern of rules, 
institutions, and unintended 
consequences gives society a 
structure, recognizable as such to 
any observer. p.61 
 
- It is up to the actor to 
follow or not follow the 
standard through self-
imposition 








(1989), Rules, Norms 
and Decisions: on the 
Conditions of Practical 
and Legal Reasoning in 
International Relations 
and Domestic Affairs 
 
Norms are directives, not all 
directives function like norms, and 
while all rules are norms, not all 
norms exhibit rule-like characteristics. 
p.10 
 
Rules and norms are therefore 
guidance devices which are designed 
to simplify choices and impart 
“rationality” to situations by 
delineating the factors that a 




- Norms are designed 
- They are guidance that 
simplifies choices to be 
made by decision-makers. 
This indicates that 
decision-makers have 
choices within situations 
where norms can be 
applied. This means that 
actors can choose not to 




Structures of common 
or collective knowledge 
 
 
Alexander Wendt (1999), 




Common knowledge requires 
interlocking beliefs, not just everyone 
having the same beliefs. This 
interlocking quality gives common 
knowledge, and the culture forms it 
constitutes, an at once subjective and 
intersubjective character. Common 
knowledge is subjective in the sense 
that the beliefs that make it up are in 
actors’ heads, and figure in 
intentional explanations. Yet because 
those must be accurate beliefs about 
others’ beliefs, it is also an 
intersubjective phenomenon which 
confronts actors as an objective 
social fact that cannot be individually 
wished away…common knowledge is 
firmly an interaction-level 
phenomenon. P.160 
 
Structures of collective knowledge 
depend on actors believing 
something that induces them to 




- The intersubjective 
nature of the structures of 
common knowledge 
indicates the social or 
interactional context 
- These structures are 
seen as facts (but can’t 
facts be disputed?) 
- These facts may not 
only, at times, cause 
behaviour in a commonly 
expected manner but also 
constitute the identity of 






Annika Björkdahl (2002), 





A set of intersubjective 
understandings and collective 
expectations regarding the proper 
behaviour of states and other actors 
in a given context or identity. 
 
- Shared set of meanings 
and understandings 
- Guides behaviour of 
states with a value 
judgment of that which is 
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Reflections, Cambridge 
Review of International 
Affairs 
 
 proper and that which is 
not 
- Creates obligation that 
may or not be complied 









(1997), Problems and 





International norms are thought of as 
sources of action in three ways: they 
may be constitutive in the sense that 
they define what counts as a certain 
activity; they may be constraining in 
that they enjoin an actor from 
behaving in a particular way; or they 
may be enabling by allowing specific 
actions. 
 
Norms serve as signposts 
(Wittgenstein 1968:39) or heuristic 
mental aids to warn policymakers of 
the prearranged actions that various 




- Guidance for members 
of a group to behave in 
certain ways in specific 
situations. It will define 
actions that are allowed 
and prohibited. 
- It provides a mental map 








A norm exists in a given social setting 
to the extent that individuals usually 
act in a certain way and are often 
punished when seen not to be acting 
in this way. 
 
 
- Dependent on 
compliance 
- The extent of compliance 
indicates a critical mass 
- Contextualising norms 
within a “social setting” 
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implies intersubjectivity, 
ordered social interaction 
with the possibility of 
social cohesion  
- Punishment is not 
considered absolute but is 








John Gerard Ruggie 
(1998), What Makes the 
World Hang Together? 
Neo-Utilitarianism and 




Collective intentionality creates 
meaning. They also establish 
intersubjective frameworks of 
understanding. 
 
Regulative rules are intended to have 
causal effects. 
 
Constitutive rules define the set of 
practices that make up a particular 
class of consciously organised social 
activity – that is to say, the u specify 
what counts as that activity. 
Constitutive rules are the institutional 
foundation of all social life. No 
consciously organised realm of 




- Rules are framework that 
can promote collective 
intentionality 
- It provides a framework 
for meaning and 
understanding that its 
members comprehend. 
This indicates that there 
can be expectations and 
obligations 
- Constitutive rules are the 
overarching framework for 






Ann Florini (1996), The 
Evolution of International 
Norms, International 
 
As standards of behaviour and not 
just behavioural regularities. 
 
 
- Distinguishes between 
normal and normative 
behaviour 
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Studies Quarterly - Guidance for one’s own 
and others behaviour 
- Creates a sense of 
obligation that may or may 
not be carried through 
- The shared and 
accepted standards of 
behaviour are considered 
as benchmarks because 




Norms as an element of 
regimes (principles, 
rules and decision-
making procedures are 
the other elements) 
 
 
Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) 
(1983), International 




Norms are standards of behaviour 
defined in terms of rights and 
obligations. p.2 
 
Principles are beliefs of fact, 
causation and rectitude. 
 
Rules are specific prescriptions or 
proscriptions for action 
 
Decision-making procedures are 
prevailing practices for making and 
implementing collective choice. 
 
Changes in rules and decision-
making procedures are changes 
within regimes (p.3) whereas 
changes in norms and principles are 
changes of the regime itself (p.4). 
 
 
- Norms expressed or 
defined by rights and 
obligations indicate that 
there is behaviour that 
ought to be followed. But 
there is always that 
possibility that members 
might choose not to follow 
an accepted and shared 
standard 
- Sanctions are a part of 
regimes theory 
- Norms are instrumental 
to the exist, progress or 
change of regimes 
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Norm Change” in Wayne 
Sandholtz and Kendall 
Stiles (eds.) International 




Standards of conduct, indicating what 
behaviours are permissible for a 
given actor in a given situation. 
 
 
- Permissible behaviour 
indicates that there is 
behaviour that ought to be 
followed. But there is 
always that possibility that 
members might choose 
not to follow an accepted 
and shared standard 
- Standard also indicates 
values, morals and 







“Learning to Cooperate” 
in Cristina Bicchieri, 
Richard Jeffrey and 
Brian Skyrms (eds.) The 




Norms depict a socialised actor 
whose behaviour is not outcome-
oriented, since when acting in 
accordance with a norm one does not 
engage in a rational calculation, nor 
does one pay too much attention to 
the action’s consequences. p.22 
 
Norms usually allow an individual to 
anticipate the behaviour of other. We 
normally expect people to conform to 
norms, and we expect others to 
expect us to conform, too. A social 
norm depends for its existence on a 
cluster of expectations. p.25 
 
 
- Norms exist in a social 
context of mutual 
expectations. It creates 
obligations that may or 
may not be fulfilled 
- Sanctions may not 
always follow on non-
compliance 
- Norms are not outcome-
oriented 
 
 
